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In Modern Russia

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People, Church and State In Modern Russia

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By
PAUL B. ANDERSON

New York
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1944

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Preface

WHEN I was asked by the Religious Book Club in London to write a book about religion in Russia, I hesitated for some time because so much has already been written on the subject. Finally I agreed to do so, because of the opportunity it gave to me personally to seek a clarification of the various factors that make the problem so complex and debatable, to set forth these factors in their proper relationship, and to attempt an interpretation that would lead to better understanding. I have long had the feeling that a satisfactory understanding between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the peoples of the West can be better facilitated by clearly discerning differences and difficulties, where they exist, than by glossing over them. As Lenin said at the Party Conference of 1903, "before uniting we need to separate." We need first to define the elements and the conflicting positions of the parties concerned. Out of this can come understanding and, so far as unity is possible, a sound unity.

The background elements of this study are the teachings of the Christian Church, on the one hand, and the Marxist philosophy of historical materialism, on the other. Whereas elsewhere these elements clash or coincide in theoretical fashion, in the Soviet Union their interplay is real, actual, in the persons of their respective adherents and in the institutions which express the genius of Christian or of Marxist teaching. In this study, therefore, we are dealing with ac-

tual, historical and highly practical experience, while at the same time theory is constantly put to the test. Our peculiar task is to show the inner relation between experience and theory, so that the whole thing will make sense.

Here is where the dialectic method, so highly prized by the Marxists, becomes of practical aid to us. We need to know not only the elements but how they are put together. In the Soviet Union this sort of thing is explained by reference to the dialectic process, viz., that which the Marxists call "the interpenetration of opposites." I have tried to make some use of the dialectic method in this study because, by following the method of reasoning used by Soviet citizens, we may better understand how they arrive at their conclusions. We need to do this because in Russia both the process and the conclusion are considered important, and the latter will often be confusing without a grasp of the former. In this study, therefore, I have tried to present the religious element as itself in process of change within the whole changing scene—political, social, economic, philosophical—relating it to the whole rhythm of the life of the Russian people.

On the religious side, the material is drawn almost exclusively from the experience and outlook of the Russian Orthodox Church. There are three reasons for this. (1) The Orthodox Church has historically been the peculiar expression of religion among the Russian people, ethnologically speaking; other forms of religious life have resulted largely from schism, from exaggeration of some particular aspect or doctrine, or from clear-cut antagonism to Orthodoxy. This is not to underestimate the significance of the non-Orthodox, for they have long constituted a numerous body, and deserve careful attention. (2) The dominance of the

Orthodox Church presented a peculiar challenge to the Revolution, resulting in a more persistent tension and greater consistency of opposition on both sides, and thus revealing more clearly the essential elements of conflict as well as areas of agreement. (3) There is greater documentation on the life of the Orthodox Church than on any other religious body in Russia. It may be added that the centralized hierarchical order and the attempted discipline of Orthodoxy naturally favors the rise and expression of definite attitudes and policies, whereas the congregational basis of the Evangelical-Baptists offers less occasion for expression of such attitudes and policies. The Roman Catholic Church has few adherents among ethnic Russians, but its international influence is taken account of in this volume, as regards both Church and state.

As anyone knows who has tried to do thorough work on this subject, documentation is exceedingly limited. The reader will find some explanation of this in the text. Because of this paucity of material, I have had to leave many questions unanswered, and I realize that, for the same reason, there may be error in some of my conclusions. With full consciousness of its many defects, therefore, and trusting that someone else may delve more deeply into the problem than I have been able to do, I dedicate this book to the understanding of Russia, and to the hope that this understanding may grow and become increasingly mutual and solid.

Paul B. Anderson

Table of Contents

		PAGE
	Preface	v
CHAPTER		
I.	The Riddle of Religion in Russia	1
II.	The Legal Position of Religion	9
III.	The People and Their Church	21
IV.	Marxism and Religion	53
V.	Adaptation of the Church to Soviet Conditions	63
VI.	Religion and Socialistic Construction	99
VII.	"Freedom for Anti-Religious Propaganda"	114
VIII.	The Patriarchal Church and Other Churches	161
IX.	Russia During the Patriotic War	190
X.	A Christian Basis for Cooperation with Russia	215
	Index	237

People, Church and State
In Modern Russia

CHAPTER I

The Riddle of Religion in Russia

FORMERLY it was said that to understand Russia you must know the Russian Church. Is this no longer true? Has the Russian Church no longer any significant place in the life of the Russian people?

For more than two decades the tendency has been to minimize the role of the Church, and in the U.S.S.R. even to disparage the place of the Church as an institution and of religion as an outlook on life. At times it was even asserted that religion was dead and the Church but a living corpse. It is well to remember that this assertion was first made, not by observers during the Soviet regime, but by the great church historian, Harnack, in 1905. The records show that very similar comments were made by the delegation from the Patriarch of Constantinople which visited Moscow during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Yet those who have been in the Soviet Union since 1939 have found churches overflowing, and the leaders of the Orthodox Church to be men of great ability and influence. What is there about this Church that makes it seem both alive and dead, to arouse the deepest devotion and, at the same time, intense disgust?

To answer this question we must examine the teachings of the Church and the nature of its relations with the people, both as individuals and as a nation. Yet this more intimate picture of itself is insufficient. We must examine

also the life of the state and its relationship to the Church and people, for the life of both Church and people has been influenced to a larger degree by government ideology and policy in Russia, than in any other modern state. At the same time, the Church and its entire outlook on life has contributed not a little to government policy at home and abroad, both before and after 1917.

The Russian Orthodox Church is now known to be no negligible factor, even in Soviet life. When the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Sergius, appealed to all the faithful on June 22, 1941, to help in defense of the fatherland, his message was made to echo around the world. Was this radio message simply a propaganda measure to win over those abroad who had opposed the Soviet regime because of its anti-religious ideology, or was it evidence of the Soviet's recognition of the influence which this appeal might have on the workers, peasants and new intelligentsia in the U.S.S.R. itself?

It has become abundantly clear that the Church and the believers generally are wholeheartedly back of the Red Army and its Commander-in-Chief, Stalin; churchmen are in the army, and even priests have won distinction for gallantry. Local churches, as well as bishops and clergy in private capacity, continue to contribute sacrificially to war funds. In deciding to build a tank column to bear the name of Dimitri Donskoy, the government itself gives recognition to this sainted hero of the Russian people, who, after receiving the blessing of St. Sergius of Radonezh, crossed the Don and was first to defeat the Tartars. After this battle, the Great Khan Mamai is reported to have cried, "Great is the God of the Russian land!"

For many Christians outside Russia, this recent recogni-

tion of the spread and continued influence of religion has seemed to be an indication of change of mind, and possibly change of heart, on the part of Stalin and the Soviet regime. They contrast this situation with conditions as they were known to have existed during earlier years of the Soviet regime. Some have been inclined cynically to doubt what they heard, both then and now, saying that there is no consistency and all must be false. The difficulty too often has been that, because of the relative isolation of Russia, striking incidents, statistics and official declarations have been reported and have made a deep impression, whereas the situation as a whole, into which these incidents fit, has been inadequately described, quite largely because it is so strange to modern British or American observers as to be imperfectly understood. When viewed in the light of the vast revolutionary changes in Russia, and particularly in the light of the peculiar conditions at the moment of happening, these reports take on both plausibility and sense. Similarly, the peculiar conditions in other countries at various moments have tended to determine the kind of reports which the press should publish, and thereby to impress certain facts upon the public mind which ought really to have been balanced by other unreported or little noticed facts of related nature.

Authentic evidence of religious oppression by the Soviets has not been lacking, and there have been few signs of any positive favor given to the Church. The trials and death sentences passed on Roman Catholic and Orthodox bishops in 1921, the arrest of Patriarch Tikhon in 1922, and the discriminations shown in the Living Church adventure, have settled deeply into the memories of foreign Christians. On the other hand, too little attention has been

paid to the establishment by the government in 1931 of a Commission on Cults to supervise religious matters in the Soviet Union, the eventual (1927) recognition of Metropolitan Sergius as head of the great body of Orthodox, and to the increasingly evident historic sense of the regime, in preserving works of ecclesiastical art and culture and in restoring public appreciation of the Church as a bearer and builder of culture as well as of creed among the Russian people.

It has been exceedingly difficult to deal with the question of religion in Russia for yet another reason. People over forty need only to recall the ignorance about religion in Russia that existed even before the Revolution. Western visitors, observers and theologians gave us on the whole a dark picture—of people worshipping ikons as if they were idols, of the Holy Synod engaged chiefly in suppressing popular education and theological development, of Rasputin as an evil genius poisoning the body politic as well as the religion of the Russian people. Unfortunately, the repressive policy of the old regime resulted in prohibition, even in Russia, of much of the very kind of discussion and literature which would have facilitated understanding, and outsiders were thereby the more confused.

True, Dean Stanley[1] enlightened us greatly, dispelling some of the gloom brought back by William Palmer,[2] Birkbeck was a veritable apostle of understanding of Orthodoxy, and Stephen Graham opened the door to an appreciation of Russian piety in his "Way of Martha and the Way of Mary," and his account of Russian pilgrimages

[1] *Lectures on the Eastern Church,* Everyman edition.

[2] An Oxford don who went to Russia in 1845 and was rebuffed by the Orthodox Church. Cf. Birkbeck: *The Letters of William Palmer* (out of print).

to Jerusalem. The happy connections made by Archbishop Tikhon (later Patriarch), when he was in charge of the Russian Orthodox Mission in America, increased the desire of American churchmen for closer relations with the Russian Church; yet it was left to the Anglican and Eastern Churches Association in London to establish practical measures for increasing understanding, through visiting lecturers and a wisely planned series of meetings and publications in the English language. These have been followed by the excellent work of the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius in England and the Orthodox and Anglican Fellowship in the United States, which have helped greatly in spreading understanding between Russian Orthodox and Western Christians, particularly among students and lay people. The nearly 300 Russian Orthodox parishes in the United States have received far too little attention as constituting an opportunity for developing friendship and understanding.

It is probably safe to say that there was less popular interest and knowledge about religion in Russia during the time of the Tsar than has been displayed since the Soviets came into power. Consequently, few people of the older generation had any impression of the Orthodox Church except what they gained as they read Turgenieff, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. Who knew of the piety streaming from St. Seraphim of Saroff, a contemporary of Newman, or of the spiritual power revealed in the humble "startsi" [3] of Optin Pustin, in the days of Dwight Moody? And how many appreciated the growth of a deeply spiritual and positively Christian trend among leading Russian philos-

[3] Persons, usually monks, of deeply ascetic practice whose ripe counsel was sought by thousands of people of high and low estate.

ophers contemporary with Charles Gore? We heard much of the "Bloody Sunday" in January 1905, when Winter Palace guards fired upon petitioners led by the priest Gapon, but little of the nation-wide discussions, in meetings and in the press, on proposals for reform in the Church and in its relations with the State, during the same year.

From the days of the Revolution until quite recently, the tendency among liberal writers and speakers, whether within the Soviet Union or abroad, has been to consider 1917 the beginning of time for the Russian people—what happened before was in the dead past, deserving only of disparagement. Russian conservatives in the Soviet Union were silenced, and those abroad were discredited, while non-Russians were often too ignorant of the past to enlighten, and contented themselves with damning the new. With the firmer establishment of socialist economy in the Union, with the dangers involved in Hitler's coming to power and with improvement in relations with Great Britain and, particularly, with the United States, the atmosphere in Russia became more favorable for a broader historic outlook. Films of Peter the Great and of Alexander Nevsky were produced by the Soviet film industry. The Tsarist generals Suvoroff and Kutuzoff became again popular heroes, because they had been true leaders of the Russian people. The phrases "Russian people," "Russian land," "Russia," again appeared. In "Bolshevik" (No. 24, 1940), the Party's fortnightly political-social journal, an extensive answer was given to the question, "Who were the God-seekers?"—the group of social philosophers who sought to tie up the religious stirrings of the early twentieth century with the Marxist social movement. Evidently the Soviet people were reviving this question.

Abroad more literature and vastly more popular interest,

together with the presence of able Russian refugee philosophers, historians and churchmen, have combined to provide a sounder approach to the question of religion in Russia, contemporary and historical. Some of the still-living participants in the rejuvenating Orthodox movements of 1901–1908, of the period of the Provisional Government, and of the Great Church Council of 1917–1918, have provided valuable authentic documentation and personal experience to enlighten us on the events and attitudes of those important periods. A good deal has already been published in English, though more lies available only to those who can read the Russian original. Of considerable importance has been the first-hand acquaintance with Russian theological forces and vital parish piety and social work, which has been made possible by the establishment of more than a hundred parishes among Russian refugees in Europe and the Far East, and by contact with the Russian Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris. The instructors and students of the Institute have contributed largely to our knowledge of Russian religion by their participation in many of the significant international and interconfessional gatherings of the inter-war period.

It is sincerely to be hoped that qualified persons will soon have access to the source material preserved in Russian, on the continent and elsewhere, so that they may provide the world with an authentic review of the history of religion in Russia. This review is especially needed for the period covered by the domination of the Holy Synod, dating from the beginning of the eighteenth century when Peter abrogated the Patriarchate, and for the succeeding period of the Restored Patriarchate, which coincides with the Soviet regime.

It is difficult to conceive of a more important contribu-

tion to the understanding of Russia than would be made by such historical studies. Out of this would grow greater mutual understanding between the people of Russia and the peoples of the West.

While waiting for these historical studies, and perhaps to incite their undertaking, there may be some value in attempting an outline of some of the more significant elements entering into the specific problem of religion under the Soviet regime. Such is the purpose of this little volume. Its method will be to take up significant events and developments, and to review them in light of the constant interplay between Christian doctrine and Marx-Lenin philosophy. This is not a history, but rather an effort at understanding the interrelationships between people, Church and state, as they have developed since 1917.

CHAPTER II

The Legal Position of Religion

FOR Western Christians, the restrictions under which religion exists in Russia today would seem unbearable. These restrictions are expressed in the wording of the 1936 Constitution, Article 124, "Freedom for the conduct of religious worship and freedom for anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens." Few Christian churches elsewhere in the world would feel that "conduct of religious worship" should constitute the limits of their activities. They would think of Sunday and week-day church schools, of women's societies, men's clubs, Boy Scout work, and of the vast variety of activities which fill the weekly church calendar; also of social work, charitable undertakings, research and practical work in the realm of improving the community, national or world social order; also of the Student Christian Movement, Girls' Friendly Society, the Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., to mention but a few of the great organizations which are basically religious. The list could be increased, only to widen the gap between the position of the Church in Russia and the Church abroad.

Such things are not only prohibited by inference in this Article of the Constitution; they are specifically forbidden by law. In the law of April 8, 1929, Article 17 reads as follows:

Religious unions (parishes) are forbidden: (a) to establish mutual aid funds, cooperatives, producing unions, and in gen-

eral to use the property at their disposal for any other purpose than the satisfying of religious needs; (b) to give material aid to their members; to organize either special meetings for children, youth, women, for prayer and other purposes, or general meetings, groups, circles, departments, Biblical, literary, handworking, labour, religious study, etc., and also to organize excursions and children's playgrounds, to open libraries, reading rooms, to organize sanatoria and medical aid. Only such books as are necessary for the performance of services are permitted to be kept in the church buildings and houses of prayer.

This leaves nothing permissible save "conduct of worship"; any activity uncatalogued in Article 17 could be considered condemned by the "etc." As regards religious instruction to children, the primary legal factor has been the original decree of January 23, 1918, separating the school from the church, which stated that, "Instruction in religious doctrine is not permitted in any governmental or common school, nor in private educational institutions where general subjects are taught. Citizens may give or receive instruction in a private manner."

Apart from the instruction given in the normal conduct of the cult, therefore, only "private" religious education is now permitted. This point was brought before the courts for interpretation, and the law was defined as permitting religious instruction to children in groups not exceeding three in number. This Article probably affected more severely the non-Orthodox, the Old Believers, Evangelicals, Baptists, and other sects, the Roman Catholics, Jews, Mohammedans, etc., than it did the formerly Established Church, because these bodies had been more accustomed under the old regime to devote special attention to educating children in their respective faiths. Under the old

regime Orthodox religious instruction in the schools was obligatory for all Orthodox pupils. Sunday schools did not exist. There were no confirmation classes, as in the Eastern Church the rite of Chrismation with oil, which corresponds to Confirmation, usually takes place at the same time as Baptism.

This prohibition of religious instruction has been the foundation stone of the Soviet government's policy of prohibiting religious propaganda, and many priests, teachers and private persons who ran foul of this law have suffered imprisonment and exile on this account. All religious bodies have had great difficulty in accommodating themselves to this law. Devious means were found to circumvent it, such as organizing a series of groups of three. Many of the other activities proscribed in Article 17 were similarly continued, and some activities quite novel to Orthodox parish practice were introduced here and there. For instance, as religious literature became scarce, lending libraries were established, and both old books and unpublished writings were copied by hand or, surreptitiously, on official typewriters, for clandestine circulation. Priests enlarged the church choirs, or conducted community singing, with the special objective of attracting the young. There were reports in the Soviet press of priests taking the lead in providing athletic sports. On the other hand, the widespread activities of the church on behalf of the unfortunate had to be stopped. Relief of the poor or sick, homes for orphans and the aged, the great variety of charitable institutions which had existed in the cities and in connection with monasteries or convents, all became illegal.

There is no specific prohibition of the printing of religious literature, and, in fact, up to about 1928 a few

pamphlets and periodicals appeared each year. An edition of the Bible was printed on government presses by the Baptists in 1926. When the resurgence of Communist ideology, in 1927, ended the New Economic Policy and substituted Socialist planned economy, not only economic but all other aspects of life came up for review and planning, in accordance with Marx-Lenin teaching. Religion was not forgotten in this process, and the reading of the article in the first Constitution (previous to 1936) regarding religion was changed from "freedom for religious and anti-religious propaganda" to "freedom for religious profession and anti-religious propaganda." Thus the right of propaganda was reserved for anti-religion. This matter also was referred to the courts, specifically in connection with the preaching of sermons, and the interpretation was announced that sermons were permitted provided they did not take on the form of a series of lectures.

The writer has seen no decree or court interpretation with reference to publishing books or periodicals, but neither has he seen nor heard of any religious publication since 1927 save the official organs of the chief religious bodies. These were printed irregularly, with limited topics, small in size, and in editions inadequate even to reach the clergy. Even these publications ceased at about the year 1935, not to resume until 1943. It is not difficult to understand the prohibition of religious literature, for the printed word can hardly be considered other than propaganda; a book or pamphlet could hardly fail to fall into the hands of an unbeliever and seem to influence his attitude, thus becoming propaganda. The official church organs, published for private circulation only, were not on sale to the public; in fact, when the writer endeavored to subscribe to one

of them, he was informed by the Moscow distributors of all periodicals that this journal was "not being published," although copies were currently being shown him by priests of the Church.

The question naturally arose as to what should be the government attitude toward classical novels and light literature, in which religious ideas were prominent. No one could read Dostoevsky's "Brothers Karamazoff" or Tolstoy's writings without having to face up to Christian doctrine as believed and expressed by significant characters in these books. Practically the entire treasury of Russian classical novels would have to be discarded if the prohibition of religious propaganda were to be applied universally and strictly. For some time indeed there was grave concern, but, by the time that general conditions permitted use of paper and presses for the purpose, government policy had become more resilient with a sense of mastery of the religious situation and these classical works began to roll off the presses in hundreds of thousands of copies.

Yet another feature related to Church activity was the training of priests or clergy. The law, it will be remembered, prohibits religious instruction "in private schools where general subjects are taught." In other words, religious instruction might still be given (to adults) in institutions limiting instruction to religious subjects. Nevertheless, there have been no such institutions. Various circumstances combined to stop the work of the four great theological academies at Kiev, Moscow, Petrograd and Kazan which trained the teachers and the higher ranks of clergy, and the 58 seminaries for the preparation of village priests. Probably the chief cause was that the whole scheme of things in the Soviet Union and the governing ideology of the

Party made theological schools abhorrent to the rulers of the country. There was a very practical reason in addition, however, and this was the lack of funds for their maintenance and for the livelihood of teachers and students. Such schools had previously received support from the very considerable revenues of the Church, part of which came from the government treasury. With the separation and with nationalization of all property, including ecclesiastical property, the revenues of the Church were reduced to the personal contributions of the faithful. The faithful were very poor, for, like all other citizens, they lost their capital resources in 1918, and besides, the fact of their being religious long precluded their gaining lucrative positions in political or economic undertakings. This situation altered somewhat after 1936. A friend of the writer, attending Orthodox liturgy in a Soviet village in 1935, noted that the collection consisted of five pieces of black bread, four green apples and one egg. Manifestly the Church could not maintain theological schools when the parishes were reduced to such poverty.

Although one reason for absence of theological schools was the poverty of the parishes, of even greater importance was the status of the national organization of the churches. The Patriarchate, the Holy Synod of the Living (Renovated) Church, the chief organs of sectarian bodies, all suffered alike in being deprived of the right to collect or use funds for other purposes than the personal maintenance of bishops or similar administrative officials.

All these factors combined to obstruct the establishing or the maintenance of theological schools. It may be questioned if candidates would have been available, even if schools existed. Probably few young men would have

applied, but it is known that the clerical calling has nevertheless been answered by a goodly number of men in their thirties and forties, who have been led by unmistakable guidance into the divine mission of priest or pastor. The Living Church, in fact, during the period when it was relatively favored by the authorities, maintained two theological schools, in Leningrad and in Moscow, with a score or more of students. Apart from this, the only preparation that could be given for ordination was that provided privately by bishops or older clergy. In this connection must be noted the peculiar qualifications usually required of village clergy in the Russian Orthodox Church. The principal qualification was ability to conduct the liturgy and other rites of the Church decently and in order. This is not to say that personal character, knowledge of Church doctrine and history, and other intellectual or spiritual characteristics were neglected. From the standpoint of function, however, the chief thing was ability to celebrate the liturgy properly. This was no small task, for it involved thorough knowledge of the wide shelf of service books and ability to piece together for each service the portions required by the various cycles of the Church calendar. This has a bearing on the nature of preparation for ordination, for much of it is learned simply by attentive participation in the service. Under precarious Soviet conditions, with thousands of priests exiled or condemned to imprisonment, those who presented themselves as candidates for ordination were certainly men of faith, devotion, purpose, and doubtless already well grounded theologically by private study. Considering these facts and the small number of vacancies, it has therefore been possible for bishops to prepare such candidates by private instruction.

Monastic institutions suffered almost complete dissolution. In some of the greater monasteries, like the Pechersky Lavra at Kiev and the Troitsky-Sergievsky near Moscow, a few monks continued to live hermits' lives, deprived of their former station and livelihood. The buildings were occupied by state economic, political or educational institutions, where they were not ruthlessly destroyed, as in the case of the Semeonovsky Monastery at Moscow, which was blown to bits while cinema machines recorded the event. Throughout the country, however, monasticism as an "angelic calling" (so referred to in Orthodox teaching) continued and continues to exist. Many are monks or nuns in secret, working in factories, hospitals or offices, while inwardly they belong to God. Their number is of course unknown, but the Soviet press has often referred to them. Occasionally they have formed themselves into cenobitic self-supporting communities, but these are illegal (Art. 17 of the law of April 8, 1929), and, when discovered, have generally been abolished.

From time to time since the Revolution there have arisen spiritual movements and groupings which attracted numerous adherents, but which subsided in influence or were suppressed. Such movements are characteristic of the Russian Church. They arise in connection with the profound spiritual experience of a person or parish, such as a wonder-working ikon, a response to prayer when in deep distress, or the revelation of spiritual power, usually apart from book-learning, in a simple monk or peasant. Throughout the Soviet period there have been reports of events of this kind, which have greatly moved the population, interfered with local anti-religious efforts, and led to investigation by the authorities, usually accompanied by a pseudo-scientific and highly cynical interpretation.

Similarly, the appearance of a wandering priest in a village where the priest has been exiled and the church probably taken over for a granary or other use, excites the latent religiosity of the people. Children are baptized, and the liturgy is celebrated in some private dwelling, while marriages are blessed and funerals conducted *in absentia*. The drop in the number of local parish churches from about 50,000 in 1917 to less than 10,000 in 1938 occasioned many such illegal expressions of religious life in the country. The Russian News Service in London on August 22, 1941, stated that 8,338 places of worship were open, of which 4,225 were Orthodox.

The "Christomol," or Christian association of youth, conceived as an organization parallel to the official Communist youth movement, the Comsomol, thus waxed and waned. It never had legal existence, but seems to have claimed many adherents during the period when the Comsomol suffered much from rowdyism among its members. So also the "Bapsomol" of Baptist youth. Student Christian groups continued clandestine meetings for a decade or more after the Revolution, when the leading group was arrested and exiled.

In the great new industrial centers, like Magnitogorsk, where vast cities grew up on open fields, such religious activities were less often reported, although there were no churches built for legalized church life. Probably an explanation lies in the very newness of life in such places, and the inconsistency of religious conceptions of the old order in the midst of ultramodern construction and tempo.

Another reason lies in the fact that these cities were peopled entirely by men and women uprooted from traditional surroundings, brought together from all corners of the Union, and finding their social cohesion along lines

guided by the Party, rather than after the fashion of their fathers. Such cities reflect the nature of the philosophy back of Soviet construction, for which religion is an anachronism. In these truly Soviet cities, the Church has no place. The anti-religious press has boasted that these are "God-less" cities.

The provisions of the Law of April 8, 1929, which cover the positive aspect of the way in which religion may find expression in organized form, are supplemented by certain articles in the Criminal Code [1] which show actions specifically punishable in the criminal courts. Thus, while the conscientious objector is excused from combat duty, the following article deals with those who would object to other state duties, especially in time of war.

Art. 59[5]. Persons enrolled in barrack duties and persons freed from military service because of their religious convictions, who decline draft in war time into regiments for barrack duties and labor regiments (are punished by) deprivation of liberty for a period of not less than one year.

Art. 69. Persons freed from military service because of religious convictions and persons enrolled in barrack duties who decline to fulfill generally useful work assigned to them, (are punished by) deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years or correctional work for a period up to one year or fine up to one thousand roubles.

Several articles deal with various forms of religious or pseudo-religious activities.

Art. 122. The teaching of religious beliefs to infants or to adolescents in state or public educational institutions and

[1] Criminal Code, RFSFR. Juridical Publishers of the Peoples' Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1938.

schools, or breaking the rules established therefor, is punishable with correctional work for a period of one year.

Art. 123. The conducting of deceiving acts with the purpose of arousing superstition in the masses of the population, in order to gain benefit therefrom, (is punishable by) correctional work for the period of one year with confiscation of part of the property or fine up to five hundred roubles.

Art. 124. Forced collections in aid of church or religious groups (is punishable by) correctional work for the period up to six months or fine up to three hundred roubles.

Art. 125. Assumption by religious or church organizations of administrative, juridical or other public-legal functions and the rights of a juridical person (is punishable by) correctional work for the period up to six months or fine up to three hundred roubles.

Art. 126. The conducting in state or public institutions or enterprises of religious rites, and also the placing in these institutions or enterprises of any kind of religious images (is punishable by) correctional work for the period of three months or fine up to three hundred roubles.

The government, however, is desirous of ensuring that freedom of conscience is not restricted by any form of activity, whether of persons or organizations or by the government itself, as is provided for in the following articles.

Art. 59[7]. Propaganda or agitation directed toward the arousing of national or religious hostility or disturbance, and also distribution or preparation and holding literature of this character (is punishable by) deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.

Art. 84. Going abroad or entrance into the U.S.S.R. without the required passport or the permission of the proper authorities (is punishable by) incarceration in camp for a period

from one year to three years. *Note*: The action of this article is not applicable in the case of entrance into the U.S.S.R. without the required passport or permission of the proper authorities for the purpose of taking advantage of the right of refuge provided for in Art. 12 of the Constitution of the RSFSR for foreigners who are persecuted for political activity or religious convictions.

It must not be supposed that the limitations of constitution and laws were everywhere and always applied. Much depended on local social and economic conditions, on the state of discipline in the Party, and on the character of non-Party persons in the local governing apparatus. Consequently, a local venture by the priest in a provincial town might flourish and even spread for a time. This success would lead to its downfall, for sooner or later it would come to the attention of alert opponents of religion, whose report would bring to bear the full force of eradicating or punitive laws.

Generally speaking, it has been the modest, unimpressive, very ordinary priest who has carried on longest, and the congregation keeping its religion confined to personal experience which has suffered less by the obstructions and criticisms of government agencies. By a paradox, during the years of militant anti-religious effort, the best religion was the religion least in evidence. This does not refer to religion of the catacombs, illegal religious groups. Such were destroyed when discovered, not so much because they were religious as because they were secret. The government is ruthless with every sort of secret grouping. It has been the business of the leaders of the Church to discover and adhere to the narrow path allowed it under the laws and constitution.

CHAPTER III

The People and Their Church

THE expressions of religious feeling and their prohibition or eradication under Soviet conditions must also be scrutinized in light of the historical and doctrinal position of the Orthodox Church in Russia. It would be a mistake to judge the situation in Russia in terms of the position of the Church and religion in England or America in the twentieth century. Rather we must seek to understand the attitude of both Church and government in Russia in light of the mind and habits of the people, formed by long years of existence in relative isolation from the ways of Western Christians.

The Church in Russia has not always been subordinate to the state, nor the head of the Church to the head of the state. Even when bound to the state, many leaders in the Church have reserved their own judgment on her peculiar task, privileges and obligations. Her earthly nature and destiny must be sought not in the state but in the people's nature and destiny. This basic consideration is expressed in the common phrase that the Orthodox Church is "the Church of the Russian people." The Church felt herself to be co-existent with the Russian people, and the guardian and guide of the people's Christian destiny. It is this sense of guardianship that led the Metropolitan Sergius to put all the resources and influence of the Church into the great national effort to resist and repel the Axis armies.

The Church once and for all must unite Her fate with the fate of Her flock for life and for death. And She does this not from any tempting reckoning that victory is guaranteed for our side, but in fulfillment of the duty resting upon Her, as a Mother who beholds the meaning of life in the salvation of Her children. Even during the union with the state, Churchmen maintained that the Church prayed for the governing power not in hope of privilege, but in execution of duty, as directed by the will of God (the words of Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow). Such is the position of our Church.[1]

On the very day of the German attack, the Metropolitan issued a call to all the parishes, likening the conflict to the historic days when the Church blessed the Russian people for throwing back the Tartars, the Teutonic knights, the Swedes under Charles XII, and Napoleon. He recalled the saintly heroes of these battles—Alexander Nevsky and Dimitri Donskoy—and proclaimed:

Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the people. Together with the people She has borne their suffering and been comforted by their victories. She will not leave the people even now. She blesses with heavenly blessing even the present effort of all the people. . . . The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox for the defense of the sacred frontiers of our homeland.

In the prayer commended for use throughout the Church is the petition:

to give victory, in Thy name, to our warriors; and in judging them if they lay down their lives in battle, forgive their sins, and on the day of Thy righteous judgment give them the crown unblemished.

[1] *The Truth About Religion in Russia,* Moscow, 1942. (In Russian.) Following quotations are from the same source.

This generous outstretching of the hand of blessing apparently aroused some question among Church people, for on August 12, 1941, the Metropolitan preached a sermon in which he gave the following explanation:

I wish to remind you to pray for those whom the Lord has destined to lay down their lives in battle. . . . It is understood that this prayer is not on behalf of kinfolk who die in battle. Relatives will remember their own without any reminder. The Church calls us to pray generally for all killed in battle, kinfolk or not, near to us or not, and even perhaps for entirely unknown persons—to pray not for their kinship or nearness to us, but just because they lay down their lives in battle for the fatherland, that is, for each and every one of us. . . . Perhaps someone says, "The people today are cool to faith and even have rejected it. What sense is there in praying for those who desire no prayers?" But, firstly, not all by any means have rejected prayer; and secondly, whoever it is, or however they look upon our prayers, we fulfill our duty of love and gratitude; he who rejects will himself carry the consequences of his rejection. Chiefly, we cannot forget the vast difference between the outlook of a man in his customary circumstances and the outlook of the same man at the hour of death. I mean by this not simply the fear of death, often purely an animal reaction, overpowering the spiritual strength of a man, making him incapable even of sincere penitence. On the contrary, I wish to speak of the fact that at this supreme hour of the separation of the soul from the body a man is sometimes capable of extraordinary achievement, not possible at any other time; that the last few minutes or even seconds of life may sometimes prove incomparably more significant for the fate of a man than all his past life on earth. . . . This means that however sinful that man, however far he may be from Christ, let us postpone our final judgment. Who knows, perhaps at the last breath of this sinner Christ appears in his conscious mind

and stretches forth the hand of salvation, saying to him, as to Peter, "Ye of little faith, why dost thou doubt?"

Here we see the historic position of the Russian Church, persisting in spite of unbelief without and littleness of soul within. The Church is the guardian of the soul of all the Russian people, whatever their spiritual condition. The duty of the head of the Church is to maintain this conception among the faithful, and to protect it against usurpation on the part of any outside force. In these quotations we see a clear reflection of the fact that there are three primary elements in Russian history—people, Church and government. The Church, however, has been essentially related to the life and aspirations of the people, and difficulties have increased in proportion to the degree in which she has neglected the people in favor of closer relations with government. When the Church has served the state against the people, as when she has turned to the state for support in her own differences with the people, the consequences have generally been worse for the Church than for either state or people.

The conflict within the Church in regard to its proper place in relation to state and people is of long duration. Its classical foundation is found in the struggle between two great figures in the Church of the fifteenth century, Joseph of Volotzk and Nil of Sorsk. Joseph was abbot of the rich Volokolamsk Monastery, which had already become known as the "nursery of bishops." He was firmly attached to the forms and ritual of the Church, to the "letter of the law," and maintained that the wealth and station of his monastery were essential, because only under such conditions could the Church attract and train men worthy of becoming the

highest dignitaries of the Church. Joseph declared that it was the duty of the state to defend the property of the Church, because a rich and dignified Church could render great support to the state, and give suitable counsel to the prince.

Nil of Sorsk took just the opposite view. He lived in a hermitage at Sorsk and was the leader among the monks of poverty who were known as the Transvolga Elders. Emphasizing the spiritual element in the Church, Nil contradicted Joseph at every point. He asserted that the Church had to do with the souls of men and their salvation through humility and penitence. It was not the business of the Church to counsel the state on matters of politics, or on war and peace, but only to give spiritual guidance for the salvation of the soul, whether of prince or peasant. The Church, according to Nil, should have no wealth, nothing to attract or display authority, yet within its own realm, the realm of the spirit, it was supreme, even over the prince. It should ask no favor of the state, and should give none to the prince.

The state found attractive elements in both of these positions. At that time, when the Prince of Moscow himself was but little higher than his feudal lords, and when the landed wealth of such a monastery as Volokolamsk gave its abbot power almost equal to the power of secular princes, the state had to beware of rivals. In this respect, it would be better to side with the humble Nil, and give preference to a free but poor Church. On the other hand, by giving its favor to the Church, the state could assume clear supremacy over ecclesiastical persons and property, and in fact profit by their wealth and influence. The problem was a real one, and in fact has persisted throughout

Russian history. A crisis came in the reign of Ivan IV, called The Terrible, when the Patriarch Philip in his character and outlook resembled Nil of Sorsk. He courageously rebuked Ivan for his personal and political wantonness, but did so on purely religious grounds. Ivan would repent, and sin again. Eventually, however, he imprisoned the Patriarch and then had him assassinated.

In the next century we have another picture. Following Ivan IV came the Time of Troubles, the Polish invasion, and the false pretenders to the throne. Finally in 1613, the citizens rallied about the burgher Minin, cast out the enemy, and chose as Tsar, Michael, the first Romanoff. Michael's father was Philaret, the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church. This was indeed an unusual combination, yet in some respects it represented the true relationship that should exist between Church and state—that of wise, fatherly counsel to a mature but loving son. During the absences of the Tsar, his father the Patriarch administered state affairs in his stead. It worked well for Michael and Philaret, and the relationship has often been referred to as classical and ideal. In the next reign, however, a crisis again arose. Alexis, the son of Michael, greatly trusted the Patriarch Nikhon, but the latter lacked the qualities needed to carry through with the relationship which had existed during the previous reign. Nikhon also on occasion would represent the Tsar, but it stirred his ambitions, and many of the secular lords became his enemies. Whereas in the matter of power he followed Joseph of Volotzk, when it came to spiritual matters he followed Nil. It was Nikhon who started the reform of the service books, the eradication of errors resulting from carelessness in copying the texts or from the addition of uncanonical prayers and customs. As is character-

istic of the Eastern Church, he placed great emphasis on form, but he held that form without content or contrary to the historic teachings of the Church, must be reviewed in order that the doctrines of the Church might be revealed in their purity.

When the rising tide of opposition to his reforms threatened the Patriarch, he turned to the Tsar for support. The Tsar, indeed, did support the Patriarch in correcting the service books, but became increasingly embarrassed over the Patriarch's ambitions in state affairs. Finally Nikhon was obliged to retire. What then were the net results of this two-reign experience of father-son relationship between Patriarch and Tsar? (1) The Church went through a mild sort of purification and reformation, with the natural consequence that opponents of reform held aloof (the Old Believers), becoming a schismatic sect which rejected the spiritual leadership of the Patriarchate and thus destroyed the ecclesiastical unity of the Russian people. (2) The Patriarchate again was forced to bow to state domination. On this occasion, however, it was not the worthy martyrdom of the humble Philip, who died for upholding the high ideals of purity of life. Nikhon fell because he chose the path of power, and, with him, the Patriarchate fell into subjection to the state that lasted until the overthrow of the Tsar. (3) In giving state support to one side in the Church's internal dispute, the Tsar took upon himself and upon the state the odium which could have been left to the reforming Patriarch. The state, by identifying itself with one side of the controversy, and then by asserting its authority over that side, assumed the responsibility for all the consequences of the internal struggle. In carrying out this responsibility, the state was obliged to declare the Old Believers to be not

only dissidents but outlaws, and to treat them as such even though they numbered many millions by the beginning of this century. In this manner, the body not only of the Church but of the state was sorely torn, and it has remained unhealed to our day. One may well ask if the welfare of Church, state and people can be truly served, and if the resolution of the conflict between Joseph and Nil can be found in any other relationship than that expressed in the slogan of the liberal Russian reformers of the period 1901–1917—a free Church in a free state.

Even this formula, however, does not meet the problem of the freedom of the individual conscience, for the assumption of a free Church, separated from the state, yet leaves room for the Church to exercise authority over the conscience of men by its own laws and discipline. If the Church is a single national Church, albeit not a state Church, the ecclesiastical establishment on its own account may attempt dictatorship over conscience, as may be seen in the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church in some of the Latin American republics. In Russia, the Orthodox Church has always adhered to the principle of national uniformity in faith as in political obedience, which in practice has meant a denial of freedom of the individual conscience. Two aspects of this problem may be noted. When the Orthodox people in Western Russia fell under the Poles, during the Time of Troubles, the Polish crown and the magnates favored, or permitted, the Roman Catholic Church to practice forced conversion among the Russians, using the same argument as the Orthodox: *cujus regius ejio religio*. Here the shoe was put on the other foot, and it pinched. The Orthodox resisted this by reference to the principle of freedom of conscience (Orthodox deputies at

the Seijm in Warsaw, 1607 [2]). It might have been expected that they would exercise the same principle with regard to the various evangelical or prophetic sects which arose in Central Russia and along the Volga at about this time, but they did not. Instead, the state in the name of Orthodoxy persecuted these sects. The result was that for several hundred years freedom of conscience was allowed only for the Orthodox, and only in 1905 did these numerous bodies with followings running into the millions receive legal right to believe and worship as their conscience dictated.

A new problem arose with the growth of agnosticism and eventually of atheism in Russia as a result of the "Enlightenment" of the nineteenth century. Men and women began to demand the freedom not only to worship God as they wished, but to abandon the worship of God. This was an especially sore point for both Church and state. The demand for freedom of conscience on behalf of agnostics appears early in revolutionary writings and became a part of the Marxist platform. It was not a demand for universal atheism, but an assertion that human freedom consisted first in freedom of conscience, freedom to believe or not to believe.

Such was the course of the three-cornered struggle between Church, state and people. It may seem a long way from Nil of Sorsk to the Revolution of 1917, but as we see the rise of vast bodies of people opposing both Church and state on grounds of freedom of conscience, we become conscious of the relevance of all of this to the Revolution and to the present-day situation in Russia. By the end of the nineteenth century the Old Believers numbered be-

[2] *Peter Mogila Metropolit Kievski,* by S. R. Moscow, 1877; in Russian.

tween fifteen and twenty millions.[3] The sectarians, including the Molokans, the Dukhobors, the Evangelicals and others, numbered several million more. Here was a great body of Russians who felt oppressed under the Tsar and liberated under the Soviets. On the other hand, it did not take long after the Revolution for the Orthodox Church itself to begin to feel a great load lifted from its shoulders and its conscience by being no more obliged to hold the sectarians in subjection, whether in its own name or that of the Tsar. In a certain sense, the separation decreed by the Soviets on January 23, 1918, gave freedom even to the Orthodox Church. It is in this sense that we may comprehend the statement of Patriarch Tikhon, made at the time when he had just been released from arrest, "We declare that there is no power on earth which can restrain our conscience as head of the Church or our Patriarchal word." So also we must understand the editors of the book "Truth About Religion in Russia," published by the Patriarchate in Moscow in early autumn, 1942, when they write:

> With complete objectivity we must declare that the Constitution, guaranteeing complete freedom for the conduct of religious worship, definitely in no way interferes with the religious life of believers or the life of the Church in general.

The same thing is found in the answer of Archbishop Andrei of Saratov to questions of an American correspondent about religion under the Soviets, found in the same volume.

> Question: In what measure is the freedom of confession now restricted?
>
> Answer: The Soviet government has never restricted the

[3] Miliukoff: *History of Russian Culture,* Vol. II.

freedom of confession. The Soviet government firmly holds to the principle of tolerance for all religions and this tolerance is legalized by a special Article in its Constitution. The Soviet government applied repressions to a part of the clergy and believers, however, not for their religious convictions but for activities directed against the existence of the Soviet regime. It is necessary to bear in mind that the Church before the Revolution was in the service of the Tsar's government and enjoyed many privileges and advantages (especially the higher clergy). Consequently it was difficult for the clergy to give up these privileges. Some lived in hopes of the overthrow of the Soviet government and themselves worked against it. The Soviet government could not reasonably leave such persons unpunished.

Out of this there was created among some foreigners the impression of limitation of the freedom of confession by the Soviet government. For the correct understanding of this position one must strictly distinguish between the attitude of the governing power toward religion, and that of various organizations which conduct anti-religious propaganda, such, for instance, as the Union of Militant Godless.

Question: Do you think that after victory over the enemy the relations between Church and government will remain the same as now, or will change; will become better or worse?

Answer: The relation between the Church and the Soviet government after victory will remain the same; even the clergy say that the Soviet government has never persecuted them for religious convictions, and they do not speak against the Soviet government, and consequently there can be no sort of change.

It is difficult to comprehend these apparently sanguine statements in the light of the Constitution, the laws, and the actions of the Soviet government with respect to religion. The problem must be tackled from various angles.

One way is to carry further the comparison between the present situation and the position under the Tsar, as referred to by Archbishop Andrei. He uses an argument which has become routine not only in Russia but abroad, and it must be taken seriously. However, it is quite likely that, on the one hand, the foreigner who condones the Soviet policy on religion, and on the other, Archbishop Andrei in making his statements, are thinking of quite different things. The foreigner thinks in terms of organization and discipline. He believes that the Church under the Tsar was in much the same position as the police force, and he leaves it at that. The Archbishop probably has in mind his own experience as a priest or monk, and recalls all the troubles of the village priesthood and of simple monks in contrast with the coach-and-six of the bishop and the private luxury of the abbot of his monastery. Both points of view are important and deserve our attention.

Let us take first the foreigner's impression. To what extent was the Church ruled by the Tsar? In the organization and administration of the Church, the Tsar held a position of authority, and he exercised it through his minister, the Ober-Procuror, who transmitted the Tsar's wishes to the Holy Synod, and thence in regular manner through the bishops to the Consistories, rural deans and priests. The Holy Synod had the right to dissent, to refuse, to petition the Tsar, but since the Tsar could change the personnel of the Synod, it eventually proved submissive. On the other hand, the Tsar was largely guided by the intentions of the Ober-Procuror, who really had the strings of Church government in his hand.

The Holy Synod was instituted by Peter the Great in 1718, to take the place of the Patriarchate. The very fact

that the Tsar was able thus to alter the form of Church government is an indication of his relationship to the Church. In the "Spiritual Regulations" [4] issued by Peter, the following brief paragraph describes the purpose and the character of this innovation:

> The Christian Tsar, guardian of true faith and of the welfare of the Holy Church, attentive also to the spiritual needs and desirous of the best administration thereof, has authorized the establishment of a Holy Synod (dukhovnoe kollegium) which will carefully and untiringly watch over the welfare of the Church, that all may be in order, and that there may be no disturbance, even as is the desire of the Apostle, and the will of God Himself.

It is evident here, as throughout the next two hundred years, that the Tsar sought first of all order; further, that the head of the state takes responsibility for establishing the chief administrative organ of the Church; and that this exercise of responsibility is taken to be the will of God Himself.

Much has been made of this system and of the authority thus displayed. But conversations with those who lived under the system, and examination of some of the writings on the subject during the last century, lead one to believe that it was not fear or opposition to the Tsar's authority, or the necessity of performing political actions at government behest, that troubled the clergy as a whole. Their difficulties and worries were of more mundane character, and caused less by conflict of high principle than by the presence of manifold and unpleasant duties.

First of all, the Church was charged with keeping the

[4] *Dukhovny Reglament*, 2nd edition, St. Petersburg, 1861.

"metric"—the record of births, deaths, marriages, etc.—all the vital statistics, and not only for members of the flock but for the entire community, including dissidents and those of other faiths. This involved making the original record, reporting to the next instance, and the issuing of rescripts, birth certificates, etc. Considering the modest education of the village priest, this must have been a heavy chore, and many were the reprimands and punishments for errors which he did not know he had committed, and when explained, he could scarcely understand. This task was greatly complicated by the laws on dissenters, particularly the Old Believers and the evangelical sects, whose position varied with the degree of tolerance granted by the ruling Tsar, and by the degree of either bigotry or hypocrisy practiced by the dissenter. Thus, marriages were valid only when performed by the priest of a legalized religious body, but when the bride and groom were adherents of a forbidden sect, they could not be married by the Orthodox priest, nor could the local priest register a marriage performed by an illegally operating priest or sectarian minister. Having in mind the fluctuation in policy between toleration and persecution, how could the priest know when a sect was completely illegal, somewhat tolerated, or legal? The situation was the more confused when children of such parents had to be registered—were they legitimate or illegitimate? Later, when the young man's military service began, what sort of birth certificate and religious adherence record should be given him? And always the secular officials were demanding accuracy, when accuracy was impossible.

Probably more important was the question of livelihood. Village priests were on the whole poor. They had small

land holdings, which they usually had to work with their own hands.

One priest, writing in Missionerskoe Obozrenie (Missionary Survey), a conservative church periodical, stated that to practice agriculture properly a priest must give up about half of his time during the year. Further, he declared that certain features of this work were not fitting for priests. Often there were hard bargains to be driven when selling livestock; to get labor, some priests had to ply the peasants with liquor, or use other unseemly stratagems. Also the breeding of cows and the renting of bulls was too gross for a man of God. "To sum up all that we have said, it must be recognized that the practice of farming and pastoral obligations . . . mutually exclude one another." [5]

Priests received payment for serving the rites of the Church for individuals or families, and this was a cause of constant friction; charges of extortion battled against claims of livelihood. Funerals, marriages, Te Deums, requiems, baptisms, the blessing of homes and fields—the priest was paid for each, but the amount was not fixed. It is needless to expand on the temptation and the ill feeling growing out of this situation. Some priests received monthly grants from the Holy Synod, but all writers agree that payments were wholly insufficient in amount and covered too small a number of beneficiaries. The average income from all sources has been variously estimated at about 600 to 800 roubles a year.

Many would gladly have entered other professions, but the priesthood was considered a social class, a profession

[5] Quoted in Curtiss: *Church and State in Russia,* Columbia University Press, New York, p. 119. An excellent treatise on this subject, but inadequate on religious life in old Russia.

passing from father to son; intermarriage was customary within priestly families, and only by exception could the son of a priest train for any profession other than for some service in the Church—priest, seminary teacher, consistory official, etc.

The ordinary monks had their similar grievances against those of their own number who, neglecting their vows, utilized the power and the wealth acquired when they achieved the position of abbot, lorded it over their inferiors, and lived lavishly on monastery wealth, even passing on large sums to their earthly heirs. Here again the foreigner must not be carried away by figures showing the wealth of monasteries; he must remember that great wealth was held by very few of the approximately five hundred monasteries in Russia.[6] The greater number of monasteries lived on poverty's edge and existed chiefly by the hard labor of the monks or their collection of alms. But chiefly he must note that the wealth of the monasteries created great problems exactly for the monks who spurned wealth and desired truly to live according to their vows. For them, the rigors of Soviet life would be normal if only they had the right to exist.

The wealth of certain monasteries and the poverty of most of the priests cannot be ascribed to the Tsar or his government so much as to the people at their contemporary stage of spiritual and social outlook. The situation was in many respects comparable to similar historical epochs in western countries. Indeed, monastic lands and wealth had been largely confiscated by Catherine II and a sort of Queen Anne's Bounty established. The treasury allowance granted in recompense, however, was insignificant in

[6] See Curtiss, *op. cit.*

amount. Throughout the nineteenth century, piety continued to express itself in donations to monasteries in the form of land, mills, or buildings, just as similar gifts in the West provide endowments for ecclesiastical use, and by the time of the Revolution many of the monasteries had regained their former position of affluence.

Especially irksome to the priests was the favored station of certain bishops, who enjoyed not only their episcopal revenues but the control of the wealth of the great monasteries in their respective dioceses. The Metropolitan of Kiev had a nominal salary of Rs.4,000, but drew about Rs.50,000 from the Pechersky Lavra; the Metropolitan of St. Petersburg had at least Rs.15,000 from the Alexander Nevsky monastery. Many bishops had other large incomes in addition to salaries and monastic revenues.[7]

Yet it was not the money so much as the arbitrary use of power that caused resentment, and the fact that, in the Russian Church, only monks could be appointed to the high offices of bishop or Rector of a theological academy. There was a certain frustration about the priesthood, which impeded the clergy in economic, educational and social life. The Tsar's government was not blamed for creating this situation, since all reasonable people appreciated that it was the product of many historical factors; but the Tsar was blamed for failure to permit reform to be instituted. The reform movement in the Church will be described later. Here we wish only to deal with the position of the Church under the Empire, in order to get background for understanding the position taken by the Church under the Soviets.

Excessive demands put on the priests and irregularities

[7] Curtiss, *op. cit.*

within the ecclesiastical profession, while heartily resented, constituted but a part of the heavy burden the Church had to bear under the Tsar. Of perhaps greater import were the restrictions placed on theological development, and particularly on attempts at revealing the connection between Christian doctrine and current movements for social, economic and political reform. Change was obnoxious to the Tsar's regime. Yet religion in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century had reached a stage where it demanded expression in life—in changing the ideology of the state and of Church establishment to conform to the high ideals of the liberal intelligentsia and the increasingly important professional classes.

Reform was needed in theological education. The sons of clergy wanted either to secure education in secular schools, or to achieve the integration of the seminaries into the secular educational school system, so that a priest's son might go on to the university in case his conscience opposed the priestly calling. This meant including in the curriculum study of mathematics, science and social philosophy, with modern literature on these subjects and freedom for discussion. It was characteristic of the dissatisfaction of students in the seminaries that practically all, throughout the country, went on strike when the final upsurge came to force abdication of the Tsar. Such students, and several generations of theologicals before them, were not "tools of the Tsar," but rather potential leaders for the revolutionary movement; in fact, Stalin had been one of them.

In the theological academies (higher theological study) the situation was but little different. Here were gathered the most promising men for leadership of the Established

Church, future bishops and metropolitans, professors and church officials. The four academies should have encouraged theological thought and progress in church-social life, but they, in fact, discouraged this. For example, the subjects for dissertations for academic degrees had to be drawn from uncontroversial realms. It was little wonder that the Metropolitan Anthony of Kiev, who had been Rector of all four academies in turn, when asked by the writer for his impressions of them, referred first of all to the prevailing drunkenness and disorderliness of the students. Here was the same frustration, exactly at the point where expression should have been encouraged for the well-being of the Church and the people.

Such were some of the more homely aspects of the position of the clergy and the Church under the Tsar. The clergy and men in the liberal professions kept up the struggle for change, and linked this demand to the general demand for constitutional reform. It was like butting against a wall, and those who shared in this conflict might well compare those days with their experiences under the Soviets, as is done in the book, "Truth About Religion in Russia." Under the Tsar there was no aspect of church life which was free of state control, and in many respects the clergy performed the functions of state officials. The "privileges" were available to a mere handful of the approximately 200,000 priests, deacons, psalm readers, monks and nuns in the Orthodox Church, and were in fact the cause of more resentment than gratitude. On the other hand, piety was free to express itself, the spread of the Church was favored, and the common people found great satisfaction in the services, in pilgrimages to holy men and inspiring shrines, and in the developing literature relating religion

to current problems of life. Furthermore, in the twentieth century there was real hope that the Church would be liberated and thereupon an era of general well-being would ensue.

When the Revolution came, it exceeded all conceptions of change. Those who resisted suffered. Only after "purification as by fire" did the Church come to an understanding of the new situation. During this period suffering was virtue, and it is against this recent suffering as well as against the background of personal grievances or stereotyped pictures of oppression under the Tsar, that Orthodox Churchmen rationalize on their present position. But above all, the Church has literally been "purified," and its essence and purpose in life rediscovered as the praising of God and trusting in His love. Men of deep faith and spiritual humility, yet bold in their knowledge of the power of God to overcome all evil, have come to understand that a mighty instrument is still at their disposal in the cult and sacramental life of the Orthodox Church as they strive to make the love of God and salvation in Christ known to the Russian people.

The sacraments are indeed the channels for the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. The Church in Soviet Russia can teach the world much about dependence on the Holy Spirit, and about the power of the Spirit. It has revealed how, with wealth, prestige, earthly authority, even the teaching function removed, the Church not only survives but grows in power and influence. Stripped to the only elements permitted by law—conscience and celebration of the sacraments—the Russian Church makes bold to say that this is sufficient; the knowledge of God has been kept alive, and the power and love of God have been made manifest even to those who do not believe.

Probably in making such statements, Russian prelates reveal the persistence of the tendency under any autocratic regime to approximate what it is desirable to say. Nevertheless, it may be questioned whether any other Church body could say this with the same degree of truth. This is because of the particular character and quality of the Orthodox liturgy and rites as celebrated in Russia.

The celebration of the sacraments in the Russian Church constitutes in itself a rich experience involving not only the spiritual apprehension of the love of God, but intellectual appreciation of His attributes of beauty and truth. This would be difficult to convey to readers who have not shared in the experience.

It has been the writer's privilege to worship with the Russian Orthodox in great city cathedrals, in some of the ancient monasteries, in village churches, in chapels, shrines and homes—with the highest dignitaries and with peasants in birch-bark shoes and tattered sheepskin coats, from Vladivostok to the Black Sea, and at scores of Orthodox shrines abroad. One visit is not enough; it is possible in such a visit to become either dismayed or beguiled by the Russian service, to find in it revolting repetitiousness or hypnotic pageantry. But acquaintance with the structure, the words, the symbolism and above all with the prayerful spirit of the service opens up channels through which the mind and soul are cleansed, refreshed and stimulated.

This has evidently been the experience of many in Russia. Even though the sole expression of religion is the cult, the Orthodox cult has proven so powerful an expression that leaders of the Church may sincerely say that, having freedom of the cult, their "word is not bound." Here is the statement of a priest in 1942.[8]

[8] *The Truth About Religion in Russia,* Moscow, 1942; in Russian.

We continue, in our country, from day to day, and from year to year, freely to pray in the Orthodox churches and to celebrate all the sacraments and rites of our faith; to christen children, to serve Te Deums, requiems for the dead, etc. No one hinders our freely confessing our faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, Who came in the flesh and will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead. And we, confessing this faith, thank the Lord that He in the new conditions of our life helps us to become true followers of Christ . . . The Russian believing people continue . . . to receive their spiritual food in the Orthodox Church—in her worship services, at sacred rites, on holy days, etc. . . .

Another priest writes:

The Soviet government has regulated its relations with the Church by special legislation, and in strict conformity therewith it has placed the Church under conditions favoring her perfection, in the spirit of the first Christians, and thereby achieving Christian salvation. In the Orthodox churches we freely pray to God, celebrate the sacraments, and satisfy our high spiritual, religious needs.

The Church bourgeoisie sees persecution chiefly in the rejection by the government of Russia of its age-old union with the Church, as a result of which the Church, or more exactly the Church institutions, such as monasteries, and the clergy, as a social class or a profession, were deprived of certain rights: the ownership of land and commercial enterprises, various class privileges as compared with the "common people," etc.

As a matter of fact, the common Orthodox people, hearing in the Gospel the commandments of Christ to the Apostles, reading the epistles of the Apostle Paul or the life of some hero of Christianity like Saint John Chrysostom, are inclined to see in the changes that have taken place not persecution but a return to the Apostolic times, when the Church and the ministers followed exactly along their true paths, to which they had been

called by Christ, when they looked upon their ministry not as a profession among other worldly professions, providing them the means of livelihood, but as the following of Christ's calling.

Along this path, quickened by the peoples' ideals, sanctified by the highest traditions of the Orthodox Church, and at the same time the spiritually more fruitful path of ministering unto the salvation of men, our Orthodox Church endeavors to move, and to this path she calls her ministers.

The reference to "first Christians" is an important clue to understanding the situation. By this neither the priest nor the present writer would imply the period of persecutions, but exactly what is said—the very first Christians, in their apprehension of fellowship with Jesus Christ. Then, as now in Russia, they met for prayer, for the celebration of the Lord's Supper, for baptism, for the invocation of God's blessing on matrimony or other great events in life, for burial, and for prayerful memory of the departed.

This life was carried on then, as now, by small groups in the midst of a society that was either hostile or uncomprehending. It was not until Constantine gave his stamp of favor (and therewith assumed authority over the Church) that great institutions of charity and of learning developed, such as are characteristic of the Byzantine period. Indeed, the Church in the Russian Empire was the last flower of the Byzantine era, with its glorious cathedrals, beautiful monasteries and hundreds of charitable institutions. These were the product of the establishment favored by the throne. They drew their substance from the people, yet the people in their parishes were quite apart from these embellishments, except as they came as pilgrims or as unfortunates to be refreshed at these institutions.

The possibilities of the Soviet regime restoring the

Constantine relationship, and with it the reconstruction of Church institutional life, will be discussed in a later chapter. We are here concerned with comparing the new with the situation under the Tsar. In this connection a further explanation is needed.

Under the old regime, parish activities in the strict sense were also relatively restricted. Large and widespread charitable undertakings were generally the work of monasteries, convents, or special institutions, rather than of the parish; and the parish church schools, under the limitations governing their existence, were more of an official burden than a spiritual opportunity. Consequently, though from entirely different principles, the old regime and the new both conspired to limit the activities of the Orthodox parish to the rites and sacraments. Indeed, one may even suppose that experience under the old helps to make possible the life of the Church under the new.

This element of limitation is undoubtedly felt by contemporary Church leaders in Russia. If we scrutinize carefully the quotations given above, or others which might be quoted, we are struck with their restraint. They specify just what can be done; they make no mention or suggestion of other activities. They insist that this is sufficient for salvation. But is there no longing in Russia for wider expression of religion in parish or national Church life? Should we understand that Orthodox Church life is normally and voluntarily limited to the rites and sacraments? To what extent have relations between Church and state influenced the range of activities in parish life? What does the Soviet government mean by freedom in the matter of religion? How has it come to take up its present position? Since our purpose is to reach an understanding of the reli-

gious life of the Russian people under old, the new, and under possible future conditions, let us review the events and developments of the first twenty-five years of the Soviet regime with these questions in mind. We shall see how theory and practice go hand in hand for both Church and state.

We may begin by noting how the Church became independent. At the time of the Tsar's abdication, March, 1917, the Holy Synod was tightly bound, in spite of the efforts at loosening, and the promises to this end given by the Tsar in 1906. The Provisional Government, however, immediately changed the Ober-Procuror, putting in the liberal Prince Vladimir Lvov, who, still acting with authority as under the Tsar, substituted more liberal bishops for the reactionaries in the Holy Synod. The whole body of the Church, throughout the nation, took on the air of revival and reform, and on April 28th the Holy Synod issued a proclamation which stated that "with the change of regime the Established Church could not preserve the old order, which had outlived its time." Preparations were begun for the new order. In July the Provisional Government established a Ministry of Religion, and the Minister took over the duties of the Ober-Procuror. An All-Russian Conference of Clergy and Laymen was called in July for informal discussion of reform. On August 15, 1917, the Great Council (Sobor) of the whole Russian Church assembled, the first time since 1696. It consisted of 564 delegates, including 278 laymen, representing 66 dioceses of the Church. At an early plenary session, Professor Anton Vladimirovitch Kartasheff, for the Ministry of Religion, presented a declaration on behalf of the Government, containing the following passage:

and, confirming the public-legislating powers of the Sobor, the Provisional Government on the 11th of August adopted the following resolution, consisting of two points: (1) to authorize the National Sobor of the All-Russian Church, convening on the 15th August, in Moscow, to elaborate and present for the approval of the Provisional Government, legislation covering the new order of free self-administration of the Russian Church; (2) to retain, pending the acceptance by the Government of the new order of Supreme Church Administration, all matters concerning the internal administration of the Church, under the direction of the Holy Governing Synod and the organs related thereto.

This was, essentially, the Government's proposal to grant "free self-administration" to the Church as soon as the Sobor, as the supreme voice of the Russian Church, should determine its new administrative organization. Throughout the autumn the commission worked and finally, with the Soviet Revolution already breaking, the Sobor voted to restore the Patriarchate with a Synod of Bishops as the supreme administration of the Church. On the 5th of November a Patriarch was elected, in the person of Tikhon, Metropolitan of Moscow.

At the same time numerous other aspects of Church life were receiving attention, including the all-important one of its relation to the state. At the time of the fall of the Provisional Government, the 7th of November, the Sobor had not yet reached conclusions, and, indeed, its deliberations were hampered by ignorance regarding the political and religious outlook of the new permanent Government which was to succeed the Provisional regime. Manifestly the form and outlook of the new Government would considerably influence the Church in presenting its desiderata

on Church-state relationships. The Provisional Government's existence was, after all, temporary, pending the gathering of the Constituent Assembly, which was expected to determine the form of government and the main lines for the reconstruction of a constitutionally governed state. When the Tsar abdicated, it was popularly believed that the new form would be a constitutional monarchy, but between March and November the trickle of socialist ideology had become a torrent, and no one could tell what would be the political complexion of the Constituent Assembly when it met, or its views on the Church and religion. Only partial and preliminary measures could therefore be proposed in the vitally important fields of education, Church finances, the establishment, etc. Fortunately we have a relatively complete picture of the views of the Church in the resolutions of the All-Russian Conference of Clergy and Laymen which, it will be recalled, met in July, just preceding the Sobor. At the time of the Conference, there was no expectation of any other form of permanent government than a constitutional democracy, possibly headed by a titular Tsar. Certainly no one participating in the Conference anticipated the establishment of a socialist soviet republic. The resolutions of the Conference, as quoted below, clearly assume a government which would be friendly to the Orthodox Church.

In the Russian State, the Orthodox Church must hold, among other religious confessions, a place of priority, most favored in government and in public rights, as is fitting to Her as the supreme sacred object of the people, of exceptional historic and cultural value, and also as the religion of the majority of the population. In harmony with the recognition, by the new governmental regime of Russia, of freedom of religious conscience

and of confessions, the Orthodox Church must hold such freedom in all its fullness. These fundamental considerations should be expressed in the following principles: (1) The Orthodox Church in Russia—in matters concerning its structure, legislation, administration, courts, teaching of faith and morality, services of worship, internal Church discipline, and external relationships with other Churches—is independent of Government authority (autonomous). (2) Resolutions issued for itself by the Orthodox Church in accordance with order established by Herself, will be recognized by the Government as the norms of law having, from the moment of their publication by the Church, obligatory meaning for all persons and institutions belonging to the Orthodox Russian Church, whether in Russia or abroad. (3) The actions of organs of the Orthodox Church are subject to supervision by the Government only in regard to their corresponding to the laws of the State; furthermore, these organs are responsible to the Government only through court procedure. . . . (10) The twelve Great Holidays, Sundays and the days especially honored by the Orthodox Church are recognized by the Government as holidays. (11) The head of the Russian State and the Minister of Confessions must be Orthodox. (12) In all moments of State life where the Government turns to religion, the Orthodox Church shall be preferred. . . . (17) The Orthodox Church shall receive from the State Treasury annual subventions in the amount of its actual needs, under condition of accounting for amounts received in due course.[9]

We need not estimate the degree in which these resolutions might have become the final decisions of the Sobor. They were the product of a nationwide Assembly of Churchmen, and we are entitled to consider them as generally representing the mind of the Church in the summer

[9] Titlinoff: *The Church During the Revolution;* in Russian.

of 1917, and the fruit of a full generation of discussions in meetings and in the press on these questions. As such, let us see how they would gear in with the ideology and plans of the government which actually came into power on the 7th of November, 1917—the government with Lenin as its genius and dominating force.

Long before this date, Lenin had anticipated these problems. His writings show that as early as 1895 he had taken the stand for "freedom of conscience and equal position for all religions." In 1905 he wrote an essay entitled "Socialism and Religion" where he goes further and demands the separation of Church and state. Yet these were but formal considerations. All Russia, and more especially all leading churchmen, knew that the leaders of the social-democratic revolutionary movement were almost to a man avowed atheists, even though only the more intelligent and alert among churchmen were thoroughly acquainted with Marxist philosophy and the program of the Communist Party on the matter of religion. Among members of the Sobor were men like Sergei Nikolaivitch Bulgakoff, who had themselves gone through the Marxist school, and who could therefore readily foresee the stand which the victorious Marxists would take.

No lectures on the subject were required, however, for, from the very beginning of the new regime, outbursts of anti-clerical and especially anti-monastic violence flared up in many parts of the country. These outbursts represented the pent-up passions of those with too little land who rendered "revolutionary justice" on the monasteries which had too much land. No one can tell how much anti-religion there was in all this. The revolution had arrived with the slogan, "land, bread and peace," and, as one who witnessed

scores of demonstrations in Russia during the summer and autumn of 1917, saw hundreds of revolutionary placards and banners, and even attended the historic meeting of the Soviet on the 7th of November, 1917, the writer can say that the anti-religious element was scarcely in evidence during this period. The Revolution was primarily social and economic, and the initial attacks on the Church grew out of the hunger for land and the desire for social emancipation.

But the Church saw matters differently. For them, life as they planned it was viewed as a whole, with property an essential part. The attack on property was therefore an attack on the whole, on the Church. This was true whether the property belonged to the Church or to individuals. After all, the sense of ownership is a deep-seated human conception, and even the Soviet government in due time seriously revised its program and practice in this regard. The reaction to confiscation of property has been almost always the same, throughout all history. In Soviet anti-religious writings, reference has often been made to an incident which took place during one of the meetings of the Sobor. Count Olsoufieff, a lay member, charged that the Sobor was attending exclusively to ecclesiastical matters, whereupon Bishop Arseny declared this was wrong, as the Church was equally interested in retaining the rights of the private landowners—"the landlords and the Church stand together."

The nationalization of banks, factories, buildings and lands was scarcely decreed during the first week of Soviet power, before the people, in whose name nationalization was proclaimed, saw that it was carried out quite thoroughly in the areas where it touched their immediate in-

terest. As regards the Church, the blow fell especially on the monasteries. Even where the monastic land could not be tilled for lack of implements and labor, the monks were prevented from using it. Hostility toward the monks was very great among not only part of the peasantry but among the village clergy. Had not the monks wandered about Russia, begging for themselves and their institutions, drawing off from parishioners large sums for the decoration of monastic buildings (and tables), and the erection of more and more churches, chapels and shrines, which in turn either attracted or blackmailed the people into larger giving in payment for chantries or a reputation for holiness? Added to this loss to the parish priest, through invasion of his field and flock, was the superiority in sacred calling which attended the monks. As mentioned earlier, only monks could become rectors of theological academies or bishops. This gave them great airs. At one of the sessions of the Pre-Sobor Commission in 1906, a member declared "the bishops act like governors of provinces, and you all know what that means." The people of means, who had been the foundation stone of the monastic establishment, were now suddenly impoverished and disarmed, unable to save even themselves, not to speak of the monasteries.

With the monasteries quickly disposed of, the struggle soon passed on to an attack on the power and influence of the Established Church. Robbed of the support of the Tsar's authority, of monastic wealth, and of the landed gentry, the Church, no longer "established" (the decree on separation appeared January 23, 1918), had to fall back on spiritual weapons. The Patriarch and the Sobor hurled anathemas, only to find that this ancient sword, mighty in the time of universal faith, had no bite for the atheistic successors of

Schopenhauer and Feuerbach, Marx, Engels and Herbert Spencer. Each anathema struck granite and rebounded to injure the sender. Those now in authority rejoiced that the Church had attacked them frontally, for it gave them the more grounds for counter-attack. This is not to imply that the Communist leaders of the Revolution lacked ideology or conviction in their struggle with the Church. They were well prepared for enmity against the Church by long and thorough study of the philosophical bases of Marxist socialism. Some of them also joined certain social classes in Russia in hating the religious institution, the Church, for personal, historical and practical reasons. These reasons have already been discussed, and indeed the practical grounds for hostility are those usually referred to by writers on the "problem" of religion in the U.S.S.R. However, they have been emphasized out of proportion to the philosophical grounds for enmity to religion. It is desirable, therefore, to review the philosophical problem in some detail. The historical situation has changed and is changing, as is evident in the pleasant exchanges between Stalin and the heads of religious bodies, whereas the philosophical basis of Marxist views on religion has suffered no such alteration.

CHAPTER IV

Marxism and Religion

AS a starting point in this review, we must remind ourselves of the fact that Marxism is not an ideology among other ideologies to which it can remain neutral, but a philosophy which its adherents believe to be the summa of all other philosophies, the residues of which are either dead, dying or deserving of death. Marxism is not a sect growing alongside of the main road of civilization. Said Lenin:

> The genius of Marx lies exactly in the fact that he provided the answers to questions which the leading thinkers of mankind had already posed. His teaching arose as the direct and unbroken continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism. . . . The teaching of Marx is all powerful because it is true. It is complete and systematic, giving to people an integrated world view incompatible with superstition, with reaction, or with the defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the lawful successor of the best that mankind created in the XIX century in German philosophy, English political economy and French Socialism. Materialism turned out to be the only consistent philosophy true to all the teachings of natural science, inimical to superstition, magic, etc. The enemies of democracy endeavored therefore by every means to disprove, undercut, slander materialism, and defended various forms of philosophical idealism, which always amount in the end to be a defence or support of religion.[1]

[1] Lenin: *Three Sources and Three Essential Elements of Marxism*, 1913.

Like the prophets of the Old and New Testaments, and the best philosophers of all ages, the Marxists have searched for truth—and they feel that they have found it.

Moving along the path of the Marxist theory, we shall approach objective truth more and more, though never enveloping it; moving along any other path, we can come to nothing but confusion and lies.[2]

More specifically, Lenin rejects the theory of truth as the organized experience of mankind.

If truth is only the organized form of human experience, it means that the teaching, say, of Catholicism is true, for there cannot be the least doubt that Catholicism is an "organized form of human experience." [3]

What they search for is objective truth, and this is found in materialism.

If there is no objective truth, then truth (including scientific truth) is only the organized form of human experience, and thereby is recognized the basic premise of the priesthood, and the door is opened to religion, and the place is prepared for the "organized forms" of religious experience.[4]

The objection to religion, according to Lenin, lies not primarily in the historic practices of priests and monks, but in the fact that the premises upon which the whole religious edifice is built are but images and reflections of human concepts—like a mirage seen by a thirsting wanderer in the desert. In Marxist writings the general thesis is that religion is the product of the feeling of helplessness and frustration

[2] Lenin: *Materialism and Empirio-criticism,* 1913.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.*

which arrives when forces beyond man's control—disease, hunger, exploitation—seem to dominate, and must be met by other external forces which man conjures up in his defense.

At present, every religion is nothing other than the reflection in the minds of men of those external forces which dominate them in their daily life, a reflection in which earthly forces take on the form of unearthly.[5]

Engels, the author of this quotation, traces the stages in which these dominating forces have impressed themselves on mankind in primitive society—forces in nature, the same assumed by powerful men, then social forces, and later the "all-powerful God," who was none other than "abstract man; thus came monotheism." He continues, "The practical basis of religion, which is the ideological process of reflection, continues to exist, and along with this basis also its reflection in religion." He gives credit to the historic efforts of mankind in seeking to dominate these outside forces, but states:

Even if bourgeois political economy gives some understanding of the causes of this domination by outside forces, yet the situation is not changed thereby. Bourgeois political economy is not in position to prevent general crises, nor to save the individual capitalist from losses in bad debts and bankruptcies, nor to save the individual worker from unemployment and poverty. We can still use the proverb: Man proposes but God (i.e., the domination by outside forces of the capitalist means of production) disposes.[6]

Marxist philosophy, however, is not satisfied with the

[5] Engels: *Anti-Duhring,* 1853.
[6] *Ibid.,* p. 261.

lecture room or the printing press for its expression. It is dynamic.

Simple comprehension, even though it goes further and deeper than the knowledge found in bourgeois political economy, is not sufficient to achieve subordination of society to social forces. This requires social action. And when this action takes place, when society, taking in hand the whole range of the means of production and using them systematically, liberating thereby itself and all its members from slavery . . . when man will not only propose but dispose—only then will the last external force vanish, which up to that time expressed itself in religion, and with it there will vanish the religious image itself, for the simple reason that there will be nothing to reflect.[7]

Relating this philosophy to their convictions that a new era was about to dawn, thanks to the instrument of scientific socialism which they had discovered, Marx and Engels gave the following estimate as to what would happen to religion.

It is clear that together with each great historical change in social order, there takes place also simultaneously a change in the outlook and conceptions of men, which means, also, in their religious conceptions. But the present change differs from all previous ones just in the fact that men have at last discovered the secret of this historical process of change, and therefore have thrown out every religion, instead of again conceiving of this practical "external" process in terms of a transcendental, heavenly form of a new religion.[8]

Engels wrote in the cool morning hours of Marxism, before the heat of the day. As the polemic advanced be-

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 261.

[8] Marx and Engels in review of Daumes: *Religion of the New Age.* Quoted in "Bezbojnik," March 25, 1933.

tween materialists, false-materialists, dialectic materialists, agnostics, reconcilers of religion and science, and apologists for religion, expressions became more caustic. Lenin wrote, in "Materialism and Empirio-criticism," "Mach (a philosopher of the empiric-critical school) here comes as close to Marxism as Bismarck to the workers' movement, or as Bishop Eulogius (reputed to be a die-hard reactionary—author's note) to democracy." And in the same volume we find this trite criticism of Ernst Haeckel, "Haeckel thinks up his own religion, something like the 'atheistic faith' of Bulgakoff or the 'religious atheism' of Lunacharsky, insisting on the principle of a relationship between religion and science."

These remarks are still in the philosophical mood. As the dynamic quality of Marxism drove its disciples into the highways and byways of everyday life, theory as regards religion begins to express itself more forcefully in terms of daily experience.

All contemporary religions and churches, all and every kind of religious organization, Marxism has always viewed as instruments of bourgeois reaction, serving as a defense of exploitation and for the doping of the working class. . . . The struggle against religion cannot be limited to abstract ideological preaching. . . . This struggle should be related to the concrete practice of the class movement directed toward the elimination of the social roots of religion. The party of the proletariat must be the spiritual leader in the struggle against all kinds of medievalism, including the official religion.

Put into concrete terms for the common people to understand, and thereby to utilize in struggling for the new order, we have Lenin's words, in "Socialism and Religion":

The impotence of the exploited classes in struggle with the exploiters inevitably gives birth to faith in a better life beyond the grave, just as the impotence of primitive people in struggle with nature gives birth to gods, devils, miracles, etc. To him who all his life works and suffers need, religion teaches humility and patience in earthly life, comforting him with the hope of heavenly reward. And to those who live by the toil of others, religion teaches philanthropy in earthly life, offering them very cheap justification for all their exploiting existence, and selling at low price tickets to heavenly bliss. Religion is opium for the people. Religion is a sort of spiritual moonshine (bad home-made liquor) in which the slaves of capital drown their human figure, their demands for even any sort of worthy human life.

During the early days of the Revolution the following incident took place, which reveals how the new authorities faced the village folk with the problem of God.

Some of the believing women would say, "It is because of you atheists that there is no rain." We would answer, "Why does not the Almighty then water your vegetables, even if he doesn't water ours?"

Throughout these twenty-five years, the Soviet government has been endeavoring to establish the Marxist socialist way of life, in which the very conception of God was expected to vanish as the economic causes which gave rise to this conception should be eradicated. However, they made clear that neither the economic causes nor the by-products would vanish of themselves. The laws and decrees of 1917–18 laid down certain normative conditions for the transfer period from Russian feudo-capitalism to socialism, such as the decree on the nationalization of property, and the law on separation of Church from the state, and school

from the Church. These laws, and the government establishing them, became arbiters in the ensuing great struggle in which the Party and others who attached themselves to the Communist program led the fight against institutions, persons, habits, prejudices, that failed to conform to these normative conditions.

The distinction between the Communist Party and the Soviet government must be noted. In the local soviets, particularly in the villages and factories, there are very few members of the Communist Party. The government represents the people; its Constitution and laws represent as much of the Communist Party objective as seems feasible of realization in public and private practice at the current stage of transition from capitalism to communism. As developments occur, corresponding changes are made in the norms of government, Constitution and laws. This is not to suggest any underhand or hidden policy of the Communist Party. It is simply to call attention to the importance of two things, (1) the distinction between Party and government, and (2) the place of transition slogans in the program and tactics of the Party. In a word, it is to emphasize the Marxist-dialectic character of government in the Soviet Union—the scientific determination of conflicting forces, and their manipulation through the controlled interpenetration of these opposing forces, arriving at results which would constitute a higher order than the previous order of society.

As regards relations between Party and government, the 1936 Constitution states (Article 126):

. . . the most active and politically conscious citizens from the ranks of the working class and other strata of the working people unite in the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolshe-

viks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system, and which represents the leading nucleus of all organizations of the working people, both social and state.

The Party is the "vanguard," it is the "leading nucleus." For this reason no study such as ours can fail to take account of the Party position on religion. In the official Party program the attitude on religion is expressed as follows:

Art. 13. With regard to religion, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union does not confine itself to the already decreed separation of church and state and of school and church, i.e., measures advocated in the programs of bourgeois democracy, which the latter has nowhere consistently carried out to the end owing to the diverse and actual ties which bind capital with religious propaganda. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is guided by the conviction that only conscious and deliberate planning of all the social and economic activities of the masses will cause religious prejudices to die out. The Party strives for the complete dissolution of the ties between the exploiting classes and the organizations of religious propaganda, facilitates the real emancipation of the working masses from religious prejudices and organizes the widest possible scientific educational and anti-religious propaganda. At the same time it is necessary carefully to avoid giving offense to the religious sentiments of believers, which only leads to the strengthening of religious fanaticism.[9]

The Party program facilitates the "dying out" of religion. It operates through all manner of organizations and institutions, as well as through its own members, individually and collectively. It also stimulates, guides and is the

[9] *Program and Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Bolsheviks), Moscow, 1932.

"leading nucleus" in government. The Party program, say on religion, may not be the law of the state, but the program indicates what the Party seeks to make the law of the state. In the Program of the Communist International,[10] of which the All-Union (U.S.S.R.) Party was a constituent part,[11] the task is further explained in these words:

The Party is the vanguard of the working class, consisting of the best, most self-conscious, active and courageous members of the class. It (the Party) embodies the accumulated experience of the whole proletarian struggle. Basing itself on the revolutionary theory of Marxism, representing the general and long-term interests of the class as a whole, the Party personifies the unity of proletarian principles, proletarian will, and proletarian revolutionary action. . . . The Party must win under its influence the majority of the members of its own class, including women workers and working youth. To accomplish this it is essential to ensure the decisive influence of the Communist Party over the broad mass organizations of the proletariat—soviets, trade unions, factory committees, cooperatives, sport, cultural organizations, etc. . . . The accomplishing of the dictatorship of the proletariat assumes also the realization of the hegemony of the proletariat over the wide masses of the working people. To realize this, the Communist Party must win under its influence the masses of the city and village poorest, the lower strata of the intelligentsia, the so-called "little man"; that is, the middle class strata in general. Especially large importance rests with the work of ensuring the influence of the Party among the peasantry.

[10] *Program and Constitution of the Communist International*, "Partizdat, Moscow, 1936.

[11] This quotation was inserted in the manuscript before the Comintern was dissolved in May, 1942. It is retained because it officially describes the program of the Party in Russia during the period covered by this study.

In connection with the functional aspect of the Party we must consider its subjective nature as well. We must examine the terms in which it makes its own the philosophical interpretation of religion found in Marx-Engels-Lenin teaching. The Program of the Communist International gives a general statement, which we shall quote, and this is taken up by the All-Union Communist Party as given above (p. 60). The former reads:

> Among the tasks of the cultural revolution, embracing the widest masses, special place is occupied by the struggle against the opiate of the people—religion—a struggle which must be carried on systematically and relentlessly. The proletarian power must destroy all government support of the Church, which is an agent of the governing classes, must destroy all participation by the Church in the government organized work of upbringing and education, and must mercilessly suppress the counter-revolutionary activity of Church organizations. At the same time, the proletarian power, allowing freedom of confession and destroying the privileged position of the former state religion, conducts by all possible means anti-religious propaganda, and reconstructs all upbringing and educational work on the basis of a scientific materialistic world-view.

This quotation is an immediate introduction to a review of Church-state relationships since 1917, although the reader will need to keep constantly in mind all three factors—the doctrinal and historic position of the Church, the revolutionary surgings of the people, and the scientific dialectic-materialistic position of the Party-controlled government. Recognition of the fact that 1917 ushered in a "transition" period, not a full-fledged communist era, is equally important, for only thus can the ebb and flow of the struggle be properly gauged against the objectives set by the Party.

CHAPTER V

Adaptation of the Church to Soviet Conditions

NO one can doubt that a real struggle began in 1917. After the first significant encounter in which the Church unavailingly used its supposedly mighty weapon of anathema, and the government abetted and confirmed the peasant seizure of monastic property, a period of "legality," albeit revolutionary, ensued, during which the closing of churches and punishment of opponents took place in accordance with the decree of January 23, 1918. A typical case in the courts was reported in "Godless at the Workbench," in the autumn of 1929.

In the town of Kimri there were five churches for 19,000 inhabitants. Of these 19,000, 4,000 were members of the Labor Union, of which 2,031 were actually workmen. The rest were exiles from other places, small craftsmen, priests, etc. One church, that of the Transfiguration, stood on the square next to the hospital. Its bell-tower was unfinished, and, as the workmen remarked, as a church it was needed by no one. The hospital, however, needed a maternity clinic, so the factory workers asked the City Soviet to confiscate the church and give it to the hospital. The City Soviet brought this report to the attention of the All-Russian Executive Committee, and the Praesidium of the Executive Committee sanctioned the proposal. Hearing of this, the priest called a meeting of the church council. In court it was impossible to determine just what took place at the

meeting. It was made clear, however, that they discussed sending a delegation to Kalinin (President of the Central Executive Committee), and other similar measures. In his last service before the closing of the church, the priest preached a sermon calling for patience and submission. However, the church people guarded the edifice and when the officials came, some of the women resisted, and there was a scene. Although the priest was not even present at the seizure of the church and the scene, he was arrested, charged with inciting to revolt, condemned and executed. The church was closed.

This sort of justice was later frowned upon, and the government has in fact rendered favorable decisions for the appealing parishes in many instances. During the first four or five years of the regime, however, and again at the time of collectivization of agriculture, actions like this one at Kimri characterized the struggle. The government had laws to enforce, and the Church, in accordance with its own laws and teachings, in many cases resisted. In fact, the spirit of the Church was one of resistance. It is well to recall some of the Church's pronouncements during the time, because of their revelation of the spirit in the Church, just as we have recorded some of the essential elements in the position of revolutionary leadership and government.

The Soviet Government required that the active members in each parish or congregation should meet and organize in a new form as a religious society, then to register this new society as a responsible social unit, and to make formal application to the authorities for use of the Church building which they were occupying, it having been nationalized along with all public and corporate properties. The new religious societies were not given the rights of legal person,

were specifically disqualified from holding real property, and received the use of church edifices and appurtenances only in the quality of tenants. The Church authorities felt the loss of the status of legal person quite as much as the loss of property. There was an attempt to meet this situation by recommending that the parishes distinguish between the temporal and the spiritual aspects of their life. It was hoped that the religious aspect would be able to carry on without going through the new form of organization, although this might be done if the authorities insisted. To retain some legal status, it was proposed that they at the same time form themselves into secular societies with rights of legal person, hoping that this body might hold church property. There was great confusion as to the meaning of the new decrees, and uncertainty raised both church and state authorities to a high emotional pitch. Local soviets were beginning to act in accordance with the principles of nationalization, and parishes were crying for instruction from the Supreme Church Administration. It was under these conditions that the Church acted.

The Patriarch's pastoral letter of January 19, 1918, four days before the decree of January 23rd, but issued in light of actual events, reads as follows:

"May the Lord deliver us from the evil spirit of the times."

The Holy Church of Christ in Russia is at present passing through a time of trouble. Persecution has been set up against the Christian Truth and the confessed and secret enemies of this Truth are endeavoring to destroy the work of Christ and are everywhere sowing the seeds of anger, hatred and destructive accusations instead of brotherly love.

The forgotten and downtrodden sermons of Christ on the love of our neighbor move us. We daily receive news of the

terrible and beastlike murders of perfectly innocent and bedridden people, guilty only of having performed their duty towards their country honestly, and that they only applied their strength to the service of their country's welfare. And all of this is carried out not only under cover of the night, but in daylight, with heretofore unheard-of impudence and unmerciful severity, without any legal hearing and with abrogation of all rights and law—all of this is being practiced during our time in almost all of the cities and throughout all of our land in the capitals and in far distant districts (Petrograd, Moscow, Irkutsk, Sevastopol, etc.).

All of this fills our heart with deep sorrow and forces us to turn to such outcasts of the human race with threatening words of accusation according to St. Timothy 1—verses 5 to 20:—convict him who is guilty before all that the people may take warning.

Come to yourselves, ye idiots, cease your bloody deeds. Your deeds are not only cruel—these acts are in reality the work of Satan for which you are subject to everlasting fire in the life to come after death and the terrible curse of posterity in the present life on earth. By authority given us by God, we forbid you to approach the holiness of Christ, we excommunicate you if you still bear the name of Christian, and in accordance with your birth belong to the Orthodox Church. We exhort you all true believers in the Christian Orthodox Church, not to enter into communication with such outcasts of the human race (Corinth. I—5 to 13).

The severest persecution has been against the holy Christian Church. The blessed sacraments illuminating the birth of man into the world or blessing the marriage ties of the Christian family—these are openly declared unnecessary, useless; the holy edifices are subject to destruction by gun-fire (Cathedrals, Moscow Kremlin) or are subject to loot and scoffing or degradation. (Chapel of the Savior in Petrograd.) The holy residents of the cloisters, honored by the believers, are seized by the un-

godly dark powers of this age. (Alexander Nevsky and Pochaevskaya Cloisters.) The schools supported by the means of the Orthodox Church for the education of priests of the Church and teachers of the Faith are declared unnecessary and are turned into schools of non-believers or into institutions of immorality.

The property of monasteries and churches are confiscated under the pretext that they form national property, but without any process of law and even without the wish to consider the legal right of the people, and finally this power—having promised to establish Law and Justice in Russia, to secure freedom and order—manifests only everywhere its uncurbed will and complete violence over all and in particular over the Orthodox Church. Where are the limits to this blasphemy against the Christian Church? How and by what means can this attack be stopped against the Church by her furious enemies?

We call all of you believers and true sons of the Church: place yourselves for the defence of our insulted and oppressed Holy Mother. The enemies of the Church seize the power over her and her property by force of deadly weapons, but you revolt against them by the power of your faith and the strength of your voices as a nation which will stop the madmen and will show them that they have no right to call themselves defenders of the national welfare, builders of the new life by authority of the public understanding, as they act directly against the public conscience.

Even if it should be necessary to suffer for the cause of Christ, we call you, beloved Children of the Church, we call you to these sufferings with ourselves in the words of the holy apostle (Romans 8:35). And you beloved brethren, Archbishops, Bishops and priests, not losing an hour or a minute in spiritual labors, with strong faith, call your children to the defence of the downtrodden rights of the Orthodox Church, without loss of time arrange spiritual unions, call them to your aid not by compulsion but of free will to enter the ranks of voluntary spir-

itual fighters, who will place against the inner powers, the strength of their own spiritual forces, and we are firmly convinced that the enemies of the Church of Christ will be shamed and scattered by the force of the cross of Christ, as it is inevitable to avoid the promises of the godly cross-bearer (Matthew 16–18). Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow and all the Russias.

A month later, February 28, 1918, the Patriarch and Synod issued the following instructions to the Church:

The new conditions of Church life demand of Church workers, especially local ones, extraordinary care and unusual efforts, in order that requisite spiritual work may be carried on with good success, regardless of the obstacles to be met and even persecution. The Holy Assembly and Holy Patriarch direct the general method to be followed at the present time by the spiritual pastors; inviting them to independent action under the present difficult conditions and cautioning against possible erroneous action on their part, propose the following instructions:

Call to the Priests:

1. Priests are invited to be strictly on guard in protecting the Holy Church in the heavy years of persecution, to encourage, strengthen and unite the believers, for defense against attacks on the freedom of the Orthodox Faith and to strengthen the prayers for the enlightenment of the doubting.

2. The Priests should encourage the good intentions of the believers directed towards the defense of the Church.

Organizations of the Church

3. Parishioners and worshipers of all parish and other churches should be organized into united societies whose duty it shall be to defend all the sacred things and other church property against violation.

4. These organizations must have an educational and charitable character as also a name, and can be presided over by a layman or priest; but should not be called either Church or religious societies, as all church and religious societies are by virtue of a new decree deprived of all legal rights.

5. In extreme cases these societies can declare themselves the owners of church property, in order to save them from seizure at the hands of the non-Orthodox or even those of another faith. Let the Church and church property remain in the hands of the Orthodox believing in God and devoted to the Church.

6. The Superiors, sister superiors and brothers of monasteries, hermitages and resting houses to be appointed by similar united societies from among local residents and regular worshipers of the parish and all loyal parishioners.

7. The principals and teachers in church educational institutions shall establish relations with the parents of the pupils and the employees of the united societies for the protection of educational societies from seizure, and guarantee of their future activity for the benefit of the Church as also the well-being of the Orthodox people.

8. These societies must firmly demand and endeavor by all means to ensure that the situation in the educational institutions shall remain strictly intact pending further orders of the church authorities.

9. Teachers of religion in the non-ecclesiastical educational institutions should by all means in their power extend their influence over the councils of educators and parents so that they may firmly defend the instruction of religion in educational institutions and cooperate with every new effort of the same for the benefit of religious training and education.

10. The removal by force of the clergy and members of the parish or monks from the monasteries should under no circumstances be permitted. In case of forceful removal, by the congregation or other persons, of the clergy from the posts occupied by them, the diocesan authority does not fill their places

but demands the reappointment of those removed to their former posts, as also the re-establishing of their rights. Every interference with a priest or member of the parish should be reported to the Church authorities, which alone have the authority, after investigating the matter, to remove priests and church employees from the parish.

11. If it should be established that the forceful removal was due to the request of any member of the clergy, the guilty person is subject to an episcopal tribunal and strict punishment, denied the right of clerical duties and is expelled from the clergy.

12. Church vessels and other appurtenances of the church service should be protected by all possible means against desecration and destruction, and for this reason they should not be removed from safe depositories; the latter should be constructed in such a manner that they might not be easily opened by robbers.

13. In case of attempted seizure of church vessels, appurtenances of the Church service, church registers and other church property, the same should not be surrendered voluntarily, inasmuch as (a) Church vessels and other appurtenances of church service are blessed for church use and the congregation should not even touch them, (b) Church registers are indispensable for church uses, and the secular authorities, if in need of same, should see to the preparation of them themselves, (c) Church property belongs to the Holy Church, and the clergy and all Orthodox people are merely their guardians.

14. In cases of attack by despoilers or robbers of church property, the church people should be called to the defense of the Church, sound the alarm and send out runners, etc.

15. Should the seizure nevertheless take place, it is absolutely necessary to make a report thereof, signed by witnesses with an accurate description of the articles seized, indicating by name those guilty of the seizure, and forthwith to report thereon to the diocese.

Articles 16–27 in the document from which we are quoting deal with excommunication of guilty persons; Articles 28–31 with Church marriages. Then follow two final articles on the onerous duties of keeping the vital statistics of the country.

32. Until further notice of the Church authorities, it is obligatory to enter promptly in the books of record the births, certificates of baptism, marriages and deaths in the usual manner.

33. The collecting by the clergy of statistical data and the forwarding of same to the civil authorities is not compulsory on the clergy. However, the representatives of the civil authorities must have access to the Church Records for the copying of information required by them under the supervision of members of the diocese.

Lest it be thought that resistance characterized only the Orthodox Church, we may quote from a pamphlet by the Roman Catholic priest, Monseignor Budkiewiecz, entitled "Historical Notes Regarding the Separation of Church and State in Bolshevist Russia,"[1] issued at the end of 1920. Dealing with the form of contract established by the Commissariat of Justice, the Dean of the Roman Catholic clergy in Petrograd, with the consent of the Archbishop, at a meeting of the parochial clergy at the beginning of December, 1918, presented an Instruction to his clergy, proposing:

(a) to ignore the form of the contract, published in the instruction, and that the signature of the parishioners who were to receive from the Government the use of the church and of articles of worship was contrary to Canon Law. The representatives of the parishioners were to point out that the Church

[1] Quotations from Roman Catholic documents are taken from N.C.W.C. News Bureau Release for May 21, 1923.

cannot be deprived of her independence and to demand that the Government of Russia be satisfied with the presentation of the Protocol, according to which the property of the Church passes to the care of the parishioners; (b) if the "department of protection" does not consent to this, then to propose immediately to introduce into the text of the contract, corrections in conformity with the spirit of the Church; (c) if the authorities will not consent to corrections, the parishioners may sign the contract, but they must declare that they have yielded to force in signing, with the explanation, however, in the spirit of the corrections indicated above, where the contract is considered as a legal fiction; (d) not to surrender church property of their own accord, but to await the demand of the authorities. In the meantime, to make every effort to save such property from confiscation (in general, to adopt the policy of delay); moreover the priests are to keep a copy of the registers of the parish outside the church and to send another to the Consistory. When the authorities demand the registers, the reply is to be made that they have been sent to the Consistory.

The Roman Catholic position as regards Church property is further clarified in a circular letter of Archbishop Cepliak, dated September 12, 1919, containing the following passage:

Just as, in general, everything that bears the name of Church property is under the sacred and inviolable dominion of the Church, so above all is this the case with regard to the objects used in Divine worship, such as the Church edifice, the sacred vessels, the bells, etc., because—(1) these things have already been designated by their donors for the service of the Church; (2) they are sacred, that is, they have been set aside from secular purposes. In view of all this, it is equivalent to appropriating them and handing them over to illegal hands, to make any contracts or other acts, having them in view, without the permis-

sion of the ecclesiastical authorities, and is not only a violation of the rights of the Church in regard to these objects, but is a profanation of them, in which Catholics, i.e., the parishioners, can take no part. As to the inviolability of these objects, that is sufficiently guaranteed by Canon law. As to the property of the Church, inasmuch as they have been given exclusively to the Church by various persons, they are inviolable property of the Church. In consequence the Archbishop and the Central Committee have already protested against the nationalization of ecclesiastical property and now, if it takes place, the parishioners are obliged on their part, to repeat the protest and to try to obtain justice and the respect for their rights.

Among the Roman Catholic documents of the period is another by Monsignor Budkiewiecz, which reveals the common attitude of the period with regard to the probable tenure of the Soviet government in the following phrase:

> The fundamental principle on which the Metropolitan based his decree that one might sign the so-called agreements and contracts regarding the churches and ecclesiastical property, with reserves, was that the present government will be of short duration and that consequently the results of the signing will not have time to appear.

After all, it was a revolution, and neither Orthodox nor Roman Catholics, nor, for that matter, the great body of people in Russia or abroad, had any clear conception of the dynamic nature of this particular revolution. This attitude probably brought the struggle between Church and state to a head more quickly than if the permanence of the revolution had been anticipated.

It is not our purpose to review the whole story of the struggle. We are simply endeavoring to find a basis for a reasonable understanding of what took place, and thus

better to comprehend the future. For our purpose, therefore, it will be sufficient to trace the developments which led to the external defeat of the Church, and the acknowledgment of this defeat by its leaders; thereafter the process of rebuilding Church life, with due attention to the efforts of the Party at constructing a materialistic world view in the youth and the laboring classes of the population.

A great trial for the Church, in its relation to the people, came at the time of the dreadful famine of 1921. War, civil strife and drought brought practically the whole population to death's door. Foreign relief organizations were admitted, and voluntary mutual aid or relief bodies appeared in Moscow and elsewhere. What was the Church to do? Patriarch Tikhon offered to collect movable wealth of the Church, such as was not consecrated for use in the sacraments, and to present it as collateral for a foreign loan with which to purchase food for distribution to the starving. At first the Soviet government intimated agreement to this project, but the possibility of the Church engaging in relief raised the question of compatability of such action with the government's position and the laws on religion. In the first place, Church property had been nationalized, and therefore could not logically be still at the disposal of the Patriarch, even though, in fact, the great mass of movable objects were still in the churches or undestroyed monasteries. Secondly, although the prohibition on charity as stated in Article 17 of the law of April 8, 1929, had not yet been made explicit, it was already implicit, definitely pointing to the idea that the Church's sole activity should be the conduct of worship. On these two grounds the state could not permit of the Church engaging in charitable relief on behalf of the masses in need. If the

matter had stopped there, history would simply have had another interesting "incident" between Church and state.

The next logical step was taken, however, when the state demanded the surrender of these valuables, and the Patriarch agreed to release only unconsecrated articles, maintaining that the surrender of consecrated articles would be contrary to the canons of the Church. Taking no account of this, the authorities issued a decree, on February 23, 1922, ordering confiscation, and government agents were sent out with instructions to seize the valuables which were not of religious significance. It was probably inevitable that local agents should fail to show any practical distinction between religious articles and those which the Church considered canonically sacred. They took what they found. Thereupon the Patriarch issued his famous proclamation calling upon the faithful people to resist. This appeal but reiterated the proclamation of Patriarch and Synod of February 28, 1918, recommending that Church valuables be hidden from the "robbers."

The immediate consequence of the conflict over Church property was the arrest, trial and condemnation of many Orthodox and Roman Catholic churchmen. Metropolitan Benjamin of Petrograd, Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev, and Monsignor Budkiewiecz of the Roman Catholic Church, were executed after trial. Many others suffered a similar fate, and 1,414 "bloody conflicts" were officially recorded in various parts of the country. Thus the Church suffered the loss of many outstanding leaders; some were killed, others exiled to the Far North or to Siberia, others, having joined up with the armies of Denikin, Wrangel or Kolchak, were evacuated by way of Constantinople, Poland, or Manchuria. Patriarch Tikhon himself did not

suffer personal danger until the summer of 1922. This followed a year in which the famine had continued its deadly work, the Patriarch had issued his proclamation of February 28th forbidding parishes to give up Church valuables, and the emigrant bishops at Karlovtsi, Yugoslavia, led by Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovitsky had appealed to the Genoa Conference for a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Although Patriarch Tikhon disavowed the Karlovtsi group, and formally disbanded their "Synod," their action, together with the Patriarch's own stand against the government, constituted grounds on which the latter decided to act against him. He was placed under house arrest.

Miliukov states that:

> At the meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, in the month of April, 1922, following a motion by Trotsky, it was decided that the policy towards the Church should assume an aggressive character, while, as explained by an article in the *Pravda*, the confiscation of valuables "should serve to sunder the crumbling body of the former state church." [2]

There is some evidence that it was intended to do away with the Patriarch by a trial based on his record of opposition, and that this was averted, partly at least by wisely guided diplomatic action from abroad. Whether by chance or plan, however, other steps were taken which seemed likely to serve the government's purpose better by effecting his removal from office and by substitution of more revolutionary churchmen at the head of the Orthodox Church. These steps led to the "Living Church" schism.

It should be recalled that the vote at the Sobor for the

[2] Miliukov: *Russian Culture*, Part I, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942.

re-establishment of the Patriarchate[3] was not unanimous. Many delegates, laymen, clergy and bishops preferred a less monarchical form. Finally the Patriarchate was re-established, but the Patriarch was obliged to exercise his authority in conjunction with the newly constituted Holy Synod. The Synod was elected by the Sobor, and was intended to provide the voice of the broad mass of the faithful during the periods between meetings of the Sobor. It was therefore vastly different from the Holy Synod of the Tsar's regime. However, certain radical churchmen continued their opposition to the new Church government and especially toward its policy in regard to the Revolution. Archpriest Vvedensky was their leader. He had been the prime mover in the "All-Russian Union of Democratic Orthodox Clergy and Laymen," organized shortly after the Tsar's abdication, and one of the chief witnesses against his diocesan bishop, the Metropolitan Benjamin, whose trial and execution we have mentioned. Around Vvedensky were very few of the faithful, but the position of his group in Church life was not dissimilar to the position of the Communist Party in political life at the time of the abdication. It was natural for the government to utilize this ally in its effort to break down the power of the Established Church. Titlinoff, a member of the Vvedensky group, writes:

> External conditions made our move possible, for precisely at that time the revolutionary authorities were ready to support a new movement within the Church even though it remained foreign to them.

[3] After the death of Patriarch Adrian in 1702, Peter the Great did not permit election of a successor, but placed ecclesiastical authority in the hands of a Holy Synod, which continued until 1917.

The radical group sent a delegation, May 12, 1922, to Tikhon, who was still under arrest, with a declaration stating that he was personally responsible for the execution of thirteen churchmen condemned to death in Moscow. Two days later the same sort of declaration appeared in the official paper *Izvestia*, calling on the Patriarch to abdicate. Actually Tikhon took steps to propose to Metropolitan Agathangel that he come to Moscow as Locum Tenens, or temporary holder of the Patriarchal office. On the 18th of May, the radicals wrote another memorandum to Tikhon, and sent this with a delegation which declared to the Patriarch that the Church was suffering because of his absence, under arrest, and asked leave to take over the Patriarchal Chancery.[4]

To His Holiness,
The Most Holy Patriarch Tikhon:

In view of the abdication of your Holiness from the administration of the Church until the time of the calling of the Sobor, and of your transfer of authority to one of the elder hierarchs, the Church remains at present, as a matter of fact, without any kind of administration.

That circumstance shows itself extraordinarily detrimental to the course of general Church life, and especially in Moscow, exciting thereby a great disturbance of minds.

We, the undersigned, have petitioned the governmental authorities for permission to open the Chancery of your Holiness and start its functioning.

By the present letter we filially ask for your Holiness' blessing upon it, in order that the harmful cessation in the administration of church affairs be terminated.

[4] Quoted in Spinka: *The Church and the Russian Revolution*, Macmillan, 1927.

Your substitute, then, upon his arrival, will immediately enter upon the discharge of his duties.

For these labors in the Chancery, until such time as the final formation of the administration under the headship of your substitute be accomplished, we temporarily engage bishops now at liberty in Moscow.

The unworthy servants of your holiness,

Archpriest Alexander Vvedensky
Priest Eugene Belkov
Priest Sergei Kalinovsky

The Patriarch gave this delegation authority to open the Chancery and to turn over its affairs to Metropolitan Agathangel, having in mind his recent proposal to the latter, writing across the corner of the delegation's letter to him:

May 5/18,1922. The persons named below are ordered to take over and transmit to the Most Reverend Metropolitan Agathangel, upon his arrival in Moscow, and with the assistance of Secretary Numerov, the synodical business; (administration of) the Moscow eparchy (to be entrusted) to the Most Reverend Innocent, bishop of Klinsk, and until his arrival to the Most Reverend Leonid, bishop of Vernensk, with the assistance of the departmental chief Nevsky.

For the hastening of my departure and the lodging in the patriarchal residence of the Most Reverend Agathangel, I beg that Archimandrite Anempodist (Alekseev) be given leave.

P. Tikhon [5]

Vvedensky and his group took over the Chancery, but there is no record of any effort on their part to transfer Church administration to Agathangel, although this was the essential element in the Patriarch's decision. By this act of

[5] *Ibid.*

virtual usurpation of Church authority, the Vvedensky group achieved their own ambitions as well as the objects of the government—displacement of Patriarch Tikhon and weakening of the Church through schism. Vvedensky set up a Provisional Supreme Church Administration to take the place of the Patriarch and Synod. This body called a new Sobor, which met on August 6, 1922. It took vigorous action against the monastic element in Church leadership, and voted to give up the recently restored Patriarchal form of Church government.

In place of the Patriarchate, the Sobor established a Supreme Church Administration, in which the "monarchical" principle gave way to a presbyterian order. This change in Church government was only a reflection of the general outlook of the renovators on religion and politics, which the Sobor expressed in the following words:

The Holy Sobor urges all churchmen to abandon all attempts to use the church for temporal political schemes, for the church belongs to God and must serve Him only. There must be no place in the church for counter-revolution. The Soviet government is not a persecutor of the church. In accordance with the constitution of the Soviet government, all citizens are granted genuine religious freedom of conscience. The decree regarding the separation of the church from the state guarantees such freedom. The freedom of religious equally with anti-religious propaganda affords the believers an opportunity to defend by argument the merits of their purely religious convictions. Hence churchmen must not see in the Soviet authority the antichrist; on the contrary, the Sobor calls attention to the fact that the Soviet authority is the only one throughout the world which will realize, by governmental methods, the ideals of the Kingdom of God. Therefore every faithful churchman must not only be an honorable citizen, but also fight with all his

might, together with the Soviet authority, for the realization of the Kingdom of God upon earth.[6]

The second Sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church, having begun its labors, expresses its gratitude to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for the permission granted to the elected sons of the church to meet in order to deliberate upon the current problems. At the same time with these expressions of gratitude the Sobor presents its respects to the Supreme Executive of the Workers-Peasants' government and the world-leader, V. I. Lenin.

The great October Revolution has carried into life the great principles of equality in labor which are found in Christian teaching. All the world over the strong strangle the weak. Only in Soviet Russia war has begun against that social lie.

The Sobor affirms that every honorable Christian should take his place among these warriors for humanitarian truth, and use all means to realize in life the grand principles of the October Revolution.[7]

However, this Living Church Sobor, like the two which followed, was representative of only the small radical wing of the Church, and its actions failed to receive wide acceptance by the faithful. When the Patriarch was finally released from arrest, his spiritual authority was immediately recognized by the main body of the Church, even though proper organs of church administration were not restored to the Patriarchal jurisdiction until 1927.

The Living Church schismatic group succeeded in spreading their influence and organization widely because of government aid in placing their candidates as bishops, deans and rectors in most of the great cities, and even

[6] Spinka: *The Church and the Russian Revolution*, Macmillan, 1927.
[7] *Ibid.*

towns, of the Soviet Union. The Soviet authorities gave support to the Living Church by removing or even exiling to the North or to Siberia those incumbents who refused to accept the schism. With many of the cathedrals and larger churches in their hands, the Living Church in 1925 claimed 12,593 parishes, 16,540 clergy and 192 bishops. This would mean more than half the total number of parishes, and of clergy at this time, and a larger number of active diocesan bishops than the Orthodox Church had ever maintained (105 under the Tsar, 168 largest recorded by Metropolitan Sergius). Yet it does not follow that the number of faithful was as impressive as the proportion of parishes. The Living Church Movement was stronger in its apparatus than in its popular support, for by its nature it attracted ambitious clergy or church wardens rather than the pious women folk and the peasantry. When anti-religious measures became more general and more severe, the Living Church people revealed less hardihood than the adherents of the Patriarchal body, and their proportion fell rapidly.

An important feature of the schismatic tendency was provision for autonomous groups within the general body. Very early the leaders disagreed among themselves, with the result that three separate sections were formed—the Living Church, the Ancient Apostolic Church, and the Renovated Church—which in 1923 reunited in a single Holy Synod. In addition, in 1925 recognition was given to the autonomous Ukrainian Church, and for a time there also existed an autonomous White Russian (Byelorus) Orthodox Church. These were all united in the second and third Sobors, on the principle of federation. The existence of separate and parallel national groupings within the Orthodox Church within a country, each with its own

line of bishops, is contrary to canon law, for the Church is one. On the other hand, autonomous territorial Churches, such as for the Ukraine, can come within the canons; thus the Georgian Church, although within Soviet frontiers, is independent, and recognized as such by the Patriarchal body. The Orthodox in the Ukraine might also have received autonomy, but in fact its administration was suppressed by the Soviet authorities on grounds of connection with the Ukrainian political separatist movement.

One must not neglect the significance of the schismatic movement associated with the name "Living Church." It brought out clearly the jealousy and hatred felt toward the monastic autocracy, who had prevented able married priests from rising to positions deserving of their talents. It gave scope for and a test of the revolutionary type of churchmanship in such matters as adherence to the social and political aims of the Communist Party, radical changes in forms of worship, and even changes in Church teachings. It tempted some foreign Protestants to believe that the Living Church was a Reformation in the Eastern Orthodox Church, and got their *quondam* support. Of great importance for the future was the fact that it gained recognition on the part of the ancient Orthodox Patriarchates of Jerusalem, Alexandria and Constantinople, thus provoking a complication between these Patriarchates and the Patriarchate in Russia, which has not yet been fully overcome, and which seriously affects the solution of many problems of the whole Eastern Orthodox Church.

As a renovative body, the Living Church made every effort to discredit Patriarch Tikhon; at its second Sobor (April–May, 1923) the Patriarch was deposed and defrocked. Since he was still under arrest, and, in fact, about

to be brought to trial by the Moscow Tribunal, his fate and influence were considered sealed. However, the unexpected happened. In June, 1923, the Patriarch was released and the case against him dropped. The grounds for his release lie in his "Confession," published in *Izvestia* on June 27th. The text follows:

Appealing with the present declaration to the Supreme Court of the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialistic Republics, I regard it as my duty, dictated by my pastoral conscience, to declare the following:

Having been nurtured in a monarchist society, and until my arrest having been under the influence of anti-Soviet individuals, I was filled with hostility against the Soviet authorities, and at times my hostility passed from passivity to active measures, as in the instance of the proclamation on the occasion of the Brest-Litovsk peace in 1918, the anathematizing of the authorities in that same year, and finally, the appeal against the decree regarding the removal of church treasures in 1922. All my anti-Soviet acts, with the exception of a few inexactitudes, were stated in the act of accusation drawn up by the Supreme Court. Acknowledging the correctness of the accusations of the Supreme Court and its sentence as conforming to the clauses of the criminal code, I repent of all my actions directed against the government and petition the Supreme Court to change its sentence and to set me free.

I declare hereby to the Soviet authorities that henceforth I am no more an enemy to the Soviet government, and that I have completely and resolutely severed all connections with the foreign and domestic monarchists and the counter-revolutionary activity of the White Guards.

The great assembly of faithful who greeted the Patriarch at Divine Service after his release testified to his popularity. At the same time there were those who were astonished and

even repelled by his confession. They desired him to continue as their champion against the Soviet regime, whereas his confession constituted a recognition of defeat. Some tried to excuse it as a forgery, others as a signature wrung from him on a document written by the authorities. A number of important Churchmen, interpreting the statement chiefly from the standpoint of politics, found that the Patriarch had betrayed the whole anti-Soviet movement, of which the Church was, in their mind, a part. Although the great body of Orthodox followed neither the Living Church, representing the left, nor these diehards of the right, both left and right drew off important contingents. That of the Living (Renovated) Church continues to this day; on the other hand, the "right" were doomed to extinction, for they, by virtue of their anti-Soviet leanings either would refuse to register, or, endeavoring to exist as clandestine bodies, were subject to administrative or court prosecution and punishment. Some, of course, while disagreeing with the Patriarch, yet followed him simply in order to retain legal existence. Subsequently other autonomous "self-constituted" Orthodox groupings were formed. They have no canonical status, but, profiting by the law on registration of religious societies, they achieve legal existence and represent a sectarian or congregational type of organization, while retaining Orthodox forms of worship.

The Karlovtsi Synod of emigré bishops maintained that the Patriarch's confession was signed under duress, and thus constituted proof that the Patriarch and Church in the Soviet Union were not free to exercise judgment according to conscience, but obliged to conform to Soviet government injunctions. On this basis practically all the Russian

refugee Church groups have involuntarily, as they affirm, maintained an autonomous status, pending restoration of full freedom for the Mother Church.

The confession is indeed an extremely significant document, for it marks the turning point in Church-state relationships. It was a disavowal not only of Tsarist or monarchic leanings characteristic of the remnants of the old Church leaders, but even of the possibility of a Constituent Assembly or any other political change in national government—it was an out and out acceptance of the Soviet government *de facto* and *de jure*. One needs only to recall that this took place in 1923, during the New Economic Policy, and at a time when Lenin was suffering from bullet wounds, in order to understand the confusion it caused. Not only monarchists but many of the moderates believed that the Revolution had lost, and that Russia was in process of returning to some semi-capitalistic order of society; consequently they felt that the opponents of the Soviet need only hold on, and certainly should not surrender.

There is no adequate documentation on the views of the Patriarch himself at the time. He reaffirmed his confession in private conversation, and devoted himself to efforts at regaining some sort of legalized position for his administration. The Renovated Church made overtures of reconciliation, but he rejected them on the grounds that their Sobor had been illegal since it was not called by canonical Church authorities. However, he was ill, and lacked the administrative organs and assistants needed for effective reorganization of the Church. Finally, in May, 1925, the Patriarch died without the satisfaction of having achieved a restored Church edifice. But even in his weakness, he was strong. His courage, his devotion to Christ above all, and

his confidence in Christ never failed. Almost from the day of his death he was revered as a martyr, and canonization took place in the hearts of the people at once, even though formal proclamation must await other days.

The period ensuing from the arrest of Patriarch Tikhon in March 1922, up to the date of formal government recognition of the Patriarchal Church administration, May 31, 1927, was truly a time of troubles. After Tikhon's death, his canonical successors, one after the other, were prevented by the government from assuming office as Locum Tenens, until finally Metropolitan Peter Krutitsky (Vicar bishop of Moscow) was permitted to do so, but only for a few months. He was exiled while still holding the office and title of Locum Tenens, and the succession, according to the Testament of Patriarch Tikhon and the rules laid down by the Sobor of 1917–18, finally came to Metropolitan Sergius of Nijni Novgorod, who became suffragan or vice-Locum Tenens (Zamiestitel Miestobliustitelja). Before entering upon a review of his administration, we must pause to catch up on other concurrent developments in the Soviet Union.

The period of militant Communism came to an end in 1921, with the Treaty of Riga, when the Red Army acknowledged defeat in the West, and with the famine of the same year, which was both a cause and a consequence of an over-hasty socialistic agricultural policy. In 1923 the country began staggering to its feet, and by 1924 new energy appeared. The Communist Youth Movement began to get its stride; book, pamphlet and periodical production rose sharply; education became the *mot d'ordre*, even though textbooks, paper and pencils were lacking. On the political side, the Trotsky-Stalin clash grew fiercer day by day. Apart from the great Church trials, which during this

period numbered 231 prosecutions before 55 courts, with 738 accused, of which 44 were sentenced to death, there were countless smaller cases, dealing with interpretation of the law, or with litigation over Church property on appeal to higher courts. A collection of the more important court judgments and administrative decisions on religious matters during this period was made by Guidulianoff, and published in a volume containing 600 large pages in very fine print.

Of special significance for our study was the growth of anti-religion during this period. A small anti-religious journal, *The Godless*, in 1925 organized interested persons into a society called the "Friends of the Godless," which in turn became the League of Godless (1926) and then the League of Militant Godless. It is hard to tell where initiative lay, in the Party, or in spontaneous groups. In any case, on April 27–30, 1926, the Central Committee of the Communist Party called a special conference on anti-religious propaganda, and by 1929 the schools were made not only free of religion but definitely anti-religious. Meanwhile, the publication of religious literature diminished, being in fact limited to books or pamphlets of the Living Church orientation, and consisting largely of polemics against the Patriarchal Church. With the aid of the British and Foreign Bible Society, a small edition of the Bible was printed in Petrograd in 1926, bearing the imprint, "Edition of Prokhanoff and Didkoff," leaders in the Russian Evangelical and Baptist Movement.

In general, after the violent clashes of 1921–22, and the schism of 1923–24, the years of 1925–26 were relatively quiet. Public debates on religion took place, and often the atheists were defeated. Nevertheless, the law on registration of local parishes was more and more strictly applied, with

the result that weak parishes, or headstrong priests, or secret monasteries were deprived of legal existence. Lacking a legalized central Church administration, Orthodox parishes and their diocesan authorities were without an authoritative voice to plead their case before the central government. Yet occasions to ask for redress increased, and the number of churches closed as well as the number of bishops, clergy and laymen sent into exile on charges related to the laws on religion assumed great proportions.[8]

It was among these exiled Churchmen that clear opinions began to be formed on the real nature of the conflict between Church and state, and the position which the Church must take. Those in exile in the North or in Siberia were frequently able to correspond with their fellows, or even to receive visits from loved ones. Thus an exchange of opinion on a really nation-wide scale took place, although unorganized and unsystematic. In due time, however, this exchange and clarification of opinion enabled the Church to give expression to its position and to apply for registration of the administrative organs of the Patriarchate.

One of the documents of this period is peculiarly interesting. It is commonly referred to as the "Solovetsk Document," and considered as being a memorandum prepared by bishops in exile in the Solovetsky Monastery, in the White Sea, for presentation to the government. We lack

[8] According to Soviet statistics, in 29 out of 87 provinces, by October 1925 there were sequestered 1,003 Orthodox churches, 29 mosques, 27 Old Ritualist churches, and 29 belonging to other creeds. 114 of the Orthodox churches were transformed into schools, 195 into clubs, 280 were used for educational purposes, 79 for dwellings and other exigencies, 298 remained vacant, and 6 were wrecked. Miliukov: *Russian Culture*, Part I, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942.

confirmation of its having been so presented, but know it to be an authentic document prepared in Russia at this time. The introductory paragraphs, which we quote, reveal the position of the Church and give the attitude of the group of Churchmen who in 1927 achieved registration of the Patriarchal Church administration.

Notwithstanding the fact that the fundamental laws of the Soviet Constitution declare full liberty of conscience, of religious gatherings, and of preaching, the activity and the religious life of the Russian Orthodox Church is still subjected to very considerable limitations. The Russian Orthodox Church is forbidden to have a regularly organised central and diocesan administration; it cannot concentrate its activity in Moscow—its historical centre—the bishops are either altogether forbidden to reside in their diocese, or else they are deprived of the right to perform the most essential duties of their service: preaching from the pulpit or visiting the parishes which are subjected to their authority; sometimes they are even deprived of the right of ordaining new priests. The Locum Tenens of the Patriarchal See and about half of the Orthodox Bishops are imprisoned, exiled, or condemned to hard labor. The state organs do not deny these facts, but they explain their necessity by political reasons. They charge the Orthodox Bishops and the clergy with counter-revolutionary activity, with plots directed towards the overthrow of the Soviet authority and the restoration of the old order. The Orthodox Church has tried many times to dissolve this atmosphere of suspicion. First Patriarch Tikhon, and then his Locum Tenens have written officially to the Soviet Government regarding this point. These efforts have been in vain, but the sincere desire to put an end to the distressing misunderstandings between the Church and the Soviet Authority (misunderstandings which weigh so heavily on the Church and which complicate the task of the state) induces the leading organ of the Russian Orthodox Church to make one more effort and

to state quite openly and justly before the government the principles by which it is guided in relation to the State.

Those who have signed the present statement are fully aware of the difficulty of establishing mutual friendly relations between the Church and the State under present actual conditions. They cannot be silent regarding this. It would not be true, it would be beneath the dignity of the Church, and besides it would be quite useless and unconvincing to assert that there were no points of discord between the Orthodox Church and the State authority of the Soviet Republic. But these points of discord lie not at all in the matters designated by the political distrust of the State; it is not at all in points ascribed by the calumny of the foes of the Church. The Church stands aloof from the new repartition of wealth, the nationalisation of property; this has always been considered by it as the domain of the state, for the conduct of which it is not responsible. The Church also stands aloof from the political organisation of authority, for it is loyal to the governments of all the countries within the limits of which it has its members. It lives at peace with all the different types of state organization, beginning with such despots as were formerly in Turkey and ending with such Republics as the North American United States. The discord lies in the irreconcilability of the religious teaching of the Church with the materialism and the official philosophy of the Communistic Party and of the government of the Soviet Republics directed by that party.

The Church recognises the existence of the spiritual principle; Communism denies it. The Church believes in the living God, Creator of the world, Guider of its life and fate; Communism does not admit His existence, believes that the world was self-organized and that no reasonable principles or purposes govern its history. The Church sees the aim of man's life in the heavenly calling of the spirit, and never ceases reminding her children of their heavenly fatherland. She does this even when the conditions of outward culture and material well-

being are at their height. Communism desires to know no other aim for man except his welfare upon earth. And this difference of ideology and philosophical viewpoint which exists between the Church and the State manifests itself also in the realm of practical everyday life, and in that of morality. The Church believes in the steadfast principles of morality, justice and law. Communism looks upon them as the conditional results of class-struggle, and values moral questions only from the standpoint of their usefulness. The Church instils the feeling of that humility which elevates man's soul; Communism abases man through his pride. The Church protects purity and the sacredness of childbirth. Communism sees but the satisfying of instincts in the marriage tie. For the Church religion is not only the living force enabling man to attain his heavenly destiny, but also the source of all that is greatest in human relation; which is the foundation of earthly welfare, happiness, and the health of nations. For Communism religion is the opium that drugs the nations, that weakens their energy; that is the source of their poverty and misfortunes. The Church wants religion to flourish. Communism wants it to perish. With such deep difference in fundamental principles separating the Church and State, it becomes impossible that an inner nearness or reconciliation could exist between them. There can be no reconciliation between assertion and negation, between yes and no. For the very soul of the Church, the circumstance of its existence and the reason for its being, is just that which is categorically denied by Communism.

By no compromise or concession, by no partial changes in its teaching, by no explanation of it in a communistic spirit can the Church attain such a reconciliation. Pitiful attempts have been made in this direction by the "Regenerated" in the Church; some of them have tried to instil into the souls of the faithful the idea that Christianity and Communism are really similar in all important points; that a communistic state is striving to attain the same objectives as the Gospels, only

by different means, i.e., not by religious persuasion, but by force. Others again have recommended reviewing Christian dogmatics in such a way as to present the teaching of the relations of God to the world in a manner that should not resemble the relation of a sovereign to his people, but should stand more in accordance with republican ideas. Others again have insisted that all saints of bourgeois origin should be excluded from the calendar and deprived of the veneration shown to them by the Church. All such attempts are not sincere and they have called forth the deep indignation of the faithful.

The Orthodox Church will never stand on this unworthy path. It will never deny either the whole or part of that teaching which has come down to it from all that has been holy in the past centuries, in order to accommodate ever-shifting popular opinions. When the ideological difference of opinion between the Church and the state is so deep, it is unavoidable that it should be reflected in the everyday life of both these organisms. A conflict in the activity of both can be avoided only by the strict carrying out of the law regarding the separation of the Church from the state. According to this law the Church must in no wise mix itself in the activity of the civil government, which has to take care of the material welfare of the people. Neither must the state hinder the Church in its religious and moral activity.

Such a law was among the first issued by the revolutionary government; it has been incorporated into the constitution of the U.S.S.R., and might have, up to a certain point, satisfied both sides, now that the political system has been so much modified. There are no religious motives preventing the Church from accepting it. Our Lord Jesus Christ has ordered us to give unto Caesar what belongs to Caesar, i.e., the material welfare of the people is the realm of the government. He left no commandments to His followers to seek to alter the forms of government or to guide its activity. According to the

teaching and traditions of the Orthodox Church it has always stood aloof from politics, and has remained obedient to the state in all that did not concern its faith. That is the reason why it was able to remain loyal to the civil government both in former Turkey and in the ancient Roman Empire, even when it was quite alien to the government spiritually. A contemporary state can demand no more of it. A contemporary state, in opposition to former political theories, does not find it necessary that the political union of its citizens should be strengthened by an inner religious unity. It does not consider this of importance, and openly declares that it does not need the aid of the Church to attain the aims set before it, and that it allows its citizens complete religious liberty.

As things stand at present the Church only desires a systematic and complete carrying out in actual life of the law which separated the Church from the State.

The document goes into great length in explaining the nature of difference between the Patriarchal Church and the Renovated (Living) Church. On the basis of this difference, as well as the uncanonical standing of the Renovated, the Orthodox claimed that they were not represented by the Renovated Church administration, and consequently had need of their own restored administration. Whether it was the Solovetsk Document or some other petition that was actually presented, we do not know, but in any case, on the 31st of May, 1927, the Soviet government authorized the registration of the administration of the Patriarchal Church, in the person of Metropolitan Sergius of Nijni Novgorod as vice-Locum Tenens, with a Patriarchal Holy Synod attached to him.[9] Thereupon the Metro-

[9] Metropolitan Peter Krutitsky, who was in exile in Siberia, continued to hold the title of Locum Tenens until his death on the 29th of August, 1936.

politan Sergius issued a declaration on June 10, 1927, which reads, in its essential parts, as follows:

Thus receiving the right to legal existence (official registration, May 18–31, 1927), we clearly take account of the fact that with rights we also take on obligations with reference to the authorities who give us these rights—and thus I have taken upon myself, in the name of the whole of our Orthodox old-church (Tikhon) hierarchy and flock, to register before the Soviet authorities our sincere readiness to be fully law-abiding citizens of the Soviet Union, loyal to its Government, and definitely to hold ourselves aloof from all political parties or enterprises seeking to harm the Union.

But let us be sincere to the end. We cannot be silent about the contradiction which exists between us Orthodox and the Communist Bolsheviks, who govern our Union. They set as their purpose struggle with God and His power in the hearts of the people. We on our part see the whole sense and whole aim of our existence in confession of faith in God and strengthening of the faith in the hearts of the people. They recognize only the materialistic interpretation of history, and we believe in the providence of God.

In spite of all this, we are convinced that the Orthodox Christian, sacredly observing his faith and living according to its precepts, for this very reason will be, always and everywhere, a desirable and exemplary citizen of any state, including that of the Soviets, in whatever area of life he is called upon to work: in the factory, in village or city, in the army or mine, etc. Should the state demand rejection of property, should it be necessary to lay down his life for the common good, should it be to show an example of temperance, honesty, earnestness in serving society—all this indeed the Christian is taught by his faith. In any case, since not only Communists but people of religious faith are citizens of the Union, in the leading ranks of these citizens must be found every

Orthodox Christian, especially as the vast majority of the population is Orthodox.

When applying for recognition, Metropolitan Sergius also requested permission to call a Sobor, for the election of a Patriarch in succession to Tikhon, and to deal with current Church questions. He also asked permission to set up Church schools for persons over eighteen years of age. All of these requests remained without approval until the autumn of 1943. On the other hand, the Metropolitan was immediately permitted to publish an official bulletin. This was entitled *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, and dealt exclusively with the business of Church administration. It was distributed only to ecclesiastical persons, not sold to the public.

Thus, after an interval of five years, from the arrest of the Patriarch Tikhon in May, 1922, to registration in 1927, the Patriarchal Church administration existed without government recognition, whereas during the same period the Renovated Church was decidedly favored by the state. It had held three Sobors, travel expenses of delegates to the first being covered by government subsidy; it had acquired the cathedrals in the principal cities with bishops in residence rather than in exile; it had maintained (up to 1927) two theological seminaries. Organizationally it embraced autonomous Metropolitanates for Russia, White Russia and the Ukraine, claiming a total of about 17,000 parishes according to statistics given at the time of the third Sobor in October, 1926. It had official recognition by the Ancient Patriarchates of Constantinople, Jerusalem and Antioch.

Naturally there were efforts at reconciliation, but neither

Tikhon nor any of his successors would concede the regularity either of the manner in which the Living Church took over and kept the Patriarchal Synod's Chancery, effectively outlawing the Patriarchal administration for five years, or of the Sobors. These were called by uncanonical authority and their members were considered as being partisan rather than representative of the whole Russian Orthodox Church. As soon as the Patriarch was released, in 1923, a number of the bishops who at first had lined up with the Living Church left it and, after acts of penitence, were received back into the Patriarchal fold. Among them was the Metropolitan Sergius. In the negotiations it became clear that the chief problem was canonical jurisdiction, rather than theological divergence.

The Living (variously called Regenerated, Renovated or Synodal) Church must be judged in light of the revolutionary times. Among its instigators, and certainly among its subsequent leaders and faithful, there were many who were undoubtedly motivated by their earnest desire to seek the welfare of the whole Christian body in Russia. They sought to rectify the faults of the old regime, and to make the Church "democratic," popular, free of the monarchial domination of the higher monastic caste. For a time they were led by ambitious, unscrupulous, and politically minded individuals, such as Vvedensky and Krasnitsky, who in fact merely turned the tables, and assumed the roles of the worst elements in the Holy Synod under the Tsar. One of the chief changes was the consecration of married priests to episcopal office, contrary to Eastern Church canons, but necessary in order to give these ambitious persons the highest offices in the Church.

At the beginning also there were tendencies toward re-

form of the cult, but these reforms were abandoned in face of the demand of the people for the customary forms of worship. Probably the Renovated emphasis on adaptation to Soviet conditions, and the acceptance of this position by great numbers of the people, played no small part in leading the Patriarchal body to abandon its recalcitrance. The movement on the whole must not be judged solely by the unscrupulousness of its early leaders. We must recognize also the release it gave to re-creative elements throughout the whole body of the Orthodox faithful in Russia. Reconciliation and unification will be difficult because of the long existence of parallel supreme organs and diocesan administrations, with settled-in incumbents. Apparently friction has now been reduced, and the common devotion of both Patriarchal and Renovated bodies to the national cause may even further reunion.

CHAPTER VI

Religion and Socialistic Construction

SHORTLY after the recognition of the restored Patriarchal Church administration, great changes began to appear in Russia, which affected literally every citizen, every institution, and the whole manner of life. The New Economic Policy was discarded and the period of planning began, made possible by the exiling of Trotsky and the recognition of Stalin's dominant sway over the Revolutionary Movement in all its aspects. It is important to keep in mind the primary fact, that from this time on all the different aspects of life in the U.S.S.R. came under planning, not only the economic and social but the mind and habits of the people as well. The decisive moment had come at the Fourteenth Party Congress, December, 1925, when Stalin proposed, "to transform our country from an agrarian into an industrial one, able to produce by its own strength the necessary instruments for its life." [1] The Congress concluded,

> that our country, the country of the dictatorship of the proletariat, has "all the essential elements for the construction of a complete socialistic society" (Lenin). The Congress considers that the struggle for the victory of the socialistic construction in the U.S.S.R. is the fundamental objective of our Party.[2]

[1] *History of the All Union Communist Party*, Moscow, 1938 (Russian edition), p. 263.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 265.

By this decision the Party accepted and began to put into practice Lenin's view, published in 1915:

> The unevenness of economic and political development is the undoubted rule of capitalism. From this it follows that there may be victory of socialism first in a few or even in a single capitalistic country.[3]

The decision meant that the Party set as its immediate objective the establishment of "socialism in one country," the U.S.S.R., rather than the achievement of simultaneous world revolution. This was the nib of the quarrel with Trotsky and the key to future developments in the Soviet Union; for, as Stalin stated in 1927, "without destroying Trotskyism it is impossible to achieve success by means of the New Economic Policy, it is impossible to achieve the transformation of the present Russia into socialist Russia." [4]

On the 14th of November, 1927, Trotsky and Zinovieff were expelled from the Party, and three weeks later the Fifteenth Party Congress accepted the directives to "develop further the attack on the kulak system and take various new measures limiting the development of capitalism in the village, and leading agriculture along the direction of socialism." The NEP drew to a close. The period of relative liberalism was over. No more foreign industrial concessions were granted; village kulaks no longer grew at the expense of weaker peasants, and religion lost its influence over social outlook and administrative apparatus. In 1928 a tightening-up process began all along the line; economic, social, educational, health and family, religious aspects of life—all felt the grip of the new "planning" era. Moscow

[3] Lenin: *Izbrannie Proizvedenia v Dvuch Tomach. Izd. tretye I*, p. 685.
[4] *History of the All Union Communist Party*, p. 255.

began to use power as well as authority. This was frankly a period of dictatorship by the central organs of government, only slightly camouflaged as the will of the people. Speaking of agricultural collectivization, the official History of the Party states:

> The peculiar character of this (agricultural) revolution lies in the fact that it was carried out from above, at the initiative of the state authorities, with the direct support from below of millions of peasants struggling against the kulak kabal for the free collective farm life.

The same "initiative of the state authorities" characterized the process of bringing about changes in the minds and habits of the people, as they were cramped into the pattern of Marx-Lenin-Stalin socialism. Religion could not expect to be left aside in this all-embracing drive for socialism; in fact, it was soon singled out as one of the chief remnants of capitalism to be dealt with in the educational and the habit-reforming part of the planning process.

It was at this time that Stalin made the following statement regarding religion, in his conversation with members of the First American Trade Union Delegation, September 9, 1927.

> We conduct propaganda and shall conduct propaganda against religious prejudices. The laws of the country are such that each citizen has the right to confess any religion. This is a matter of conscience for each one. Exactly for this reason we carried through the separation of Church from the state and, proclaiming freedom of confession, we also preserved for each citizen the right to struggle against any religion by means of persuasion, propaganda and agitation. The Party cannot be neutral with regard to religion, and it conducts antireligious propaganda against any and all religious prejudices because it

stands for science, while religious prejudices go against science, since every religion is something contrary to science. Such instances, as in America, where recently they condemned Darwinists, would be impossible with us, because the Party conducts a policy of complete upholding of science.

The Party cannot be neutral with regard to religious prejudices and will conduct propaganda against these prejudices because this is one of the sure methods of undercutting the influence of the reactionary clergy, supporting the exploitive classes and preaching subordination to these classes. The Party cannot be neutral with regard to the bearers of religious prejudices, with regard to the reactionary clergy, poisoning the minds of the toiling masses. Have we oppressed the reactionary clergy? Yes, we have oppressed them. The trouble is only that they are not yet fully liquidated. Antireligious propaganda is the means which must carry through to the end the work of liquidating the reactionary clergy. There are sometimes cases where Party members hinder the full development of antireligious propaganda. If such members of the Party are rejected, that is very good, because there is no place for such "communists" in the ranks of our Party.[5]

By 1929 the First Five Year Plan was ready. The mass collectivization of agriculture began. The first of over 500 new industrial establishments started to grow from blueprints to reinforced steel and whirling machinery. On the 8th of April of that year the basic law on religion was promulgated, being a codification of the vast number of laws, decrees and court decisions which fill the 600 pages of Guidulianoff's book, "Separation of Church from State in the U.S.S.R., a complete collection of Decrees, Instructions and Court Decisions," of which the third edition had appeared in Moscow in 1926. The law of April 8, 1929, not

[5] Lenin: *Izbrannie Proizvedenia*, Vol. I, 1939. 0912. Moscow.

only codified but tightened the instructions on religion. Thus Article 17 contains prohibitions not previously in force, at least on an all-Union scale.

Article 17. Religious associations are forbidden: (a) to establish mutual aid funds, co-operative and productive associations, and in general to use the property at their disposal for any other purpose than the satisfying of religious needs; (b) to give material aid to their members; to organize either special meetings for children, youth, women, for prayer and other purposes, or general meetings, groups circles, departments, biblical, literary, handworking, labour, religious study, and so on, and also to organize excursions and children's playgrounds, to open libraries or reading-rooms, to organize sanatoria and medical aid. Only such books as are necessary for the performance of services are permitted to be kept in the church buildings and house of prayer.

The articles prohibiting churches from collecting money except among members, and those which restricted holding of divine services to "the locality of residence of the members of the said religious society and the premises of their house of prayer (church)," struck heavily at the sectarian groups, whose meetings for Bible reading, prayer or a discourse did not depend on a church building with altar, iconostasis, vestments, etc., as among the Orthodox.

Yet more severe was the change in the text of the Constitution, as regards religion. The old reading was as follows: "Freedom for religion and anti-religion is granted to every citizen"; as changed, the Constitution stated, "There is freedom for religious confession and anti-religious propaganda." The distinction between "freedom of religion" as in the old text, and "freedom for religious confession," as in

this text, was explained in the anti-religious press (*Bezbojnik* 6, II, 1930) as follows:

The XIVth Congress of the Soviets on May 18, 1929, altered Article V of the Constitution in relation to religious propaganda, and thereby destroyed the ambiguity which was found in the old law as well as in the law of April 8, 1929. . . . Now any activity of propaganda or agitational character on the part of religious or church people cannot and must not be looked upon as activity permitted by the laws, but on the contrary as activity extending beyond the limits of the freedom of confession guaranteed by the law, and falling under the action of criminal and civil laws. Such activities must be qualified according to articles 58–10 and 59–7 of the Criminal Code. . . . The revision of the article indicates that henceforth the activity of all religious unions consists only in the conduct of services. No other activity extending beyond the limits of serving religious needs are permitted. Even religious propaganda is not permitted. Confession but not propaganda.

In this manner religion was deprived of any participation in the process of socialization, while the emphasis of government policy was laid on anti-religious propaganda and on devices aimed at making religious life intolerable. The six-day continuous working week eliminated Sunday, or any other day, as a common weekly holiday; collectivized agriculture gave rise to the slogan, "A church in a collective farm is a joke"; priests and other ministers of religion were classified among kulaks and non-producing members of society, and thereby deprived of civil rights. Their children lost the right of attending higher educational institutions. Being a "lishenetz" (deprived of civil rights), the city priest was not permitted to reside in a communal house, which meant, practically, seeking refuge in one of the

poorest houses in the suburbs. For the same reason priests were deprived of bread cards, when they were introduced in 1929. Added to this was arbitrary taxation. The suffering became intense, especially as many local authorities in their zeal far exceeded their instructions in meting out such punishments as confiscation of personal chattels, eviction from houses, and exile to the far north or Siberia, with or without motive. By this time 150 bishops had been arrested and exiled.[6] There is no record of the number of priests in exile, but in some districts (okrug) not 20 percent remained. Religion, sorcery, drunkenness, theft, ownership of private enterprises, were all lumped together for eradication in this headlong rush for "socialism in one country." They were all considered as remnants of capitalism in the minds and habits of the people. This was concurrent with the drive for collectivization which advanced at a rate far exceeding government expectations, with the result that several millions of resisting peasants were exiled or died from the famine that soon began to appear.

At the Sixteenth Party Congress, in 1930, summarizing the successes of socialistic construction and the cultural revolution, and noting the advances achieved in liberating the masses from the reactionary influence of religion, a resolution was passed calling for "holding fast and developing these successes."

However, the tempo was dangerous.

Notwithstanding the warnings of the Central Committee against excessive enthusiasm over the successes of collectivization, many party workers began to force collectivization artificially, not reckoning with the conditions of place and time,

[6] Timasheff: *Religion in Soviet Russia.* Sheed & Ward.

not reckoning with the degree of preparation of the peasants for entrance into the collective farms.[7]

On the 2nd of March, 1930, the Central Committee published Stalin's article, "Dizziness with Success," in which he called such extremists to task.

What were the specific points on which this "dizziness with success" touched the life of the Church? Answer is found in a memorandum submitted by Metropolitan Sergius to Comrade Smidovitch, Head of the Commission on Religions, at the Kremlin, on the 19th of February, 1930, less than a fortnight before Stalin's article appeared. Since this was the Church's official reaction to the situation, we quote it in full:

1. The insurance assessment of the churches, especially in villages, is sometimes so exorbitant that it deprives the community of the possibility of using the church buildings. It is essential that the valuation of the church buildings should be lowered (it must not stand on a par with buildings that bring in revenue) as well as the rate for insurance assessment.

2. Collections of the authors' honorarium in favour of the Drama Union must be carried out within legal limits; i.e., the collection may be made only for the performance in church of such musical works as have been nationalized or the rights of which belong to a certain individual, and not simply because singing took place in church, and especially during Divine service; the ministers of religion, when performing Divine service, must not be looked upon as artists performing musical pieces, and therefore the churches must not be required to pay 5 per cent of all the revenue received by the clergy, i.e., the revenue received for all ecclesiastical services performed in church or outside.

[7] *History of the All-Union Communist Party* (Bolsheviks), 1938, p. 293.

3. It is essential to discontinue the collection of premiums for the insurance of the choristers, which was cancelled in 1929, but is collected from the churches for all the years it had not been paid in (sometimes since 1922), and which together with the accrued interest reaches considerable amounts (e.g., over 4000 roubles).

4. It is essential to suppress the assessment of the churches for various agricultural products (e.g., bread, grain, wool, etc.); also special obligatory agricultural collections: e.g., for tractors, for industrialization, for floating government loans, etc. As the churches have no land of their own, these assessments of course fall on the members of religious communities; therefore it becomes a new form of taxation for faith, which the faithful have to pay over and above all the other taxes they pay, together with all other citizens.

5. The Instructions of the NKF (People's Commissariat of Finance) of Jan. 5th, 1930, N. 195, according to which fines or confiscations for non-payment of taxes by the church should not be applied to the property of the individual members of the church council, must be applied to the insurance assessments, to authors' honorariums, etc.

6. It is essential to explain that members of parish councils, church wardens, church guardians, and other persons ministering to the needs of the local church, should not for this reason be rated as kulaks and, therefore, should not be burdened by heavier taxation.

7. It is essential to explain that local representatives of justice, when Orthodox communities or the clergy send in their complaints, should not refuse them lawful protection of their rights, when the latter have been infringed by local administrative authorities or by some organization.

8. It must be accepted as a rule that before closing a church the decisive factor should not be the desire of the unbelieving part of the population, but the existence of believers who desire and are able to use the given building; that an Orthodox

church, if given up by one community (congregation), be transferred only to another Orthodox community; and that if a church is closed (whatever the reasons for this step), the members of the Orthodox community retain the right to invite their priest to perform all manner of family rites in their own homes.

9. It is necessary to give explanations regarding the going into effect of the decree of the SNK (Soviet of the People's Commissaries) of the 8th of April, 1929, concerning religious unions, and also the reference to the instructions (Oct. 1st, 1929) and other orders concerning this same question, for the reason that sometimes local authorities do not accept petitions for registration of communities (congregations) and even forbid their taking any steps towards registration (whereas the law clearly gives the final date for registration—1st May, 1930—for all communities which desire to continue their existence).

10. *Desires of the clergy*. The ministers of religion, as persons not employing hired labor, should be registered, as hitherto, as persons belonging to free professions, and not as non-working elements of the population, or still less as kulaks.

11. That income should not be fixed in an arbitrary manner, sometimes quite surpassing all possibility of payment (for instance, in Ijevsk, Bishop Sinezii Zarubin was taxed 10,300 roubles, with an additional 7000 roubles as an advance for the following year), and that taxation be fixed on a par with other persons of liberal professions.

12. That local village authorities should receive clear instructions fixing the limits and terms of local taxation and assessments for ministers of religion, as non-kulak elements.

13. That ministers of religion not employing themselves with agriculture, cattle breeding, hunting, etc., should not be taxed in kind in such products as bread, grain, wool, butter, game, etc. Sometimes these taxes are demanded without delay, in the course of 24 hours.

14. That in cases when the property is being requisitioned

for non-payment of taxes a lawful minimum of furniture, clothing and boots should not be taken away.

15. When forced services are being fixed, they should be reasonable in fixing the amount of service. For instance, in the village of Liuk, in the Votski district, the priest was demanded to fell, saw into timber, and cart away 200 cubic sajen of wood. Also that the age and state of health should be taken into consideration.

16. That the ministers of religion should not be deprived of the right of having their home within their own parish and near their church, even in villages transformed into collective farms; and that those who rent them rooms should not be more severely taxed on this account.

17. That the children of the clergy should be allowed to study in the 1st and 2nd grade schools, and that those of them, who by autumn 1920 were registered as students of the VUZY,[8] should not be expelled simply because of their origin; also that those who have already been expelled should be permitted to finish their education.

18. It is desirable that professional or voluntary singers who are members of the "Rabis" Union (Art Workers) or other trade unions, and who take part in church choirs as a means of earning money on the side, should not, because of this, be excluded from the "Rabis" or other unions.

19. In the summer of 1929 the question was raised of opening in Leningrad higher theological courses of the Orthodox Patriarchal Church. It is very desirable that this petition be granted, if only to equalize our section of the Church with that of the Renovated, which has its own academy.

20. For a long time the patriarchate has felt the need of having some sort of periodical publication, if only a monthly bulletin in which the decisions, pastoral letters, etc., of the central church authorities could be published, as being of interest for the whole Church.

[8] Higher educational institutions.

21. In view of newspaper articles demanding that the constitution of the USSR should be revised to forbid all religious propaganda and to further restrict the activity of the Church, we request protection and retention for the Orthodox Church of the rights granted to it by the existing legislation of the USSR.

There is little need for comment on this memorandum. It reveals the specific nature of the difficulties placed in the way of religious endeavor during this period, and also the fact that the central government was considered as having competence to deal with these difficulties. In anti-religious efforts as in all collectivization and in the whole socialization process, the initiative stemmed from the central organs of the Party and government.

The years 1927–1932 saw a tremendous convulsion in the U.S.S.R., a breaking up of the whole order of life, like the breaking up of the ice on the Volga. Tremendous forces clashed and crashed, and the rising flood broke down every "soft spot" in the resisting environment. Religion was such a "soft spot," one of many in the environment, in which the terrific force of revolutionary ideology made itself felt. Yet they are at fault who believe that religion suffered simply because it *happened* to be in the way of this flood. Religion was specifically included in the list of reactionary elements. In 1927, when the first rumblings of the socialist drive were to be heard, Stalin declared, "We conduct propaganda and shall conduct propaganda against religious prejudices." [9] Party leaders who had grown up in the midst of philosophical discussions on Party principle and program undoubtedly understood fully the distinction between "religious prejudices" and religion in its common connota-

[9] Cf. p. 101.

tion, but the rank and file either could not or would not draw such a distinction. Indeed, they had Lenin's authority for considering all religion inimical to socialist progress. Consequently, in the tremendous upheaval of the First Five Year Plan, "anti-religious propaganda against religious prejudices" took on physical character, a vengeful and brutal attack by militant atheism on all the institutions of religion, just as "voluntary" collectivization became a process of crushing down a modern industrializing framework on the village life of the peasants.

The churches of the West were hardly in position to comprehend this situation. Some clumsily confused political and religious elements in the Russian scene; others, who resented the Soviet political program, seized upon the sufferings of Russian Christians as a battle cry for drawing churchmen into an anti-socialist camp. Fortunately, there were others who understood the situation and criticized the Soviet authorities on logical and reasonable grounds, viz.: the responsibility of the Soviets for taking the initiative and for permitting excesses in their struggle against religion.

It is idle to debate whether or not there was religious "persecution"; the important thing is not the name for what took place, but the fact that certain things did take place. The memorandum of Metropolitan Sergius is a very restrained recital of some of these things. The Soviet press and court records will provide any sceptical person with an ample supply of cases where ministers of religion and religious institutions suffered eradication or destruction at the hands of state authorities during the years of hasty transfer from the liberalism of NEP to the rigors of all-round Socialism in economic-social and spiritual-intellectual life in the U.S.S.R.

Those who suffered most during this period were the priests and the Evangelical-Baptist groups in the villages and towns in the rich agricultural regions, because this was the era of socialization of agriculture. The cities had already passed through this stage. Consequently the recently authorized administrative organs of the Orthodox Church, as well as the heads of other religious bodies, continued to function without special hindrance, whereas in the village and the Cossack "stanitsa," priests, leaders of evangelical prayer meetings, or others known to be active in religious life, were rejected or excluded from membership in the kolkhoz (collective farm), being left literally in "outer darkness." Some continued to live a pitiable existence, and a few of these eventually were accepted in the collective farms, when the atmosphere became more tranquil. Most of the un-collectivized, however, were banished, and many died in the transport or of the rigors of exile. Religious persons, ordained or otherwise, probably suffered no more than the others, but religion and private property, priest and kulak, all were considered the scum or remnants of capitalism, having no place in the new order of socialized agriculture, and therefore doomed to extinction.

The inner condition of the Orthodox Church at this time is probably well described in the following paragraph which we draw from the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, No. 11–12, issued in the autumn of 1932:

At present the Patriarchal Holy Synod, with the Vicar of the Patriarchal *Locum Tenens* at its head, is filled with the hope that, with the all-powerful help of God, Church life in the future may flow along the accepted course and that, in spite of the difficulties which have always existed and will always exist in the earthly conditions of the existence of

Christ's Church, She, this Church, will be a faithful haven for believers, where they may replenish their spiritual strength for struggle with sin and with the temptations of the world for the sake of salvation to Life Eternal.

CHAPTER VII

"Freedom for Anti-Religious Propaganda"

BY the end of 1932 greater calm was restored. A period of relative equilibrium ensued. The Second Five Year Plan was in the offing, promising consumption goods from the machinery installed during the First Five Year Plan. The famine of 1932–33 was localized; although from three to five million perished in southeastern districts, the rest of the country suffered only moderately. The peasants irksomely tried to adapt themselves to collectivized life. Schools, both in town and village, were filled to bursting. Young men and women worked by day and studied by night in order to build Magnitogorsk and other industrial giants, the symbols of the mighty new socialized state. In the fifteen years since "October" a generation, probably more than a generation, had passed on. The new generation remembered the hardships of 1920–21, but had only second-hand knowledge of capitalistic society, and they reacted to capitalistic theory or the remnants of capitalism as if they were an anachronism, not an active principle or potential danger in society. Such "relics" as religion, wooden ploughs, private shops, were scorned rather than hated; they ignored their existence rather than feeling any urge to fight them, as had been felt by the older generation. The theory of "samotyok"—socialism will come of itself—arose and had to be combatted by the Party organs. The population had to be rendered more alert; socialism must

be related to conscious effort. It must be intellectually comprehended, scientifically planned and vigorously carried forward.

This was the tone and theme of the education of the time, whether in school, press, film, radio or art. It was characteristic also of anti-religious propaganda, which reached its apex at the turn of the period—1932–34. A huge volume entitled "Fifteen Years of Atheism in U.S.S.R." appeared in 1932, giving impressive figures regarding the growth of the Godless Society, the vast volume of atheist literature produced, the numerous anti-religious museums, and the corresponding diminution of religious forces and influence in the country.

To be sure, the Godless Society's five year plan, announced in 1929, was by no means fulfilled. Instead of an anticipated membership of 17,000,000 in 1932, the records showed 5,500,000; instead of 1,500,000 subscribers to the *Godless Newspaper*, 250,000 to the *Godless* monthly and 60,000 to the *Anti-religionist* periodical, the actual record at the end of 1932 was 473,000 for the first, 199,500 for the second, and 31,900 for the periodical. Yet these are impressive figures. The "Anti-Religious Textbook," a 370-page manual, had sold 820,000 copies by 1933.

In July, 1932, a group of American teachers asked Emil Yaroslavsky, President of the Godless Society, for information about the spread of atheism, and he gave the following reply:

We are not conducting an anti-religious campaign at present. A campaign conveys the idea of some temporary goal to be reached by special measures, whereas we are carrying on systematic, day-by-day anti-religious propaganda, along with the organizing of such masses as desire to work in it. At pres-

ent the Society (of Militant Godless) counts 5,500,000 members. However, this does not imply that there are only so many "Godless." One might give the following rough data: Of the Trade Union members, over 40% are Godless; in Moscow as much as 80%. Thus one might consider the average to be 50%—and this means 10,000,000 persons. Furthermore, this does not include collective farm members, of whom there are several tens of millions, and not less than ten millions of Godless among them. We have whole villages which call themselves Godless, for in them not a single peasant observes religious rites. . . . Among city children religiosity is preserved mainly in families of believers; in Godless families there are no religious children. However, even in the believing families far from all children are believers, for they are strongly influenced by the school, the Pioneers organizations,[1] and the whole environment of life. If we are to estimate the entire number of believers in our country at 100,000,000, and this means more than half of the entire population,[2] I would say that less than a half of the total number of children are believers.[3]

A number of important phrases stand out in this statement: Not a campaign, systematic propaganda, Godless villages, influenced by the whole environment. In these phrases are found the characteristic features of Soviet life, as regards religion, during the period from 1932 to 1937. Propaganda of anti-religion had become a function of the state schools in 1929. Soon there arose the need of augmenting the number of qualified instructors for anti-religious work in the Pioneers, Comsomol,[4] trade unions, collective farms, among all citizens. In consequence, a number

[1] Soviet organizations for children of school age.
[2] About 160,000,000 at that time.
[3] "Bezbojnik," August 7, 1932.
[4] Communist Youth Association.

of institutions were established as training centers for anti-religious leaders. Some maintained a two-year course. For the Anti-religious Section of the Leningrad Institute of History, Philosophy and Languages, requirements for registration were the same as for other higher educational institutions, and students were provided bedrooms and scholarships.

A publication entitled "Workers' Anti-religious University" was issued in Moscow in 1933, which gives the normal program for a two-year course and a syllabus of subjects. The introductory paragraphs to the five sections reveal the nature and purpose of these courses:

The two chief subjects of the first section (Russian language and mathematics) are studied with the aim: (1) to freshen up and deepen present knowledge, (2) to show how this knowledge can be practically used in anti-religious work, (3) in mathematics to establish its proper place in science and to show the negative influence of religion and the positive influence of materialism for the advancement of science.

The second section (132 hours) aims: (1) to equip anti-religious workers with all necessary knowledge of the facts of natural science, (2) to prove that materialism is founded on natural science, (3) to reveal the negative influence of religion for the development of science.

The third section (Social-Political), being one of the most important, contains 242 hours of study, of which the largest proportion, 88 hours, is dedicated to dialectic materialism. . . .

The fourth section, 264 hours, provides specialization, and its most important subject is "The Origin and Development of Religion and of Christianity" (132 hours). In this course the history of Christianity and its relation to class struggle up to our own day will be taught. Courses on other religions, Judaism, Mohammedanism, Sectarianism, Lamaism, will not only

give a rapid survey of the origin and development of these religions in the midst of class struggle, but will reveal their specific class essence at the present moment. . . . As regards "History of Atheism" (32 hours) this course is necessary, because in history we see the development of religion going hand in hand with the opposite atheistic tendencies.

The last section, on methods (108 hours), provides . . . a special seminar on various specialized forms of work, political enlightenment, pedagogy, library, oratory, besides practical work (180 hours). In the latter, the teacher will show what an active Godless can and must do in his district, with adaptations for city, village, national minorities, etc.

At the meeting of the Executive Bureau of the Society of Militant Godless, June 15–18, 1933, it was reported that 144,161 persons were receiving anti-religious instruction in local groups; 4,135 were enrolled in courses and seminars of the intermediate section, there were 26 Workers' Anti-religious Universities and one for Red Army soldiers, six anti-religious higher educational institutions, and the Anti-religious Correspondence Institute had six departments, giving instruction to 3,799 persons. There is an interesting parallel here, between the 26 "Universities" and the 58 Orthodox Theological seminaries, and between the 6 higher anti-religious institutes and the 4 theological academies, or higher theological schools of the old regime. It is interesting to note further that diligence in study did not always or exclusively arise out of enthusiasm for the anti-religious professional ministry, any more than was the case of the theological students of the old regime. For both religious and anti-religious ministries, special inducements were offered. The better students in theological seminaries received scholarships when they advanced to the academies;

similarly, qualified candidates for anti-religious work received free quarters and a scholarship. Prizes were also offered. A fund of 30,000 roubles was set up to provide prizes in the "Anti-religious Study Competition for the Academic Year 1933–34." [5] First prize of Rs.1,000 was awarded to the Jarovslavsky City Soviet of the Militant Godless, with the following citation:

Nearly 50 per cent of all the members of the Militant Godless Society took part in anti-religious study; 13,799 studied in 541 different groups. . . . In order to draw into anti-religious work a greater number of factory workmen, a series of anti-religious subjects was chosen for them to work out in cooperation with the students of the industrial-polytechnical courses and of the workers' technical schools. . . . In order to provide leadership for anti-religious work in government schools in the city, the teachers were called together for instruction in the principal anti-religious subjects. Besides introducing anti-religious study into the system of workers' education, and the direct organization of anti-religious workers' groups in the automobile factories and the rubber plant, systematic instruction was organized in an anti-religious seminar of the Communist University, attended by 150 persons. . . . The regional staff of the competition in cooperation with the city Department of Public Education helped the schools to elaborate a series of anti-religious topics for groups in which 5,489 took part. Less satisfactory was the progress of anti-religious work in the collective farms, where there were 33 anti-religious groups attended by 732 persons.

The whole scheme of things was reversed; under the old regime religion was considered to be of the very substance of life. The izvoztchik [6] and his fare both removed their

[5] "Antireligioznik," No. 4, 1933, Moscow.
[6] Cab driver.

headgear when passing a church or the shrine of the Iberian Virgin; ikons hung in all public places; church holidays and saints' days governed the rhythm of life; religious instruction was given in all schools, public or private. There was the fundamental assumption that God exists, and that spiritual forces penetrate all areas of human life and activity. Under the Soviets the basic assumptions about God and spiritual forces were discarded in the conviction that they belonged to the pre-Marxian period, when they were necessary as assumptions, but false in essence. Truth was revealed in the nineteenth century, thanks to the availability of science. Science answers all the questions previously unanswerable and deferred to God. The task of anti-religious propaganda, whether conducted by the schools, by the Godless Society, or by leaders and agencies of government, was to translate these new assumptions into terms acceptable to the minds and habits of the people.

In countries of the West, most people have had some personal experience of religious "propaganda" in their common school classes for reading, history, and social study. In the Soviet Union, these and other school subjects have become impregnated with anti-religion. How can one teach anti-religion in mathematics, physics and similar sciences? An answer is found in the syllabus of courses [7] for one of the 26 anti-religious universities, from which we draw the following paragraphs.

The object of the study of mathematics. Mathematics as a scientific method for studying the phenomena surrounding us. Dimension. Analysis and geometry. Causes furthering the development of mathematics in antiquity and in our days. The "mathematical numbers" of pagan priests in ancient times.

[7] "Workers' Antireligious University."

Legends about the supernatural origin of mathematical knowledge. The monopoly of mathematical knowledge demanded by pagan priests to enable them to oppress others.

. . . *Percentage and diagrams.* The chief problems of percentage. The percentage of workmen who are members of religious societies. The calculation of the yearly increase of production (in %), according to the data of the Five Year Plan. Study of statistical tables. Statistics of drunkenness and hooliganism during holidays. Statistics of the death-rate as result of alcohol. Statistics of religious denominations. Statistics of leaving the Church in workmen and in peasant regions. Statistics of the revenue of monasteries. Diagrams corresponding to these tables. Statistics of the Godless movement in the U. S. S. R.

Ratio and proportion. Ratio between the two values. The ratio of the amount given by the Imperial government for the building of churches to the general amount expended in construction. Ratio between the wages of a workman and the revenue of a village priest in pre-revolutionary Russia.

Introduction to algebra. Development of mathematics. Development of algebra. Persecution of men of science in the Middle Ages. The tragic fate of Galileo. Letters used in algebra. Algebraic problems and their characteristics. Algebraic expressions. Formula. Empirical formulae and their uses. Establishment of the dependence of mathematical formulae on various dimensions. Sacred figures in the East. . . .

Physics. The place of physics in anti-religious propaganda. Connection between ancient myths and the endeavor of man to discover the causal relationship between various natural phenomena. A myth—the expression of primitive man's helplessness to establish the true, scientific reason for the phenomena. Scientific method in thinking—the foundation of godlessness.

Movement as the basis of all that exists. The laws of movement. Different types of movement. Force—the cause of move-

ment. Inertia. Newton's laws. Action equal to reaction, as an example of the dialectic development of a physical process. Was the miracle performed by Joshua possible? (Lecture and demonstration.) . . .

Phenomena of light. Laws of reflection and of refraction. . . . "Miracles" founded on phenomena of light. Full inner refraction. (Lecture and demonstration.)

Chemistry. Its importance; for economic life in peace and war; in agriculture, and for working out a correct world view. The part played by chemistry in the struggle against religious superstitions.

Mechanical and chemical industry. Physical and chemical phenomena. Transformation of energy. Mechanical mixture and chemical amalgamation. "The Miracles" of chemical transformations. . . .

Obtaining oxygen. Experiments of combustion in pure oxygen. Oxydation. The air—a mixture of oxygen and azote. Combustion of phosphorus and phosphoric hydrogen. Self-combustion. "Divine" wandering lights. Combustion of sulphur and natrium in oxygen. Acids and basic elements. Modification in the colouring of the indicators. Neutralization. Colours. Transformation of water into blood. . . .

Unity of matter. Theory concerning the building up of matter and the evolution of the universe and the earth's surface, from a chemical point of view. Science rejects all the statements of religion.

Geology. Introduction: The Biblical, religious point of view. Its class essence. "The Bible in the Depths of the Earth.". . .

Methods of geological reckoning of time; compare this with Church calculations. How old is the earth? Practical work for the study of the earth's surface.

Belief in hell under the earth. Rejection of the religious explanation of the causes of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. . . .

Astronomy. Introduction: What does the world look like through the prism of a religious viewpoint? The worldview of a savage and of science. Astronomy as the deliverer of human thought. Astronomy struggling against the Church. The contents of the letter addressed by the Soviet astronomers to the Pope of Rome (1930). Science and religion.

The world is not such as it appears to the direct observer. The "Heaven" of science. Contemporary astronomical telescopes. . . .

Will there be "an end of the world"? The teaching of Clausius. The work of contemporary scientists. The Nernst hypothesis. The universe in the light of contemporary physics. Antireligious deductions. Excursions to the astronomic observatory: Study of the starry sky.

Biology. A short history of biological science. The importance of biology for working out a dialectic-materialistic worldview. The Darwin theory a spontaneous dialectic theory. The importance of biology in medicine, technics, agriculture, and other branches of human life. Importance of biology for antireligious propaganda.

The origin of man. The religious conception that man is a being totally different from the rest of the animate world. Origin of the Biblical narrative regarding the creation of man out of the earth. The class character of the Biblical tale concerning the origin of man. The relationship of man to the animal world. How man differs from animals. The antecedents of man. The part played by labor in the humanization of the ape. Atheistic deductions.

Darwinism and Atheism: Darwinism and Marxism. The Marxist conception of evolution. Atheistic deductions from Darwin's theory. The persecution of the Church against Darwin's theory. Contemporary scientific reaction in capitalistic countries and the attempts made to refute Darwinism. (The "Monkey trial.") Attempts to give an idealistic explanation to the evolution of the organic world. The adaptation to evo-

lutionary teaching made by the Church. The attempt to canonize Burbank.

Origin of life on the earth: Theory of spontaneous genesis in ancient times. The invention of the microscope. The world of small creatures. The revival of the theory of spontaneous genesis. The experiments of Pasteur. The attempts made by the Church to profit by the experiments of Pasteur. . . .

Life, Death. The limits of life and death. Relative conception of "death." The death of a whole organism and the continuation of life in separate organs. The conception of death as an infraction of the coordinated work of the various parts of the body. Death as a qualitative leap from the animate to the inanimate. Constant struggle between life and death in the living organism. The organism as a unity of opposites. The cause of the putrefaction of corpses. The relics of saints.

Does the soul exist? The conception of an "eternal," "Divine" soul, according to the religious beliefs of different nations. Close relationship between spiritual activity and the nervous system. The brain. Comparative anatomy of the brain. Experiments of Flourance, Holtz, and others. Unity of the psychic and the physical. Activity of the nervous system and spiritual activity not the same thing.

Psychic activity—special characteristics of highly developed organism. Evolution in the conduct of animals. Tropism. Reflexes. Instincts. Conditional reflexes. Experiments by Pavloff. Qualitative peculiarities of the above types of activity. Conditional reflexes in man. The historic conditioning of human psychic activity. The psychic activity of man as a reflection of his historical activity. The similarity and the difference in the psychic activity of man and of animals. . . .

Creation of new forms. The part played by theory in human practice. Dialectic materialism as a rule of activity. Selection. Experiments of Mitchourin and Burbank.

Victory over sickness. How religion looks on the cause of sickness. The modern scientific answer to this question. Con-

tagious diseases. Their origin and the struggle against them. The founders of modern medicine. Serum, vaccination, and chemical therapeutics. Individual and social prophylactics. Religious ceremonies a source of contagion.

Diseases of the glands of inner secretion and scientific progress in treating them. The struggle against old age. Rejuvenation.

These paragraphs show how propaganda and instruction on antireligion, like propaganda for socialized economics and military preparedness, have been intimately related to the daily life of citizens. Soviet life is an integrated life of theory and practice. But, in line with dialectic principles, theory is made to express itself dynamically, and prove itself in practice. Consequently atheism cannot rest quietly in books on the library shelf, but must demonstrate its motivating power in the lives of people. During the Second Five Year Plan, when emphasis was placed on producing goods for common consumption, antireligion also was brought down from the higher realms of theory and directly applied to the common life of the people. The organized power of religion was already broken, but there remained the necessity of breaking its power in individual lives and in the habits of social life. This is called for in Article 13 of the Party program, and confirmed in countless articles and speeches for the enlightenment of the Soviet public. Atheism must take the place of religion in the attitudes and general outlook of the public.

In order to gain a better comprehension of the attitudes and general outlook of the new generation in Russia, and of their leaders, with whom happy relationships are sought for the advancement of human life everywhere, we need to pay careful attention not only to what is, but how it got

that way. In other words, we need to examine both the intellectual atmosphere and the elements of school instruction which have the purpose of creating this atmosphere. It is of the essence of happy relationships with the Soviet people that there should be understanding of the process by which the inner and fundamental conceptions are created, as well as of the social and economic activities through which these conceptions are expressed. These conceptions are, of course, in large measure the product of the Soviet educational system. They are maintained by the routine of work in factory, office, field or home, and by constant reiteration and confirmation over the radio, in the press, films, etc. We ought, therefore, to review all these media of instruction at some length. This, however, is a task beyond the scope of this little volume. We may content ourselves with an examination of how the Revolution itself becomes a school subject in which children learn patriotism, economics and atheism as essentially related to each other.

During the first decade of the Soviet regime, religion and antireligion were in physical conflict in the persons of their respective champions. This conflict was in itself an educative and formative process—part of the dialectic process of history—from which certain conclusions could be drawn for the instruction of those, who, by reason of age or distance, did not participate. In illustration of these conclusions, we quote from the syllabus, already referred to, the sections which deal with Socialistic Construction and Religion.

Introductory Lecture: The Struggle for Socialism

The dictatorship of the Proletariat as a fundamental condition and weapon of socialistic reconstruction. The economic

life of the transitional period and its various stages. . . . The struggle of classes during the various stages of the transitional period. The part played by religious organizations in this struggle; protectors of the interests of the oppressing classes. . . .

Socialistic advance and class relations within the country. The mutual relations of the class forces within the country in connection with the great development of industrialization. The relation between the worker class and the peasants chiefly founded on the product of the labour of both classes. The acuteness of class struggle within the country. The development of activity among the kulak (thriving peasant) capitalistic elements and their attempts to withstand the government. The part played by religious organizations in this struggle.

Religion and religious organizations the worst foes of the socialistic advance along all fronts. Antisoviet elements make use of religion (cases of heretic orthodox sects, the Baptists, the spies in the Ukraine and in Belorussia, etc.). Religious organizations using all means as a weapon in their struggle against the Soviet government; propaganda against the achievements of science in agriculture (chemical manure, struggle against harmful insects, a more rational exploitation of the fields, etc.). The persuasion of the peasants not to give up the old "Divinely established" ways of tilling the fields; propaganda against collectivisation. All this Church activity directed against the development of the economic power of the Soviet Union. Religious organizations profiting by the mistakes made in the socialistic construction.

Left deviations in collectivization. Closing of churches. Counter-revolutionary demonstrations of the clergy of various denominations in connection with a partial desertion of the collective farms by the peasants and with the correction of certain admitted mistakes. Propaganda for an early end of the Soviet government.

Construction of socialism in one country. Theory of the

proletarian revolution and the law of the unequal development of capitalism. Its peculiarities during the time of imperialism; the problem of the possibility of the victory of socialism "at first only in a few, perhaps only in a single capitalistic country." (Lenin.) . . .

The struggle of religious organizations of all the world against the country in which socialism is being constructed. The united front of Churchmen and sectarians in their struggle against the Soviet Union. Attempt to organize a crusade. Causes for its failure. Attempts to organize a new crusade. Support given to the White Guard by Churchmen and the Archbishop of Canterbury and his attitude towards the White Guard emigrant movement; material and moral aid given. Organization of special theological seminaries for the "White" emigrants and their preparation for future work within the Soviet Union. Work of the world religious organizations abroad and in the Soviet Union; spies, refusal to do military service in the USSR; invitation to serve in capitalistic armies. Compare propaganda of sectarians here and in the U.S.A. . . .

The Church and the Provisional Government. The Congress of the clergy and laity in June, 1917, in Moscow for a victorious end of the war and for obedience to the government, etc. The October Revolution and the attitude of the clergy. The election of a Patriarch by the Church Sobor. Anti-Soviet demonstration of the Churchmen.

Military Communism. Active participation of religious organizations in counter-revolutionary activity. . . . Participation of church in counter-revolutionary plots. Invitation of intervention, especially of French and English intervention.

The NEP as the only correct policy of the victorious proletariat and its international importance. . . . The bourgeois and Church "Smenovekhovtzy" (those who surrendered intransigeance in favour of loyalty to the Soviets). The hopes of capitalistic elements for a gradual return (as result of the New

Economic Policy) to capitalistic social relations. Separations in the midst of the clergy. The Tikhonians and the Regenerated (Living Church). Social-economic causes for the discord among the clergy. Regeneration tendencies among other Christian and non-Christian religions in the USSR. The Tikhonians as adherents of a return to the bourgeois-landowner order; their continual struggle against the Soviet government; an example of this. The Council in Karlovtzy (Russian orthodox bishops) in Serbia and the conduct of the clergy during the famine and the sequestration of church valuables. The political program of the Regenerated. Its relation to the NEP. The preaching of Christian socialism. Absence of social foundations among the workers and peasants. The loss of influence of the Regenerated as a result of a more profound class struggle in the village. The return of most of the Regenerated into the fold of the Tikhonian Church, especially when the latter declared cessation of open warfare against the Soviets.

The growth of sectarianism among the petty bourgeois elements and among the more backward unorganized workmen. The causes of the growth of sectarianism in the first period of the NEP. Difference of growth of sectarianism during the military stage of Communism and during the NEP stage. Influence of political and Church liberty on the development of sectarianism, as an expression of the neutral tendencies of the average peasants during civil war and the strengthening of the kulaks at the time of the NEP. The sectarian pseudo-collective-farms. The social status of the sectarians. Discords among the sectarians. Sectarianism as a political weapon of the kulaks during the NEP period.

The last stage of the NEP. Increase of activity among religious organizations as a result of the advance made by socialistic elements. . . .

Success of the socialistic reconstruction of national economic life. Difference between socialistic and capitalistic economic life. Program and fundamental tendencies. Church members

uphold the capitalistic manner of organizing economic life (anarchy, elemental forces dominating), as something given from "on high" and "organized by God Himself.". . .

Great material values are swallowed up by Church and sectarian organizations. The money spent by the workers during church holidays and for religious ceremonies. What this money might add to the economic welfare of the people. . . .

Class struggle and the new distribution of forces in the village. The collective farmer a true steadfast bulwark of the Soviet government. . . .

Religious people make use of difficulties in the way of collectivization. Religious organizations express the political hopes of the kulaks. Desperate attempts to prevent collectivization by means of the influence of religion. Use made of religiously minded peasants and especially peasant women to break up the collective farms from within.

Use made by our foes of even the smallest mistakes in our anti-religious work (e.g.: closing churches in an administrative manner, counter-attack of churchmen).

In this syllabus is to be found an epitome of the history of the conflict, from the standpoint of the atheistic world-view. It is informative, consistent, and reasonable. But it is out of balance. Even where there is criticism of certain acts or tendencies, such as illegal closing of churches by the local administrative organs of government, the purpose is not to give an objective picture, and of course not to defend the Church but the policy of government. It is a one-sided affair, showing religion always to be in the wrong.

People in the West, who are accustomed to free speech and free press, naturally look for literature or statements from representatives of the other side. But there is no such literature, thanks to the application of Soviet constitution

and laws; any publication in the defense of religion and attacking atheism would constitute religious propaganda. This is one of the areas, therefore, where the question of religious freedom arises. During the NEP, religious books and pamphlets were issued by the Living (Renovated) Church, but these consisted chiefly of an apologetic for their special brand of religion and criticism of the Church under the Tsar and under Patriarch Tikhon, constituting therefore more of an aid to antagonists than to supporters of religion. Here and there "debates" were held between anti-religious propagandists and defenders of religion, but these were of local occurrence, and the few reports regarding them which appeared in the press brought out praise for the anti-religionists and cynicism or scorn for religion. Religion was permitted in the heart and within the walls of the "house of prayer"—church, chapel, mosque or synagogue—but not outside. When a Soviet citizen speaks or writes of religious freedom in Russia, the picture he has in his mind is that of certain churches or chapels he has passed and seen to be full of worshippers. Accustomed as he is to customs and laws which draw a sharp distinction between legal and illegal organizations, he correctly judges the Church to be "legalized" and in the same sense free. When a foreigner speaks or writes of religious freedom, we may fairly assume that he interprets it in terms of freedom for religion and religious activity such as he has had ample reason to experience or observe abroad. Trouble or confusion arises when this distinction is not drawn. In the Soviet Union legislation allows freedom of conscience and of confession, freedom for worship and celebration of the sacraments, freedom for an exigetical homily or humble sermon, free-

dom for living with Christ in one's heart, but no freedom for the evangelical commission to preach the gospel to all nations, not even to the Russian people, except as part of a service of worship.

The syllabus which we are studying has thus far dealt with the reflection or expression of religion in science and in history, including contemporary history among the Russian peoples. It subsequently proceeds to deal with the nature of religion and with the current expression of religion in capitalist countries. This part is illuminating for it enables us to "see ourselves as others see us." It will be noted that the authors of the syllabus have followed closely the line laid down by Marx, Engels and Lenin, with their able philosophical collaborators, and have also continued along the same line in interpreting religious currents of our day.

The section begins with an analysis of the chief theories on the origin of religion: (1) the naturalistic school of Max Muller, (2) the theory of the fear of death; noting the "methodological insufficiency of this theory, the roots of religion are not biological but social," (3) the authoritative theory, and (4) the animistic theory (Spencer, Plekhanoff, Laphag, Kuhn, Stepanoff), and carries on with the following outline.

Origin of Christianity. Christianity as one of the Hebrew sects, opposed to the Jerusalem priestly caste. Peaceable tendencies of Christianity towards the Roman Empire. The relation of Christianity to the failure of the Roman-Hebrew wars. Christianity accepted by the proletarian and slave masses of the ancient city population. Christianity as a religion establishes the acceptance of the *status quo* of the environment: this can be explained only by the low standard of slavery and

the weakening of class struggle in Rome in the second–third centuries. Christianity lowering the moral standard. Mysticism, eschatology, religious orgies during the agape. The important part played by the prophets in early Christianity. The anarchic essence of prophecy as the reflection of the influence of the de-classed elements in Christianity. Difference between early Christianity and Communism. Christianity preached submission and adaptation; it was not hostile to the oppressing classes. The legendary character of the Christian persecutions. The rich classes joining Christianity. The establishment of the Church and of the authority of bishops, metropolitans, patriarchs, and popes. Oecumenical Councils. The union of the Church with the state. The deification of the royal authority (Caesaro-Papism).

Did Christ exist? The mythological and the historical schools. The insufficiency of the historical school (Criticism of Nikolsky). The fundamental conceptions of the mythological school. Absence of historical or archeological data concerning Jesus Christ. False data concerning Christ, from sources of a later day invented by the Church. Contradictions found in the Church sources (e.g., in the Gospels). The untrustworthiness of these sources. Similarity of the cult of Christ and that of the pre-Christian cults of dying and resuscitated gods. The vegetative character of these cults. Their relation to agricultural magics. The influence of the slave-owning society and the Messianic ideas on these cults. The mythical character of the other chief individuals of the Gospel narrative: the Virgin, John the Baptist, the Twelve Apostles. The doubtful historical existence of Paul. How and when was the Christian chronology established.

Capitalism in England. The economic dominion of England. Victory of the machine; capitalization of agriculture. The conquest of new markets. Crises. The Parliamentary Reform of 1832. Struggle for Free Trade.

Reaction of 1815–20. The first stages of the workmen's mass

movement. The struggle for the reform of 1824. The Trade-Union movement.

Chartism. The social status of the English proletariat. The struggle for the charter. Various stages in the struggle. The historical importance of the movement. The development of the workmen's movement. Trade Unions and their peculiarities of organization and tactics. Socialistic movement and socialistic parties. Reasons for the weakness of the socialistic movement.

Christian socialists in England acting as a brake on the Chartist movement. Social Utopists of England and their religious standpoint. Christian associations. Propaganda of the union of labour and capital. The class essence of Christian socialists in England. Christian socialism a feudal socialism. . . .

Economic development of America in the first half of the nineteenth century. The struggle between the bourgeois North and the plantation South. The workmen's movement in America in the first half of the XIXth century. The victory of the North and the liberation of the negroes. The economic development of the United States at the end of the XIXth century. Peculiarities of this development. Agriculture and the trends of its development. The political order and its peculiarities. The two-party system. The bourgeois political parties. The economic policy of the bourgeoisie. Foreign policy. Development of the workers' movement. Trade Unions and their peculiarities: their organization and tactics. The American Federation of Labour. Industrial Workers of the World. The socialist movement and the socialist parties. Reasons for the weakness of the socialist movement. . . .

Religion serving the counter-revolution. The class essence of religion in the Western European capitalistic countries. The Church and the regeneration of religion in capitalistic countries. The union of the Church and the state. The cooperation of social democracy, bourgeoisie and the Church. Fascism serving the Church. The calumny of the bourgeois and the Church against the Revolution. The struggle against Com-

munism. Religion serving chauvinism. Religious persecution. Antisemitism and the part played by the Church. The Church struggling against the workers' movement. Religious-political unions. Christian Unions, Trade Unions, the World's religious organizations: The International Christian Trade Unions, the Catholic International of Young People; the British and Foreign Bible Society, the Scottish Bible Society, the Society for Spreading Christian Knowledge, the World's Student Christian Federation, the Y.M.C.A., the Salvation Army, the World Baptist Union, and others.

The aims and tasks of religious unions. The struggle for influence over the working mass. Struggle for the young people, the school, for influence over children, women, peasants. The World's Congress of Believers. International of Believers. The International Church Movement. Contemporary Christian socialism in the West. Religion as a weapon of colonial spoliation and of imperialistic conquests. Christian missions as agents of imperialism. The proletariat and religion. . . .

In this section there appears a corrective to the uninformed view, that opposition to religion on the part of the Soviet authorities was a simple reaction against the faults of the Church of the Tsarist regime. The Communist Party, with its official or unofficial agencies, is as universal in its views on religion as it is on economics and politics. Marxian socialist philosophy is an integrated philosophy, its economic plan is a scientific system, and its entire educational effort a means of coordinating this philosophy with this system. This is no picayune nationalist or racist philosophy, but, as has been quoted:

The genius of Marx consisted in the fact that he found the answers to questions which the leading minds of mankind had put. His teaching arose as a direct and uninterrupted continua-

tion of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political science and socialism. . . . It is the lawful successor of the best that mankind created in the XIXth century in German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism.[8]

The basis for the atheism of Karl Marx and Engels is found in their dialectic philosophy, and their references to contemporary religion were drawn from Roman Catholic and European Protestant Church life. Even Lenin's fundamental work on religion and religious philosophy, "Materialism and Empirio-criticism," scarcely mentions the Russian Church. Marx-Engels-Lenin philosophy makes science its essential element and atheism its corollary. In the popularization of this philosophy and its propagation as scientific socialism, historical incidents and practical examples are, of course, used to reveal the connection between philosophy and everyday life. Lenin did this in his article on "Socialism and Religion," where there are many references to the Russian Church. On the other hand his longer article, "On the Attitude of the Workers' Party to Religion" (1909), the Russian Church is scarcely referred to, although this is one of his strongest statements on this subject.

In the Soviet Union, anti-religious propaganda, or, to use another term, education in atheism, naturally has drawn heavily upon local incidents, customs, faults of the Russian Orthodox Church, which is the form of religion best known to the Russian people. Much of its argument, however, is based on the outlook and practices of the Churches in the West, and especially on showing the current relationship of outstanding British statesmen or of American

[8] Lenin: *Three Sources and Three Essential Parts of Marxism*, 1913.

capitalists with the Churches in these countries. Lloyd George, Ramsay MacDonald, Austin Chamberlain, Henry Ford, John D. Rockefeller Jr., or simply a caricatured "capitalist" or clerical "running dog of capitalism" were pictured numberless times in the illustrated Godless journals, *Atheist at the Workbench*, *The Godless Newspaper*, *The Godless Journal*, etc., published not only in Russian but in the languages of national minorities. The Vatican was similarly presented, and some of the most blasphemous caricatures were those of the Pope. On the whole, the writer, in reading the greater part of the books, pamphlets and periodicals put out as anti-religious propaganda in the Russian language, has been impressed by the way in which they have avoided the pitfall of making their case simply on faults in religious life in Russia—Orthodox, sectarian, Jewish or Moslem—and how they carefully built up the case against religion as a universal phenomenon of the pre-scientific era.

During this period (1927–1937) of the most widespread education in atheism, experience brought out the points which were found to be of greatest importance in this propaganda. These were summarized as follows in the "Agitators' Guide,"[9] a fortnightly journal serving, as its title indicates, as a current manual not only for anti-religious workers but for the whole body of professional propagandists.

1. "All religion is contradictory to science" (Stalin). Science gives man a correct understanding of the world and of the laws of nature. Equipped with knowledge, man in the process of working actively transforms nature, adjusting it to his needs. Science arms the workers in the struggle for the reconstruction

[9] No. 8, May, 1937, Moscow.

of social life, for the destruction of exploitation and oppression. The workers of our country, mastering science, are successfully building communism under the leadership of the Party of Lenin and Stalin.

2. Religion at its very roots is inimical to science. It teaches man to have blind faith and not to study, not to carry on research. Religion gives the believer a wrong, distorted conception of reality. The origin of the universe, of life on earth, of man, of mind—all this is wrongly, anti-scientifically, primitively explained in religious books. Religion holds man in darkness and ignorance.

3. Religion teaches the would-be existence of a special unearthly, supernatural world, unsubordinated to any natural laws: god, devils, hell, paradise, life beyond the grave, and so on. All that happens on earth depends, according to religious teaching, on "the will of God.". . . Religion thereby inculcates the idea of the complete passivity of man, the idea of predestination from above of the whole pathway of life of a man, the idea of his uncomplaining subordination to his "destiny," "fate."

4. Religion makes all sorts of prejudice and superstition, which play a harmful, reactionary rôle, sink into the mind of the believer.

5. Religion teaches that true human happiness is not on earth but "in heaven," that earthly life is simply a stage to the attainment of happiness after death. In order to procure "eternal bliss" after death, believing workers, according to religious teaching, must uncomplainingly carry their "cross" on earth. Patience, humility, love of enemies—these are the rules of conduct recommended to workers by religious "morality."

6. "Religion is the opium of the people" (Marx). Poisoning the mind of the workers, it turns believing workers and peasants into submissive slaves, simplifies the mastery of exploiters in class society. Religion is a weapon in the hands of the exploiters, by means of which they restrain the workers from revolutionary struggle against their enslavers.

7. Religion spreads national jealousy, arousing enmity between people of various faiths.

8. By pacifistic preaching of peace, calling for love and universal forgiveness, religion and religious organizations seek to modify in capitalistic countries the alertness of workers and to disarm them before the face of wars now in preparation by the imperialists.

9. In our beautiful country, the land of triumphant socialism, religion is a vestige of capitalism in the minds of part of the workers. Religion favours the strengthening in actual life, in the habits and minds of the believing workers, of a whole range of harmful, reactionary, capitalistic vestiges.

10. Religious customs (especially religious holidays) bring vast material loss to socialistic economy, and put a brake on the rise of culture in the masses.

11. Religious vestiges still resting in the minds of a not unimportant part of the workers, favor reactionary activity of anti-Soviet elements.

12. Every religion brings harm to the workers. . . . Lenin taught that the more refined the religion, the more harmful it became, because the more difficult for believing workers to comprehend its reactionary role. . . . No matter how churchmen and sectarians greet and praise the Soviet power, no matter how they try to "adjust" their "gods" to Communism, the essence of religious activity is profoundly reactionary and at its root inimical to socialism.

13. The Communist Party always has considered and considers anti-religious propaganda one of its most important tasks. "Our propaganda must include the propaganda of atheism," taught Lenin. "We conduct propaganda and shall conduct propaganda against religious prejudices," teaches Stalin. The struggle against religious poison is struggle for the new man, for the mastery of science and technics, for the dawn of culture and of the whole human process, for Communism. The overcoming of religious vestiges is one of the most important political tasks.

Throughout this summary, but particularly in the 12th article, we feel the rigidity of the Communist position. The same was evident in the syllabus from which we have quoted, particularly in the section on "Religion Serving the Counter-Revolution," where not only churches but Christian Trade Unions and youth movements are thrown into the same pot, as enemies of Marxian socialism. Many friends of Soviet Russia like to forget, or at least to minimize this rigidity, but there it is. The Soviet Government is firm in its desire and intention to substitute atheism for religion. In the Moscow Patriarchate's book on "The Truth About Religion in Russia," to which reference has been made, this attitude is not overlooked.

> In Russia, as is known, anti-religious propaganda is conducted, for which freedom is guaranteed by the constitution. It is known also that anti-religious ideology is the ideology of the Communist Party and, of course, the Orthodox Church regrets this fact.

This is one of the most difficult problems to solve in dealing with the Soviet Union. With one hand, the Party rules out God, and with the other it writes into the constitution freedom for religious worship. Where is the consistency? An introduction to the answer is found in an incident that occurred in connection with adopting the new constitution. The published draft, which was spread all over the country as a matter of education and to provoke discussion, contained the phrase which, in effect, would restore full citizenship to ministers of religion, providing them even the right to stand for election to the Supreme Soviet. There was much discussion on this point, in meetings and in the press. Finally, on November 25,

1936, when Stalin introduced the debate at the Extraordinary Meeting of the Supreme Soviet and dealt with various suggested revisions in the text, he came upon the article on universal suffrage (Art. 135),[10] and made the following explanation:

> Some say that there is danger that there may creep into the supreme organs of the country elements hostile to the Soviet power, perhaps some of the former white guards, kulaks, priests, etc. But what is there actually to fear? Those who fear wolves should not enter the forest. In the first place, not all former kulaks, white guards or priests are hostile to the Soviet power. In the second place, if the people here and there should elect hostile persons, that will only mean that our agitation (propaganda work) is badly handled, and we fully deserve such shame; but if our agitation work is carried on in Bolshevik manner, then the people will not let hostile persons get into their supreme organs. This means we must work and not whimper. We must work and not simply expect that everything will be provided ready-made by administrative order.

Stalin's use of the phrase "not hostile to the Soviet power" attracts our attention, for it is contrary to the general attitude of government and Party up to this time. Three facts are important in this connection. (1) The constitution is the basic law of the Soviet Union, formerly the Russian Empire, at a definite, historical stage in its development, viz., the stage of socialism. (2) Socialism is not yet Communism, and historical remnants of Tsarist

[10] "Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the U.S.S.R. who have reached the age of eighteen, irrespective of race or nationality, religion, educational and residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights."

feudo-capitalism are, reasonably enough, expected to persist in the socialist state, whereas they will disappear in the Communist stage. (3) Communists are, so to speak, the prophets and advance guard in the socialist order, striving for the achievement of the Communist order. Even the socialist stage is an advance, however, and Stalin took the pains to point out that priests in the socialist stage of society are not the same as priests in the previous era. In socialism, priests no longer hold any place of power. Hostile priests have no legal existence. Priests permitted in office are only those who have proved their loyalty. They have adapted themselves to new socialist conditions, including the restrictions on Church life, and are no longer a hostile element *in the socialist stage*. If and when the Party should decide to take another radical step forward toward the Communist stage, then the slogans and attitudes appropriate to the Communist stage would become applicable, viz., that Communism and religion are incompatible.

It is confusing to have contradictions constantly appearing, both in speech and action, as regards religion, but it is helpful always to bear in mind the developing nature of society in the Soviet Union, and particularly the recognition of stages of development. Party and Soviet literature will always be confusing, for Party members, like prophets, speak of the future while living in the present. They talk of Communism while living under Socialism. However, by gaining a grasp on their philosophy of history, we can get a fairly clear view of both present and future.

Throughout the socialist period religious views are expected to remain, but in a diminishing number of people and with dwindling importance. Rather than antagonize

religion, as was done in the periods of revolutionary dynamism, 1918–21 and 1927–32, the policy is to apply a more strictly scientific method, dictated by the Marxist-scientific world view. According to this view, the concept of God grows out of certain historical conditions and when these conditions have been suitably altered, this concept will no longer appear.

> The omnipotence of God is nothing but the fantastic reflection of the impotence of people before nature and the economic relations created by themselves.[11]

It is the purpose and task of Marxist Socialism to effect this alteration, and it is expected that in the end the God-concept will have no grounds for appearing. Then there will be no God. In this process of logic there is no sentiment, no feeling of either love or hate. The Communist cannot hate God, for he cannot hate what, for him, does not exist. The Communist does not even wish to be concerned with God; he is concerned with achieving certain conditions of life for mankind. He is obliged to concern himself with God simply because other men, not yet enlightened with the Marxist scientific world view, persist in believing that God exists and has influence on matter and on human affairs. Such persons tend to depend on God, thereby less on themselves and on man as such, and to seek the ways of God. They are diverted from strictly scientific processes, and tend to judge in terms of divine law, which implies recognition of other authority than is inherent in the Marxist social-economic order of society. It is apparent that such persons by their views hinder the work-

[11] Karl Marx: *Capital.*

ing out of the scientifically ordered way of life—their belief in God, in relation to Marxist society, is like sand in the gears of a Rolls-Royce engine.

Out of this view of the situation, expressed in greatly simplified terms, to be sure, grows the Soviet attitude toward religion, which is not one of neutrality, and its program, which is not one of persecution. It is an inimical attitude, like the attitude of a gardener toward weeds in his cabbage patch, or of a soldier toward the enemy's machine-gun nest. This attitude determines the measures to be taken with regard to religion. In a broad sense one may say that these measures are like a pincer movement. One arm of the pincer is socialist construction, building and changing the order of life until exploitation shall cease, suffering can be quickly relieved by science, and the destiny of man fulfilled in the span of his earthly life—in brief, where the very thought of God will not arise. The other arm is that of enlightenment, education, propaganda, neutralizing, de-energizing or eradicating the ideas which are in any way related to the concept of God. Both arms of the pincer move forward, and then converge.

Here again, however, the actualities of Soviet life have modified the operation of plans and policies, quite in line with the fundamental Marxist theory that economic conditions determine mental attitudes. By 1935 the Second Five Year Plan began to provide results in consumers goods, and the Stakhanoff type of labor efficiency began to increase incomes. The people became concerned with the amenities of life. Theoretical matters claimed less attention. Stalin characterized the situation in his speech on the 17th of November, 1935, on the significance of the Stakhanoff movement by saying:

The current stage of socialist competition—the Stakhanoff movement—is necessarily bound up with new technics. The Stakhanoff movement would be unthinkable without the new, higher technics. Before you are people like Comrades Stakhanoff, Busygyn, Smetanin, Krivonoss, Pronin, the Vinogradoffs, and many more—new people, working men and working women, who have completely mastered the technics of their work, harnessed it and driven it forward. Such people did not exist, or almost did not exist, three years ago. These are new people, peculiar people.[12]

A new kind of people appeared during these years, the product of socialist construction. They were trained in technics and schooled in the socialist order of life. They felt at home and thoroughly enjoyed using machines, electricity, hydraulic power. Power became subservient to them. Man became master, nature the servant. During this period there was little philosophizing among the workers. By day they worked with tremendous vigor at building Magnitogorsk and other industrial giants out of nothing, and at night they studied mathematics and chemistry in order to gain an understanding of the forces at their disposal. In Magnitogorsk and other new cities no church was built. Religion was omitted from this new order of power where men were supreme. Consequently there was no enemy for atheism to fight, and anti-religion began to lose its *raison d'etre*. Both religion and anti-religion fell into the discard.

The actual situation and the current mood as regards religion in the spring of 1936 is well revealed in the report at the Tenth Congress of the Communist Youth Association, where a new official program was under consideration:

[12] Stalin: *Questions of Leninism*, 11th Edition, Moscow, 1939, p. 493.

Regarding religious prejudices. The left-overs of bourgeois ideology have their reflection in religious superstitions and prejudices. Of course the roots of religion in our country have been fundamentally destroyed, and the greater part of our youth, of our children, are growing up free from any religious influence. Yet it would be wrong to think that the struggle with religious prejudices, even among youth, has been finished.

In the initial draft of our Program we wrote: The Comsomol decisively, mercilessly, struggles against religious prejudices. But Comrade Stalin pointed out to us: "Why write 'decisively, mercilessly'; that is not the point. It is necessary to patiently explain to youth the harm of religious prejudices, to conduct among youth propaganda for a materialist world-view, the only scientific world-view." [13]

This is in a very different mood from that which characterized the statement in 1927 that "we conduct anti-religious propaganda and we shall conduct anti-religious propaganda," and is indicative of the great change that had taken place.

It is not difficult to understand, therefore, why it was that in the middle thirties the anti-religious movement passed through a curious epoch of formalism. The number of registered members of the Union of Militant Godless remained on the level of about five million in the branches and cells spread throughout the country. Production of anti-religious books and pamphlets declined, but the circulation of the periodicals kept fairly steady, because the subscribers were these branches or cells, rather than individual readers. Those in authority, however, felt a growing dissatisfaction with the state of affairs on the Godless front, and the investigations and purges which they instituted brought out some interesting facts.

[13] "Pravda," April 22, 1936.

Travelling agents of the Society would call at the addresses of local branches or cells, and find no one acquainted with its affairs—the secretary had moved to other work, or had given up for lack of interest. Elsewhere they discovered that lecturers had been hired, and halls filled, but the lecture itself proved so uninteresting that the audiences left during the speech. In a number of instances, funds of the Society could not be properly accounted for. In a town in the Caucasus, the Society became ambitious, rented larger quarters, established a restaurant, game rooms and baths, but went bankrupt. The anti-climax came when, having cleaned up the mess, the Godless Society appointed as successor a man named Andriadze, who erred in that he closed the year with an unused balance of Rs.40,000 out of the subsidy given him for anti-religious work. District Party leaders and Trade Union officials, all of whom were nominally committed to the Godless program declined to take hold of the situation, saying that they were too busy with other things, that the people were not interested, or that religion was no longer a menace. Crowds continued to visit the anti-religious exhibits in St. Isaac's Cathedral, Leningrad, the Kiev-Petchersky Monastery, and elsewhere. But little enthusiasm, if any, was aroused. Even at the headquarters of the Atheist Society some of the leaders were removed in the purge. A period of apathy set in on the religious front.

In addition to the rise of "new people," various other causes probably contributed to this. In the first place, the Church and all religious bodies had settled down, after the rough treatment they endured during the First Five Year Plan, to such a modest existence as to be little in evidence, and certainly not a visible threat to the welfare of either

the state or the individual citizen. Secondly, enthusiasm for socialist construction found ample outlet in practical matters, in the production of goods, and particularly of consumers' goods, with education and research following the same line. Third, the youth of the country by this time consisted of boys and girls, young men and women, who had been born after 1917, or whose memories did not reach back to the period of the powerful state Church; they had no personal experience of obligatory religious instruction, or of religion as a force in society, and were either atheist or religious according to their own natural bent and conscience. Finally, it would seem that atheism as a doctrine defeated its own self, for it contained only negative elements. Atheism means to be without God, and for persons who were or became atheist, this part of life atrophied, it ceased to exist. The dialectic had run itself out.

The Atheist Union can be looked upon as a subjective grouping in soviet society, which withered away with growing equilibrium and objectivity in intellectual and social life. Having no organic roots or source, according to its own teachings, and being nothing but the obverse of religiousness, it follows that as religion declines, so also must atheism. But whereas religion by its very nature has dynamic power, atheism has none. As religion retired from public view, becoming a matter of conscience, and religious persons became undistinguishable from atheists in their productive and social efforts, the Church no longer seemed a dangerous enemy and the Atheist Union became a Don Quixote fighting, so the public felt, an ephemeral windmill.

Nevertheless the Party was more thorough than the public in its observations and was consistent in its operations. Emil Yaroslavsky was not only head of the Atheist Union

but one of the few remaining Bolsheviks of the pre-Revolutionary period, and in fact one of the Party's most trusted theoreticians and historians. He consistently upheld the doctrine that religion and Communism are incompatible, and never failed to bring this doctrine forward when others have let it fall into neglect. Consequently, whenever the Atheist Union faltered and its forces failed to rally around the banner of Godlessness, Yaroslavsky stirred up the Party and government for more direct action. This is what occurred in 1937.

The Stalin Constitution had gone into effect, life on the whole was much easier, but under the surface elements hostile to the regime persisted. In this time of relative liberalism, opposition felt more free to expand. This is apparently what happened, and the result was the great purge, the trials and the nation-wide stiffening of discipline and outlook that took place in 1937. While abroad little was mentioned beyond the famous Zinoviev and Tukhachevsky trials, actually in the Soviet Union there were local trials or administrative actions in a great many places, involving tens of thousands of persons in industry, collective farms, schools and church life.

Here is the report on one of the trials involving religion, as it appeared in the monthly, "The Godless," No. 7, 1937, quoted from the "Orlovskaia Pravda" of the 30th of May, 1937:

In April and May, 1937, agents of the People's Commissariat of Interior Affairs in Orel revealed the existence of a counter-revolutionary fascist organization of churchmen uniting inveterate partisans of churchly obscurantism. The leaders of this organization were: Bishop Innokenty Nikiforoff, archpriest Voskresensky, vicar of the Smolensky Church in Orel,

and Tikhomiroff and Jdanovitch, priests of the same church.

Who were the members of this counter-revolutionary organization of churchmen? Thirty people have been prosecuted in this connection. Among them, one bishop, twelve priests, three deacons, three former landowners, one former prince, two former nuns, eight former wealthy houseowners. Seven persons out of this counter-revolutionary gang were, at the time of the Tsarist regime, members of the reactionary "Union of Archangel Michael." Sixteen persons had been tried for counter-revolutionary activity. Among them are some who had completed a term of banishment. They all carried on counter-revolutionary work among the believers.

This gang of malicious enemies of the toilers of U.S.S.R. aimed at the building up of a broad counter-revolutionary organization of fascist rebels from among active churchmen and reactionary elements; it further aimed at the strengthening at all costs of the old (non-Renovated) church as a legalized institution for counter-revolutionary work, uniting around this "Russian-Orthodox Church" all the reactionary elements of the city of Orel from among believers; at the liquidation of the Renovated Church in the so-called Orlovsky diocese and at the attracting to the church of young people and working with them in an anti-Soviet spirit. Thus they wanted to take advantage of the Article 124 of the Stalin Constitution.

What were the means toward the achievement of these aims employed by the gang?

The organization of counter-revolutionary fascists openly confronted the faithful with the task of overthrowing the Soviet regime; sermons of a counter-revolutionary nature were constantly preached. Fascist churchmen demanded that the faithful should resist measures taken by the Party and the Soviet authorities.

The leader of the counter-revolutionary fascist organization, Bishop Innokenty Nikiforoff published an anti-Soviet

prayer which he composed in the old-Slavonic language; this prayer was systematically read to the believers.

Another active member of the counter-revolutionary fascist organization Archpriest Voskresensky was, for the past two years, practicing general confession which by its nature was exactly like an anti-Soviet mass meeting.

Bishop Innokenty Nikiforoff would send to country places priests who had been banished from the city as a result of an administrative measure of the authorities. Such priests would carry on counter-revolutionary work among certain backward members of the collective farms.

Members of the counter-revolutionary gang aimed at degrading the historical significance of the greatest document in the world—the Stalin Constitution.

Bishop Innokenty Nikiforoff, priests Voskresensky, Tikhomiroff and Jdanovitch provoked the faithful to taking steps for opening churches which were no longer functioning, collected signatures, etc. Fascist churchmen carried on harmful work before the All-Union census in December, 1936.

The counter-revolutionary fascist organization of churchmen carried on the baptism of school children in the collective farms of the district. This has been done, for instance, by the priest Posdniakoff among the collective farmers of the Great Kulikov region. This same Posdniakoff preached counter-revolutionary sermons to the collective farmers.

One of the active counter-revolutionaries-fascists, priest Jdanovitch, established a confessional in his home. He used confession for a sly and well-planned questioning of the faithful; among the questions asked by him were, for instance, the following: "What is your social origin?"; "Do you have any connection with persons abroad?"; "Have you been sentenced to banishment under the Soviet regime?"; and so on. By means of such questions he tried to feel his way in the matter of enrolling for membership in the counter-revolutionary organization.

Jdanovitch comes from the region bordering on Poland, and took over from Roman Catholic priests their methods of work with people.

Are the members of the fascist counter-revolutionary gang themselves believers? One can judge about that by the answers given by the priest Posdniakoff at the time of trial: To the question "Are you a believer?" Posdniakoff answered: "I have never been a believer." To the question, "What then made you choose the career of a minister of a religious cult?", Posdniakoff replied: "Financial difficulties." "That is to say, covetous interests," asked the prosecutor, and received the reply: "Yes, just as all other priests."

By these answers one of the members of the fascist gang opened before the toilers the "mystery" of the calling of the minister of religious cult, and reveals the entire system of religious "education."

The very fact of the existence of this counter-revolutionary fascist organization proves that the stinking remnants of the rottenness of the past are making a last spasmodic effort to hold up the march of history, of the victorious socialist construction.

The peoples of the Soviet Union are guided by the Party of Lenin and Stalin on their road to communism, and will mercilessly deal with all the enemies of the people, with all wreckers, all counter-revolutionaries; they will mercilessly punish all those who are endeavoring to hinder the realization of the genial teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin.

Public trials of churchmen are seldom reported in the press, and we may therefore take this one to be of some significance, possibly even a "demonstration trial." An examination of the report shows that the churchmen are charged with counter-revolutionary activity, and certain definite acts are used to substantiate the charge, viz.:

attracting young people to the church;
publishing a prayer in Old-Slavonic language;
holding general confessions;
recommending priests who have been banished from cities to go to the villages to do religious work;
urging the people to petition for reopening of closed churches;
baptizing children of school age;
hearing confession in the priest's home.

Aside from these specific actions, there are a number of general accusations:

joining a counter-revolutionary organization of fascist rebels;
using the church as anti-Soviet center;
working with youth in anti-Soviet spirit;
derogating the Constitution;
"wrecking" before the census;
sermons of counter-revolutionary character.

There is no law prohibiting any of the actions in the first group of charges, whether in the decree of April 8, 1929, or the Instructions covering the same, issued January 16, 1931, or the Constitution of 1936. On the other hand, no evidence was recorded in substantiation of the second group of charges. One would expect that if the prosecutor had evidence, he would present it. What he has done is to make perfectly legal actions appear to be illegal. The whole case can be understood only in light of that subjective element which is fundamental to the Soviet judiciary, viz., revolutionary legality, and a similar peculiarly Soviet *modus vivendi*—utilizing the program of the Party as well as the laws of the State as the criterion for right and wrong. By this means, the Party's fundamental and avowed opposition to religion becomes one of the norms of law, and consequently any endeavor to maintain or strengthen

religion is considered anti-Party and therefore counter-revolutionary.

Such is apparently the case here. Lacking evidence of actions contrary to Soviet law and constitution, recourse is made to the contradiction between religion and the Party philosophy, and thereby actions which are wholly legal can yet be made to appear counter-revolutionary.

It is difficult to understand how a priest would have retained his calling out of "covetous interests" under the conditions which have obtained since the revolution, but it is of course possible. This confession, however, offers another key to the understanding of the whole affair. The trial was put on as a demonstration, in which the priests must be universally branded as hypocrites and therefore dangerous friends and leaders for the citizens of the U.S.S.R. Color is lent to this supposition by the fact that this case in court was referred to in anti-religious articles in many Soviet newspapers and periodicals.

The Party organ, "Agitator's Guide," No. 23, 1937, provided a peculiarly interesting article on our subject, because it gives both the material and the strategy of anti-religious work at this epoch. "The agitator," according to this article, "must help the believers to release themselves from religious opiate and from the influence of priests and sectarians." For this purpose he must (1) show the anti-scientific character of religion, (2) help the toilers form a materialistic world view, (3) point out to them facts from history and the present, showing the reactionary, counter-revolutionary role of religion and the clergy, (4) "show, again by facts, from past and present life the vile moral image of ministers of religious cults." (Here follow indecent adjectives).

After this introduction, the article proceeds to "show up" leading church personalities. Metropolitan Sergius "saved up more than 300,000 Roubles . . . often has drunken parties with bishops coming from the periphery (provinces). His salary for 1936 was Rs.12,000 plus Rs. 36,000 for expenses. Archbishop Pitirim received Rs.10,000 plus Rs.28,000 for expenses; Bishop Sergei Voskresensky the same; Archpriest Lebedeff, Rs.8,000 plus Rs.24,000 for expenses."

Turning to the Renovated hierarchy, Metropolitan Vitalij is also said to have saved Rs.300,000 and to have got Rs.30,000 in 1936. "Metropolitan Vitalij instructed his secretary to purchase 'advantageously' a summer home for him, where he lived in luxury."

"Metropolitan Vissarion (Zarin), leader of the Gregorian (schismatic) group, has the reputation of being a feudal lord . . . makes an annual trip on the Volga."

"The priest Lisitsyn, village Kukotki, Gorky region, wrote a letter to the parish council demanding (1) Rs.600 for holiday expenses, (2) a written obligation to pay all his taxes, (3) an obligation to provide him annually with 600 poods [14] of rye and 20 poods of wheat. Otherwise he would reject the offer of serving this parish."

Other similar examples followed, but these will suffice to show the character of the propaganda of this period. The chief argument is that bishops and priests have become rich and morally lax. This is quite different from the trials at Orel, where the churchmen were charged with having allied themselves with the political opposition, which is the most serious of all crimes in the Soviet Union, and the most severely punished. Acquiring wealth, on the

[14] Pood equals 36 lbs.

other hand, is not a crime, for the piece-work system, the Stakhanoff or other pressure methods of increasing production, and the payment of author's fees or royalties on a percentage basis have resulted in wide variation in incomes. The official income tax blank has a rubric for those with personal incomes in excess of three hundred thousand roubles a year. However, it is one thing for Stakhanoff to earn a large income by introducing ultra-modern methods in coal mining, or for Ilya Ehrenburg to find his royalties dance with public demand for his writings, but quite another thing for a priest or bishop to have a large bank balance. This is contrary to any ideology, in East or West, but particularly painful to the Communist Party. Having stripped the Church of its lands and treasures, dispossessed and even for a time disfranchised the clergy, and having effectually reduced the Church to penury, the reappearance of wealth could only mean the failure of these efforts and a renewal of danger in Church life. Money is stored-up power, and the Church must not be allowed to acquire power. The case against "magnates in the Church," as they were referred to in the press, was therefore a good one. Furthermore, if it is true that some of the churchmen used funds at their disposal in the manner indicated, they must stand morally condemned by good citizens anywhere, whether religious or not. One might have expected violent reaction on the part of both churchmen and the civilian authorities.

Nevertheless, the matter was not pressed severely in any quarter, so far as we know. After a few weeks of echoing in the press, this scandal was dropped, as most scandals are, and in 1942 Stalin sends his thanks to Metropolitan Sergius and other prelates for their large personal contri-

butions to the Soviet war efforts. Circumstances alter cases.

It is significant that the personages charged with unbecoming acquisition of wealth were none other than the heads of the respective divisions of the Orthodox Church, both Metropolitan Sergius of the Patriarchal Church and Metropolitan Vitalij of the Renovated. This may have been a fresh effort to weaken the Church by discrediting its leading personalities, but there is no evidence that it had this result. Possibly the improved economic condition of the public generally made increased Church incomes seem less obnoxious. But probably the public felt anti-religion to be a cry of "wolf" heard too often, and therefore paid no attention. In any case the Church suffered far less during this era of revived revolutionary fervor than it did in 1917–1922 or in 1927–1932.

As we enter the epoch of the present war, that is, the months preceding Munich, life in the Soviet Union settled down to a grim and determined battle for production of war materials. The position with reference to religion takes still another turn. The pincer movement, tightening for a while in 1937, is again halted. The materialistic influence of socialist construction is neutralized by the suffering of these times, and the desirability of national unity has for the present led to tolerance in place of anti-religious propaganda.

At the present time, therefore, the Church exists as an ordering of the way of those who are as yet unconverted to Marxist teaching, yet not hostile to the Soviet way of life. From the standpoint of Marxist leaders, it is better to have religion in orderly legalized control, relatively free, than in a state of rebellion, both because religious persons

who are "not hostile" may as citizens in industry or agriculture, etc., actually assist in socialist construction, and because, being free, they are more accessible to educational efforts and susceptible of a real change in worldview than if they were outlaws and oppressed. In this way socialist construction is advanced even by the efforts of religious people, while by their very efforts, the Marxist affirms, these people are perhaps unwittingly cutting the roots of their own belief in God.

It is natural and fair to raise the question as to whether such participation by religious people, and by the Churches, is not likely to modify the basic attitude and teachings of the Party and government on religion. There is no evidence of this. Neither the constitution, nor the laws restricting religion to "conduct of worship" have been rescinded or modified. The authorities have simply taken account of the peculiarities of war time conditions.

A larger number of people are manifesting publicly their interest in religion. That there should be increase in religious feeling during war time is logical from either Christian or Marxist teaching. But that there should be more widespread public manifestation of religion is probably due to the government's recognition of the political loyalty of the Church. The rather ostentatious publication of photographs of original signed receipts for Church contributions to war efforts is indication that both Church and state want the public to know of this loyalty. Since religion is thus brought out in the open, more people have become willing to show their religion in public, even to signing up as "twenties" for registration of parishes and contracting for use of Church properties, which they have always had the right to do but have hitherto done with

great caution. In fact, restoring civil rights to the clergy, and Stalin's saying that "not all priests are hostile," which occurred in 1936, constituted a greater fundamental change for the position of the Church and religion in the Soviet Union than the publication of news about Church contributions to war funds, or the appointment of an Orthodox Bishop to a government commission, or any of the other recent instances of government recognition of religion. The reported increase in number of active churches represents only the normal operations of a law existing since 1929, and no religious activity has been reported which goes beyond the limits of the law of 1929 or constitutional provisions of 1936. There has been no change in legislation, either in favor of or against religion.

We are indebted to the "Soviet War News" of August 22, 1941, for some statistics regarding the status of religion in the Soviet Union, presumably as of the year 1941. It is not clear whether these figures embrace all the legalized groups of the Orthodox Church, or only the Patriarchal jurisdiction, but apparently all are included. In order to reveal the historical significance of these figures, we give in a parallel column the relevant comparative figures for the Orthodox Church in 1917.[15]

	1941	*1917*
Religious associations of all kinds	30,000	.....
Licensed places of worship	8,338	.....
Ministers of cult	52,442	.....
Orthodox Churches	4,225	46,457
Orthodox priests	5,665	50,960
Orthodox deacons	3,100	15,210
Orthodox bishops	28	130
Orthodox monasteries	38	1,026

[15] "Bezbojnik," January, 1935.

The number of associations greatly exceeds the number of licensed places of worship, which is confusing, as is also the large figure for the number of ministers as compared with either associations or places of worship. On the other hand, the group of figures regarding the Orthodox show consistency, except for the number of bishops, of which there are doubtless more than indicated, especially if both Patriarchal and Renovated are included.

Briefly, it may be said that the war situation has had a three-fold effect on the position of religion. (1) The historical process of development from socialism to communism has been halted, perhaps even retarded, with the result that religion as a natural phenomenon has a larger legitimate place in Soviet life. (2) The Soviet government has taken a more tolerant attitude toward religion, partly in recognition of this retarded situation, and partly in order to gain greater national unity and maximum effort in production and combat. (3) The Church and religious people take advantage of this tolerance to increase the number of registered congregations and to give public expression to their religious feelings, within the limits laid down by law and constitution.

CHAPTER VIII

The Patriarchal Church and Other Churches

IN SPITE of the strenuous life of these years in Russia, the Patriarchate has not been so absorbed with the problem of Church and state that it has neglected all others. The Church has been relieved by law of what is commonly called the social task of the Church, and of all the problems accompanying the operation of Church institutions of charitable or educational intent, for these do not exist in Russia. On the other hand, the Church has had to face problems of internal administration and finance, questions arising from schism and weakening of central authority, cases of heresy, problems growing out of relations with the other national Orthodox Churches and with the Roman Catholic Church, and the problem of reuniting the Churches of Christendom. There have also been problems peculiar to Orthodox theology or custom, and the persistent task of helping the individual Christian to orient himself in a thoroughly secularized society.

The absence of religious literature is a great handicap in any endeavor to describe the development of Church policy on these matters, although to a certain extent this lack is compensated by the anti-religious press. Even the people in Russia know little of happenings in the religious sphere beyond their own territory. The anti-religious publications of the Union of Militant Godless and of the various Party publishing houses, particularly their periodicals,

have been of great help to Church people in following the activities of their co-religionists in other parts of the Soviet Union. Naturally there has been a good deal of exchange of information through travellers, and Soviet people are constantly moving about. The three great councils of the Living Church, the last of which congregated in 1926, offered the best opportunity for discussion of religious matters that has come since 1918. The resolutions of the Councils, however, reflect the partisan character of those who convoked these meetings, and cannot be considered as authentic policies of the Russian Orthodox Church. Unfortunately the Patriarchal Church has held no Sobor (Council) since 1918. Occasionally, during periods of relative tranquility on the political front, local conferences of clergy have been held, but only the anti-religious press has reported on such meetings. Both the Patriarchal and the Renovated bodies have continued to gather a specified number of bishops in Synod at regular sessions year by year, and some of the discussions and decisions have found their way into the official bulletins printed by these bodies for circulation among their clergy. Much of this was routine business, but even routine reflects policy. Occasionally articles of extraordinary interest have appeared. Thus the journal of the autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which continued publication until the central organ of this Church was liquidated during the Ukrainian secessionist troubles, gave much interesting information on this very active section of the Church.

Quite an extensive document on Church life and policy was prepared during the First Five Year Plan by some outstanding laymen who opposed Metropolitan Sergius' policies, while remaining within the Church of his jurisdiction.

This document was carefully prepared, and it helped greatly in grasping the exact nature of the problems faced by the Church in the period of reconstruction. Unfortunately, it was never published, either in Russia or abroad. A priest who left Russia in the early thirties wrote a brochure on the policies of Metropolitan Sergius, taking a definitely critical attitude. Metropolitan Eleuthery of Kovno, who retained canonical ties with the Patriarchate, visited Moscow in 1932 and wrote a brochure, which, however, throws little light on the policies of the Orthodox Church. In view of the incomplete and scattered nature of the material available, whether in Russia or abroad, it is manifest that a comprehensive statement regarding Church policy cannot now be written, and we must content ourselves with a modest review which unfortunately will reflect the paucity of source material.

The development of the Patriarchate's policy in regard to relationships with the Soviet government has been dealt with in earlier chapters of this volume. The Church under Patriarch Tikhon decided to accept the principle of separation, and to abide by the terms of the constitution and laws of the country. From time to time the Church has felt itself oppressed beyond the measure of the law, and has then petitioned for redress, according to law. At no time has the Patriarchate requested abrogation or modification of law, although local churches, especially in villages, have done so. Where the local Soviet has been tolerant or even friendly to religion, parish councils have requested privileges which amounted to abrogation of law, and even special favors, such as financial aid in building, repairing or heating a church. Such local experiences, however, may scarcely be considered the expression of Church policy.

Somewhat the same situation appears in the realm of Church activities. Up to the outbreak of war in 1941, the Church had taken no part, as a Church, in any government undertaking. In 1936, during the nation-wide discussions on the new constitution, the question arose in many localities as to whether the Church ought not to be considered a "society of the working people" under Article 141 of the constitution, and therefore entitled to nominate candidates for election to the Supreme Soviet. There is no record of the Patriarchate taking cognisance of this suggestion, to make it a matter of policy, although this must have constituted a real temptation to some members of the Patriarchal Synod. In no case did a church gain recognition as a nominating society, and eventually official explanation from Moscow made it clear that the separation meant separation. Some local priests were actually proposed for nomination by recognized nominating agencies, but their candidacy never went beyond this stage, and no priest was finally officially nominated to the Supreme Soviet. Locally, also, throughout the whole Soviet period, there has been many a case where a priest has held office as bookkeeper, secretary or even president of the local Soviet, and more cases where the local church has led the community in cultural or even economic development. Between purges some outstanding priests and lay churchmen have even held important posts in scientific and social institutions. Not infrequently the priest has led the village in selling government bonds. In general, it may be said that the Church is separated from the state, but the Churchman (priest or layman) cannot divide himself and he remains both Churchman and citizen.

Whether it was policy or natural development, we can-

not say, but soon after the NEP, parish councils began to include fewer of the former people and more of the rank and file of workers and peasants. This has probably been the determining factor in the whole of Metropolitan Sergius' policy in relations with the government. The Church is the Church of the people, and as the people stand by the government, so does the Church. It is idle, therefore, to speak of Church policy on national or international affairs, for the Church as a religious society does not concern itself with these matters. Church people express themselves on such matters not through the Church but through the government.

On the other hand, the Patriarchal Church has revealed definite policies in its relationships with other Church bodies, Roman Catholics, schismatic Orthodox, other national Orthodox Churches, and the Churches of the Reformation. It will be recalled that there were very few Roman Catholics left in the confines of the Soviet Union after the Treaty of 1921, which determined the western frontier. Consequently there have been few occasions for first-hand relationships between Orthodox and Catholic. There have been numerous evidences of friendliness between individual Roman Catholics and Orthodox in periods of common suffering and in exile. We have already noted how the policies on Church property followed very similar lines during the famine period. Although Metropolitan Benjamin and Monsignor Budkeiwicz were brought to trial simultaneously in Leningrad, no evidence of collusion between them was presented. In the years that followed, the Vatican has shown great interest in the Russian Church, sending Mgr. Michel d'Herbigny on a mission to Russia, and organizing from time to time periods of intercession

for Russian Christians and their "return" to Roman jurisdiction. The Patriarchate has been cold to these demonstrations of sympathy, and has adhered to the traditional policy of Eastern Orthodoxy with reference to Rome.[1]

The occupation of Western Ukraine and White Russia in 1939 brought several millions of Latins and of Uniats under Soviet rule, along with an approximately equal number of Orthodox. Although an embittered struggle had been going on for years between these bodies while they were under Polish rule, there is no record of this quarrel being continued by the contesting bodies, either locally or at their respective hierarchical centers in Russia.

Because of the significant role religion has played in the history of the territory now contested between Poland and the Soviet Union, we venture to give a brief resumé, especially as we are concerned with the people quite as much as with the Church and state. The people of the Western Ukraine have, unhappily, been pawns in the century-old struggle between the East and the West, both in politics and religion, and this is still true today. Are they Eastern Orthodox or Roman Catholic, are they part of Russia or of Poland? We need to review the factors in this situation in order to understand the policy of the Patriarchal Church.

Historically, Kiev is the capital of the territory now called the Ukraine, but until the seventeenth century this territory was called "Rus" by the people themselves. It was in Kiev that Christianity took root in Russia, at the end of the tenth century, and here the Metropolitans "of all Russia" resided until the coming of the Tartars, when they fled north to the ancient Russian cities of Novgorod

[1] See p. 187.

and Suzdal. With them moved the center of political authority, for at that time there was no Tsar of all Russia, but only princes dividing the chief cities. When Ivan III of Moscow gathered together the Russian land as the Tartars retreated, Kiev did not come under his rule, for the struggle to liberate Kiev from the Tartars was being carried on separately by the Cossacks of the Dnieper with the help of various allies, principally the King of Poland. When the Poles moved eastward to aid the Cossacks and local residents to fight the Tartars, they were accompanied by prelates of the Roman Catholic Church, who established an episcopal see at Kiev. For nearly three centuries the Cossacks and Slav population of Kiev and the Western Ukraine fought against the Polish nobility and gentry, who seized the land and enserfed the peasants, and against the Roman Catholic Church which forced them into the Unia.[2] They acknowledged the Polish King as their ruler, up to 1649, and supported him against the voracious appetites of the princes and magnates who formed the Polish Diet. They formed a strong organization of Orthodox brotherhoods to keep alive their Orthodox faith and teaching during the periods of Roman Catholic domination. When Peter Mogila became Metropolitan of Kiev in 1633, the Orthodox faith again dominated in the city and Western Ukraine. At the middle of the seventeenth century the Muscovite Tsar, who had been asked by the Cossacks to aid them in gaining final independence from the Poles, himself installed officials and began to rule the land. Yet the situation was not the same as under the Polish King, for two principal reasons: (1) The Cossacks as a fighting force received a regular

[2] Continuing to use Orthodox rites but under the jurisdiction and theological concepts of the Vatican.

place in the Russian army, and (2) the whole native population, being Orthodox, were freed from the domination of the Western Church.

It was from the Patriarchs of Jerusalem and Constantinople that Peter Mogila received his consecration and recognition of ecclesiastical autonomy for the Kiev Metropolitanate. This status lasted about three decades, i.e., up to the time when the Muscovite Tsar assumed the protectorate over the Cossacks, whereupon the Metropolitans of Kiev became integrated into the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. From the middle of the seventeenth century, therefore, up to the Revolution there was neither political nor ecclesiastical autonomy in the Ukraine. Poland again occupied Kiev in 1920, but only for a few days. In the following year Ukrainian nationalistic tendencies dominated in Church, as in politics, and an autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church was proclaimed within the confines of the U.S.S.R. Patriarch Tikhon held fast to the canonical position that autonomy could not be seized, but must be granted in accordance with the conditions and procedures provided for in the laws of the Eastern Church; meaning, roughly speaking, the actual political independence of the territory, and peaceful resolution of problems of personnel, finances, etc., at the separation. The Living Church, however, recognized this autonomy. Eventually the autonomous Ukrainian Church was liquidated by the Soviet government for joining the political Ukrainian separatist movement.

When, in the autumn of 1939, the Red Army occupied the Western Ukraine and White Russia (Eastern Poland), the problem of dealing with the Orthodox Church in this territory arose. It became more confused when the German

Army in 1941 drove through this whole area, including Kiev and Minsk, the capital of White Russia. Again we must catch up the threads of history, in order to understand the problem and the Patriarchate's decision. From the time of the partition of Poland, in 1772, to the Treaty of Riga in 1921, the Russian Church held canonical authority over all Orthodox up to the German border. When Poland regained independence in 1918, the Orthodox in Poland were divided amongst themselves as to whether they should continue under Moscow jurisdiction, or request autonomous or even autocephalous status. It was largely due to Polish political counsel that autonomy was decided upon. Unfortunately, however, they did not negotiate with the Moscow Patriarchate in accordance with canonical provisions, partly because of the chaotic conditions of the moment (the Patriarch was under arrest, and the Living Church was, in Poland, considered a revolutionary body, lacking canonical basis), and partly because the Polish government did not favor such negotiations. Consequently, instead of clearing with Patriarch Tikhon, the Orthodox in Poland approached the Oecumenical Patriarch at Constantinople, as the historical center of Orthodoxy, and received from him recognition of their autonomous status and of the rank of Metropolitan for their chief bishop, Dionysius. This action was sorely resented and never accepted by the Moscow Patriarchate, which persisted in claiming jurisdiction over all Orthodox in Poland. This claim was not pressed, however, until the Red Army entered Poland, when the Moscow Patriarchate simply considered the faithful in Eastern Poland to be lost children returning home. All the dioceses in the reclaimed territory were placed under Bishop Nicholas, who was given the ancient title of

Metropolitan of Kiev and Galitch (Galicia). Several of the bishops installed by Metropolitan Dionysius of Warsaw were accepted by Moscow. Others retired to Warsaw, or resigned from episcopal office. New bishops were installed by Moscow.

The next step came when the Germans advanced. Metropolitan Nicholas withdrew to Moscow, but several of the bishops remained. Now the situation was not merely reversed, but further complicated, for the Germans prevented the Polish Orthodox Church from restoring its jurisdiction over the territory east of the frontiers of the new "General Government," and instead allowed the autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church to be revived. This was done under the leadership of Bishop Polycarp, an Ukrainian nationalist. He had been consecrated by Metropolitan Dionysius of the Polish Church during the early thirties, when the Polish government policy had favored the Ukrainization of Orthodoxy, to offset Russian influence. His consecration was therefore not only valid, but definitely related to the Ukrainians, and had back of it the Oecumenical Patriarch's support of the Metropolitan Dionysius. Naturally the Patriarchate in Moscow in 1941 refused to accept the claim to autonomy on the part of Ukrainian Orthodoxy as it had done in 1656 and in 1922. The Oecumenical Patriarchate now supports Moscow, but we do not know whether this is because of its desire to stop further complications, or because of its anti-Axis orientation.

In this review of the Ukrainian Church situation we see at work the several factors which have played so great a part in history and, by the same token, may be expected to be potent in the future: the fate of the Ukraine, the inte-

gration of religious and political loyalties, and the manner in which jurisdictional disputes can be properly settled. The basic factor is this, that the Ukrainian people are historically Eastern Orthodox, while the Polish people are historically Roman Catholic. Those in the "Unia" form a no-man's land, a zone of conflict, not of agreement.

In contrast with the Polish Orthodox Church, the ancient Church of Georgia, in the Caucasus, claimed autocephaly on the grounds of independent existence up to the time of Catherine, when Georgia became part of the Russian Empire. The Moscow Patriarchate accepted this position. The Church in Esthonia similarly negotiated with Moscow, and was granted autonomous status, under Metropolitan Alexander. The position of the Church in Latvia was not clarified during the rule of Archbishop John, with the result that both Moscow and the Oecumenical Patriarchate claimed the authority to appoint his successor. Again, under the pressure of political circumstances, the Latvian government gave its favor to the Oecumenical, with the result that the Metropolitan Germanos, Greek Exarch in London, traveled to Riga and consecrated the monk Augustine as Archbishop of the autonomous Latvian Church. In Lithuania, Metropolitan Elevthery never rejected Moscow jurisdiction, and on his death the Patriarchate sent the young Bishop Sergius as his successor.

When these Baltic states were incorporated in the Soviet Union, in December, 1940, Metropolitan Alexander of Tallin and Archbishop Augustine of Riga returned to the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate.[3] Their position

[3] In the book, *The Truth About Religion in Russia*, there is a striking photograph of the three Baltic prelates seated with the Metropolitan Sergius at the Patriarchate in Moscow.

at present under German occupation is unclear, but the Metropolitan Sergius still claims their loyalty to the Moscow Patriarchate.

It is plain from this account of developments on the Western frontier that the Moscow Patriarchate has maintained the clear policy of demanding discipline and exercising authority throughout the lands and among the peoples of the old Russian Empire, or the new Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. We have now to deal briefly with its policy with reference to the emigrés or refugees who fled the Revolution. This is by no means a digression from our main theme, as this great body of over a million carried with them some of the most precious elements of Russian Church thought and piety, and their relation to the main currents in Russia is of great importance. This has been evident to all who have had contact with Russian refugee theologians in the oecumenical Church union movement. The Russian refugees of yesterday, and perhaps of tomorrow, belong truly to the Russian people and must figure in any review of people, Church and state.

During the Civil War in Russia, the Patriarchate issued instructions that, if any portion of the Russian people got cut off from connection with Moscow, the Bishop of the diocese should temporarily rule and set up such organs as he found essential. This was done by the bishops in southern Russia under Denikin and Wrangel. When great numbers of civilians were evacuated from Russia, along with the White Army, several prelates of note accompanied them. Others found themselves abroad during the shifting of lines in the Polish War of 1920 and in the Koltchak resistance in Siberia. Those who came through Constantinople and were given asylum by the Serbian Patriarch Varnava, set up a Synod and later a Council (Sobor), under

the leadership of Metropolitan Anthony, the most outstanding of all the Russian bishops at the time of the Revolution. This was the body which, in 1922, petitioned the Genoa Conference to start a White Crusade against Red Bolshevik Russia, and by this action seriously worsened the position of Patriarch Tikhon before the Soviet authorities. The Patriarch disavowed the Synod and declared its dissolution. This only confirmed the emigrant bishops in their opinion that the Patriarch was "not free," for they were confident that he shared their desires and hopes, and that he had acted under duress in issuing the order for their dissolution. If the Patriarch is not free, they argued, then there is the greater reason for the emigrant bishops to carry authority, and not only for the care of the souls of refugees, but for the fate of the entire Russian Church. This has been the chief ground and argument of the emigrant bishops. It received further support by reason of the absence of a legalized Patriarchate during the five years from the arrest of the Patriarch in 1922 up to registration by Metropolitan Sergius in 1927. The feeling that the Patriarchate is not free became the almost universal attitude among refugees in 1930 when Metropolitan Sergius declared that in the terrible experiences for all believers during the collectivization period of 1929–30 there was no persecution of the Church. Few of the refugee prelates or faithful endeavored to understand the nature of things in Soviet Russia, and indeed actions speak louder than words. Some were able to rationalize sufficiently to accept the Metropolitan Sergius' declaration, and they have formed a small band of Patriarchal loyalists, with a Metropolitan bishop (Benjamin) in America, a sturdy center in Paris, and a few faithful scattered about Western Europe and the United States.

The final test came when Metropolitan Sergius in 1930

demanded from each Russian bishop and priest abroad a signature of loyalty to the Patriarchate and to the Soviet government.[4] Many were ready to profess loyalty to the Mother Church, leaving it for better times to adjust practical relationships, but few indeed were prepared to profess their loyalty to the Soviet government. Some were already naturalized citizens of other states, and all were political refugees from the Soviet Union. It has yet to be explained why this double loyalty was required. Certainly it would have given the Soviet government considerable moral power over all signatories, and would therefore have lessened their criticism of the Soviet state; on the other hand, it could hardly help the Patriarchate, for the state could in some measure hold the Patriarchate responsible for the actions of anyone abroad who declared in writing his loyalty to both Church and state in Russia. One may hope that the policy of the Metropolitan Sergius which led him to make this demand of the clergy abroad will in due time be clarified.

During these twenty-five years of enforced separation, the Church in emigration has done more than merely exist. It has taken upon itself, in the measure of its ability, the task of keeping alive and developing the lively currents of Russian Orthodox theology and religious philosophy which had their sources in Khomiakoff, Solovieff, the Troubetskoys, Pavel Florensky and other remarkable thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The men abroad felt it to be their duty to nation and to Church to carry on, to think, speak, write and publish, especially because no religious literature has been produced during this period in Russia, although we may believe many

[4] Cf. *Truth About Religion in Russia,* p. 131.

manuscripts have been written. This is the significance of the works of Berdyaeff, Bulgakoff, the monk Cassian, Kartasheff, Troitsky, Ilyin, Florovsky, Fedotoff, and of the younger Orthodox writers who form the next generation, among them Nicholas Zernov, Smolitch, Zander, Evdokimoff. Most of these writers have been connected directly or indirectly with the Russian Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris, founded in 1925 by the Metropolitan Eulogius. The Patriarchate in Moscow has condemned certain writings produced abroad, and has objected to the trends of theological thought expressed by certain members of the faculty at the Institute. Nevertheless, some of the students, on completion of their study and upon ordination, have become active priests of parishes in France or elsewhere under the Moscow jurisdiction. The Patriarchate's policy would seem to be one of feeling satisfaction over the existence of the Institute, without inclining to hold any direct relationship with it which might lead to the Patriarchate's being held responsible for the Institute's activities. One reason for this tolerant attitude toward the Institute in Paris is probably the fact that for many years it was the only Russian Orthodox higher theological school existing in any part of the world.

The Patriarchate was early called upon to establish a policy with reference to discipline in the ranks of its own bishops and clergy. This was particularly necessary after the Living Church schism, both because the problems raised in this connection were so complex, and because the temptation was great to make use of the chaotic conditions in order to set up independent dioceses or provinces, or even to develop a sort of episcopal congregationalism.[5] There

[5] The Russians call such uncanonical bodies "samozvantsi" or "samotchintzi"—called or ordained by themselves.

is no published record of the number of such attempts, or of the personalities involved. However, we have learned of the basic reasons for some of these defections, and of the policy followed by the Patriarchate in regard to them.

Perhaps it was the long tutelage of the Church under the Tsar, or perhaps it was the Eastern Church's love for correct form and order, but in any case one of the chief causes for defection was the feeling that Metropolitan Sergius had not followed proper procedure in re-establishing and legalizing the Patriarchal administration. It will be recalled that Metropolitan Peter of Krutitzk was chosen to be Locum Tenens at the death of Patriarch Tikhon, but was soon exiled by the Soviet authorities. Some of the foremost bishops complained that Metropolitan Sergius had not done all that he might have done to make it possible for Metropolitan Peter of Krutitzk to return to Moscow and rule as Locum Tenens, and that he too easily agreed to remain in office himself. They also held that he made greater concessions than necessary in negotiating for recognition by the government. In a sense, we have here another "reformation," with a residue of "old believers," such as occurred under Patriarch Nikhon in the seventeenth century, although this time the conflict arose not on theological but political grounds. Metropolitan Sergius took a practical and forward-looking view; Metropolitans Joseph and Gregory, with a few other bishops and their followers, took the conservative line. The former's policy dominated. Question arose as to what discipline to impose on the dissidents.

Metropolitan Joseph was deposed. Yet he stubbornly held on, with a certain following of clerics and even bishops in his Province. Eventually he was indicted by the

Soviet government for disloyalty, and apparently condemned. The Patriarchate then had to establish a policy with reference to Joseph's followers who wished to return to Sergius' jurisdiction. We have record of the monk Ipatiy, who was promoted abbot by Metropolitan Joseph, and in 1934 requested return to Metropolitan Sergius' fold. The Patriarchate decided to accept him as a monk, i.e., refused to acknowledge the action of the deposed Metropolitan in making the promotion.

There was also the case of a renegade who was consecrated bishop by Metropolitan Gregory, but later offered to return to Sergius, bring his diocesan clergy and faithful with him, if Sergius would accept him in his episcopal status. The Patriarchate refused to be tempted, and resolved to accept him only in the rank he held when leaving the Patriarchal jurisdiction.

From these and other cases it is evident that the Patriarchate's policy was one of clemency, yet not of laxity, with reference to the internal opposition. Actions by opposition bishops were invalid, but did not taint the previous ordinations of priests or monks. The situation was otherwise when it came to the Renovated. Persons who accepted office or ordination from a Living Church or Renovated bishop were held to have committed an error deserving of suitable penance. Thus Metropolitan Sergius himself, who for a brief period followed the Living Church, did penance in the robes of a simple monk before Patriarch Tikhon. In 1934 a Renovated priest, Dimitri Gudenkoff, ordained in 1929, applied for reception by the Metropolitan Sergius, and the decision was to receive him as a layman, i.e., to consider his ordination invalid.

In cases involving moral laxity, the Patriarchate has

been stern. A certain priest, Skibin, renounced his faith at a meeting of the village Soviet, but hid this act from his superior. In due time he repented and confessed to the priest Smirnoff. Subsequently the renunciation became known to the diocesan bishop, who referred the case to Moscow. The Patriarchate's decision was to demand of Skibin a written confession and to leave judgment to the diocesan bishop. The priest, Smirnoff, was required to do penance for aiding Skibin.

There is no record of the attitude or policy of the Patriarchate with regard to the wandering priests who tramped through areas bereft of churches, baptising, celebrating the liturgy, singing requiems; or regarding the secret monasteries and convents which are known to exist here and there in Russia. There must be a certain satisfaction at knowing of the hardiness of faith that leads to such clandestine service, yet the illegality of this form of religious life must also cause difficulties for the Patriarchate. On the other hand, we do have record of policy with regard to legalized priests or bishops who move about; here the discipline of the Church corresponds to the laws of the country. According to the law of April 8, 1929, a priest (or other minister) may serve only one religious society (parish); he may, however, register himself out of that parish and register into another, in order to conduct services there, repeating the process for return to his regular congregation. This is a great inconvenience and a hindrance to the range of service which a minister may undertake; yet it is similar to the rules of the Church, where the priest must secure permission from his canonical superior (archdeacon or bishop) for conducting service elsewhere than in his own parish. In 1934 the Patriarchate also announced

a decision regarding the movement of bishops, in connection with the case of the Bishop of Pugachev, vicar to the Archbishop of Saratoff. The Patriarchate ruled that if the bishop intends to leave his diocese for less than two weeks, he must inform his superior; if for more than two weeks, he must ask permission of the Patriarchate. A vicar bishop must ask leave of his superior for any intended absence, of whatever duration.

One may assume that this policy of demanding strict discipline among the clergy was necessitated both by the laws of the country and by the chaotic conditions which developed with reduction in number of priests, and increase in competing religious organizations—the Living Church, dissidents, etc. Each was eager to augment its forces and doubtless issued invitations which were tempting to the priests of the Orthodox Church. Yet we must recognize fully another factor in favor of discipline, viz., the natural self-discipline of the clergy which was the counterpart of the inner spiritual self-discipline that kept them true to their divine mission. It is this which has enabled the Church to hold fast to its calling and to constitute today an organized and disciplined body, adapted to the peculiar conditions of life in the Soviet Union.

The Moscow Patriarchate, persistently claiming to be the unique Church of the Russian Orthodox people, has exerted no small influence on the movement for the reuniting of Christendom. It has affected, first of all, the policies of the other Churches of Eastern Christendom. The ancient Patriarchates and the autocephalous Churches of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Roumania have striven earnestly in recent years to give better form and expression to the unity which is implicit in their Orthodox faith. Since the year

787 there has been no general or Oecumenical Council. Yet the unity of the Eastern Church has been astonishingly retained by the very nature of its teaching of "Sobornost" (conciliarity), that doctrine and order depend not on a single primate, but on the consensus of all. During twelve centuries it has been inner unity rather than external authority that has held these highly divergent national church bodies together. The Oecumenical Patriarch, in the Phanar at Constantinople, has been the symbol of unity, but the overpowering size and strength of the Russian Church have given it, during recent centuries, a large measure of influence on matters concerning the welfare of all. With the disestablishment of 1918 and the growth of schism, this dominating position was shaken. Since that time the other Orthodox Churches have been anxiously awaiting the day when the Russian Church might again share freely in their common affairs.

At the end of the twenties it was hoped that the day had arrived. Realizing that the calling of an Oecumenical Council would require preliminary agreement on many points, the Oecumenical Patriarchate invited the several national Orthodox Churches to send representatives to a pre-Council Conference. For the Russians, he sent invitations to the Patriarchate and also to the Synod of the Renovated-Living Church. This was his undoing, for Metropolitan Sergius replied with a refusal, saying that the Patriarchate headed the only canonical Orthodox body in Russia, and that acceptance of the invitation to sit as an equal with the Living Church would be tantamount to allowing the latter's claim to this position, and also contrary to the ecclesiastical canons which allow only one episcopal jurisdiction in any territory.

A further reason for declining the invitation was the fear lest hasty action would be taken on Church Reunion. It will be recalled that the Phanar as well as the Patriarchate of Alexandria had recently expressed recognition of Anglican orders. The view of the Russian Church is given in the following paragraphs found in the letter from Metropolitan Sergius to the Very Reverend Archimandrite Basil Dimopoulos, representative in Moscow of the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, dated September 30, 1931, No. 7467:

. . . Now they invite us, but we cannot consider it convenient to accept this invitation, so that we may not later find ourselves before some *fait accompli* which we had not expected, and may not carry the responsibility for decisions which we in conscience do not share.

Furthermore, in its essence the question of the union of churches demands the greatest degree of discernment. Here only that union will have real value which rests upon the complete unity of aspiration. We on our side cannot give up our belief that only our Orthodox Church, found in its completeness in the East, is the Church of Christ. The uniting with our Church of some other body we can conceive of only by the analogy of the saving of the drowning. It would be strange if the drowning, before accepting help from the ship, should begin to put forward some sort of conditions. This would be a clear evidence of the fact that he either does not wish to be saved, or does not realize the hopelessness of his position.

If, for union with the Anglicans just at this time, concessions are demanded of us, even hurried ones (without adequate preparation for them in the Orthodox mind as a whole), then there is reason to fear that the fruit of all negotiations and discussions will be not authentic unity of the Anglicans with the Church, but only external, so to speak, a diplomatic union,

hiding inner differences. But for the Church of Christ in its real sense, from the standpoint of Her eternal purpose—the salvation of souls (which alone justifies the existence of the Church)—such a union cannot have any particular value, it is rather even dangerous. Like every union which is based on reservations, such a union in its very self carries the germs of dissolution. On the other hand, chasing after an illusory unity with the Anglicans might threaten us with the destruction of unity within the Orthodox Church itself.

In view of all these considerations, we decline participation in the matter of *unia* with the Anglicans, retaining for ourselves the right to have our own judgment on the consequences.

When the other Orthodox Churches, especially the Serbs and Bulgars, learned of this refusal, they declared that a meeting without representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate would be fruitless, and the Conference was postponed *sine die*. Some may condemn the policy of Metropolitan Sergius in this connection, yet it must be admitted that the Oecumenical Patriarch acted ill-advisedly and hastily in recognizing the Living Church in 1922, and this was the chief cause of the failure of this attempt at advancing Church unity.

After this date there have been few exchanges between the Patriarchate and the other Orthodox Churches. Metropolitan Sergius protested to the Oecumenical against his granting a temporary Exarchate to the Russian Metropolitan Eulogius, head of the Russian Church in Western Europe. He also requested the Patriarch of Serbia to discontinue giving hospitality to the Council of Russian Bishops (Karlovtsi), which, it will be recalled, claimed ecclesiastical authority over all Russian Orthodox outside

Russia. After the arrival in the United States of Metropolitan Benjamin as Exarch for the Moscow Patriarchate, the Carpatho-Russian Bishop Adam petitioned for recognition and acceptance by the Patriarchate. The response was a definite rejection of the petition, chiefly on the grounds of invalid consecration. Here again the Patriarchate held to the strict interpretation of the canons, although the practice of "economy" would have brought a goodly body of priests and faithful into the Patriarchal fold.

Throughout the entire course of discussions and negotiations for recognition of Anglican orders, there has been a remarkable hesitation on the part of not only Russian emigrant theologians but of the heads of the Serbian and Bulgarian Churches to take any definite position until the Russian Church had spoken its word on the subject, and without the voice of these Slav Orthodox, according to the principle of conciliarity, the Eastern Church's view cannot be expressed. This brings the Moscow Patriarchate directly into the picture of the Oecumenic Movement. There has been great advance and more may be expected, but definite conclusions involving the Orthodox Church as a communion cannot be reached in the realm of faith and order until the Moscow Patriarchate has met with the others and reached a united opinion.

Meanwhile, we find significant indications of the mood of the Russian Church in a long article written by Metropolitan Sergius and published in the "Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate," No. 23–24, 1935, under the title, "The Meaning of the Apostolic Succession." This article gives quite succinctly his views on the point which has so far been crucial in all these negotiations. Metropolitan Sergius makes it clear that the attitude of the Orthodox toward

the non-Orthodox is that they are not "of another faith" (i.e., non-Christian), but rather are only fallen away from the True Church. Consequently they come within the operations of the laws of the Church, and they may be considered as Christians. There must, however, be evidence of Christian baptism, and if there is doubt, it is better to risk duplication by baptising again. Other sacraments, such as confirmation or ordination, are valid only when performed under valid consecration.

There are, necessarily, many cases where all the facts are not known, or where evidence is only by implication. In such cases the Metropolitan prefers to exercise the privilege of Church "economy" (exemption), and he dislikes the principle of recognizing as "implicit" that which would provide canonical validity. "The Church cannot give what the sacraments have not given," he writes. In other words, the Church and its dogma, however great its power, cannot be considered a substitute for historical fact or real sacramental action. "We do not have the Catholic principle in accordance with which dogma determines history. When we see disagreement between history and dogma, we must first ask ourselves: do we correctly understand dogma?" This is a wise exercise of critical faculties, and keeps the Church alert to changing conditions.

Great importance is attached to Church "economy," but it may be exercised only when the non-Orthodox body possesses "valid episcopal consecration, directly maintained from the Apostles, and of course along with the Apostolic teaching of the priesthood." "Consequently the existence of Apostolic succession noticeably separates out a given group of non-Orthodox bodies from their mass." Where such succession exists, the case may be considered in the

light of the rules of the Church. But even the rules allow for "economy," for

the rules of the Church are not dogmatic definitions on matters of faith, once for all deciding questions, and they do not act automatically. They are given primarily as a guide to the ecclesiastical courts, and consequently each case assumes special judgment. . . . However, in making such exceptions to the rule, the Church does not thereby create precedent for the future, and gives no one the right to justify breaking of rule by reference to such precedent. Church "economy" does not annul and does not even weaken the force of a canon. It has in mind only the given incident with its individual, non-recurrent nature, and limits its action thereto.

This explanation is of peculiar significance for the reason that Metropolitan Sergius' article was written at the time when, in Europe, the principle of "economy" was playing a large part in negotiations between the Anglican Communion and the Orthodox. It is unlikely that the Patriarchate was able to follow these negotiations in detail, but Metropolitan Sergius was apprised of the chief elements involved. In the paragraphs which we shall now quote there is evidence of his deep concern over the union of Christendom, along with insistence upon the faith and discipline which he considers indispensable for the achieving of this end.

Being on earth the only bearer of authority to bind and to loose, and the only treasury of saving grace, the Church of Christ has the possibility and the right to declare invalid all ordinations outside the Church. However, guiding Herself by considerations of Church economy, the desire to favour the salvation of the greatest number of people, She does not exercise this right always and everywhere. The Church leaves

in force the ordination of non-Orthodox bodies which have retained the Apostolic teaching of ordination and the Apostolic form. She can somehow recognize them as valid because She also draws the proper conclusions from this recognition, viz., She does not duplicate acts performed by such clergy, whether baptism or chrism with oil (confirmation). In all this the non-execution by the Church of the basic right with reference to a certain group of non-Orthodox bodies by no means infers the rejection by the Church of this right for all time when the circumstances of Church life alter, and the condescension described with reference to a given non-Orthodox body ceases to contribute to the salvation of a greater number of persons, or, still more, when it begins to directly hinder this, the Church returns to her basic right and annuls the dispensation, again binds the loosed. Thus is explained the seeming inconsistency and the changeableness of the attitude of the Church to non-Orthodox bodies.

There is much in common between the origins of Anglicanism and of our Renovated. Both there and here the beginning was laid in the breach with their Patriarch and in the uniting, under this breach, of a lawful hierarchy (so far as this may be said of Roman Catholic hierarchy). Both here and there authorized diocesan bishops declined to perform the first episcopal consecration. Both here and there the first consecration was performed by chance bishops, some of them suffragan bishops, some of them wholly in retirement, whose entire authority had not been restricted, it would seem, simply because the lawful Church authority at that moment had not yet placed interdiction upon them.

The Anglican hierarchy has not received recognition by the whole of the Orthodox Church. However, if the renowned "*rapprochement* of the Anglican Church with the Orthodox" were to go its normal ecclesiastical path, if the Anglicans, as a body, actually agonized in seeking the True Church and grace-given priesthood; if the thought of achieving first of all recog-

nition of their hierarchy, which the Roman Pope at one time so brutally condemned, did not confuse their search from time to time, in order, if achieved, to quietly remain just as they were—then the reunion of the Anglican with the Orthodox Church might very well take place, and the question of hierarchy, in all likelihood, would be answered in a positive sense.

Such an uneven attitude toward phenomena seemingly equal is explained exactly by considerations of Church welfare, pastoral-practicality. Old Catholicism and Anglicanism separated from Rome when Rome itself was in schism.[6] Their separation was in effect a withdrawal from schism, even though it has not been crowned as yet by reunion with the Church. They must be blamed not for separation, but rather for failing in all this time to go the rest of the way. However, by their separation they, of course, weakened the Roman schism and thereby in part strengthened the position of the Orthodox Church. It is natural also for them to look upon our Church as an ally, and to have interest and sympathy for Her; and for our Church to have hope that condescension toward them will serve for the salvation of a greater number of persons.

The view that the Universal Church is a conglomerate of variegated parts—national churches, of which some are Orthodox and others not—has many attractive features. At times it has been expressed by Orthodox, even by Orthodox bishops. For example, Metropolitan Platon of Kiev (Gorodetsky, 1891) once on a diocesan journey, after visiting a Catholic Church, declared publicly in a sermon (i.e., officially) that "our human boundaries do not reach to the heavens.". . . Probably many similar expressions may be heard at various current inter-Church conferences, congresses of religion, etc.

But this exceedingly attractive theory, so broad and all-pacifying, cannot be called a Church theory. The Church of

[6] Since 1054.

Christ always understood its unity to lie in the one eucharist: "All partake of one bread and cup." The hierarchical principle may be preserved, it may draw its succession unquestionably from the Apostles; but, as separated from participation in the eucharist with the Church, hierarchy loses that which rests in the Church, the authority to bind and to loose, and, even more, to celebrate the True Eucharist. Consequently, only those Churches which have not lost participation in this universal single eucharist may be living members in the Universal Church of Christ. The circle of such participants may at times be reduced to the very minimum, but this does not alter the case and does not give to the fallen-away majority the right to consider themselves the Church. The very most that may be conceded is this: non-Orthodoxy is the half-darkened porch or courtyard of the Church, where stand those who have fallen, those who have been deprived of the right of eucharistic and prayerful communion, although as yet they are not entirely foreign to the Church. The path to the restoration of lost communion, and thereby to eternal salvation, is the same for a fallen-away community as for any individual falling person. It is necessary not only to recognize their sins before the Church, but also to receive from the Church, which alone has the power to bind and to loose, permission to take part in Her eucharist, which is done by the proper ceremony of reception. Only this permission can open up to the separated the approach into the ranks of full members of the Church.

Consequently, wrong are those who reject any significance in the Apostolic succession existing among non-Orthodox, as is done by intolerant zealots of Orthodox dogma, but greater still is the error of those who look upon this succession as a thing of intrinsic value, by means of which it is possible to get along apart from the Orthodox Universal Church. The vast advantage of non-Orthodox communities which have retained the Apostolic succession lies in the fact that the Church considers them still as "churchly" (ek tis ekklisias), "not yet

foreign to the Church." She still retains "a certain rule of communication" with them, similar to that which She has with the fallen and bearers of penance. However, if this incomplete and faulty communion is not crowned with full unification with the Church in one eucharist, all the advantages appertaining to such non-Orthodox communities are lost without benefit (Romans 9:4–5, 10:4).

Few will doubt that this is an important document. Its significance lies not only in what it says, but in the fact that it was written with such poise and wisdom in the midst of the First Five Year Plan, when all of Russia was in turmoil—collectivization, Magnitogorsk, exiled millions, the construction of socialism. One is reminded of the poise of St. Anthony who, when he returned to the world after twenty years of complete isolation, was "quite like other men."

We do not know of the extent to which views expressed by the Metropolitan Sergius represent the view of all the Orthodox people in Russia. There are no scholarly treatises to tell us of theological research during the period. In 1934 the Patriarchate awarded the degree of "Master of Theology" to the priest N. Konopleff for a work entitled "The Saints of the Vologodsky Region," but the dissertation was not printed. Lacking literature, conferences, councils, we may however believe that the very fact of the Orthodox holding fast to the Patriarchate and even increasingly returning to its fold, is evidence of the Patriarchate's being their true leader in thought as well as in conscience and action. Such policies and trends as we have been able to discern and describe may well indicate the main line along which the Russian Orthodox Church is moving.

CHAPTER IX

Russia During the Patriotic War

IN any country the outbreak of war presents a crisis when everything comes under question and under control. The present war is one of such extent and ferocity that the national resources of every country have had to be utilized to the full. New resources have been earnestly sought and heavily drawn upon. Lifting each individual's attention and feelings to the level of a national interest with which he identifies himself, war produces a surmounting of distinctions and rivalries between individuals and groups; the will to survive and to advance becomes a common will uniting all peoples and groups. At such a time collective life and discipline becomes reasonable, and those in authority are given willing obedience, provided their authority is justified by their effectiveness in leading toward the common goal.

The Nazi leaders counted on a different course of events in the U.S.S.R. They had convinced themselves that the differences within the body politic in the U.S.S.R. were so deep and the objectives sought by various elements in the population were so divergent, that the shock of attack would intensify centrifugal tendencies and disunity. They had in mind the tendencies in the army which led to the liquidation of eight generals and many others, and the persistent trend in the religious life of the people which had

brought churchmen to trial and insinuating attacks on the leading bishops as recently as in 1937. At the time of the first blow, in June, 1941, German officers were saying that the army hated Stalin and would desert at the front, and that the Church would gather the people together in hope of rescue from the Godless bolsheviks. They proclaimed a crusade of liberation from political tyranny and religious oppression for the Russian people, while counting on the same slogans to intensify distrust of the U.S.S.R. in Great Britain and to ensure neutrality, at least, on the part of the United States.

Yet the effect was the opposite, in Russia, abroad, and among the Russian people in the territories which were occupied by the armies of Germany and her satellites. The British government's immediate declaration of common cause with the U.S.S.R., and the similar declaration by the American government, had a profound effect on Stalin and on the Russian people, as they enabled Stalin to say, in his radio broadcast of July 3, 1941, "In this war of liberation we shall not be alone. In this great war we shall have trusty allies in the persons of the peoples of Europe and America, including among them the German people enslaved by the Hitlerite overlords. . . . In this connection the historic declaration of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Churchill, on help to the Soviet Union and the declaration of the government of the United States on readiness to give help to our country, which can only draw forth the feeling of gratitude in the hearts of the peoples of the Soviet Union, are fully understood and indicative." The German radio jubilantly announced, during the first week of the war, that thousands of Soviet troops had deserted at the front, but it soon became clear that these were no deserters but guard

troops at the border overcome in the invasion of a nation at peace.

Instead of revolting, all the people resisted; this included many even of the Russian people in Europe who had been exiles or refugees from the Soviet state. The attempt to raise battalions from among the former White Guard officers met generally with a cold lack of interest. In the Ukraine and in Bessarabia the effort to draw Orthodox churchmen away from the Moscow Patriarchate resulted in disunity among them rather than in increase in the ranks of the would-be crusaders. On the contrary, clergy as well as laity joined with unchurched in support of the guerrilla fighters. Thus, even in the territories entirely cut off from Moscow, the public retained its loyalty to the state it was supposed to hate.

Within the borders of the Union, for a time shifted far to the east by the invader, reaction was even more marked. The hard and disciplined life, which the Nazi leaders had counted on to cause revolt, became even harder and more disciplined. Thirty millions or more of the population were evacuated from their homes in villages or cities to districts where their productive powers could be utilized in the war effort. It takes little imagination to guess at the condition of housing, clothing and feeding in the centers to which men and machinery were transferred. Yet all the evidence is that the people played their part with little complaint, in spite of hardships, and joined quickly the ranks of workers for victory for their country. It would seem that almost the whole population had come to accept and even to value the Soviet order. Unquestionably it meant something to them which was either incomprehensible or denied by enemies or sceptics abroad; these had assumed that the "nationaliza-

tion" of the Revolution had left the people without a sense of home, property, or homeland, that government by the "dictatorship of the proletariat" had separated them from any sense of responsibility for the common welfare, that purgings, exilings and "liquidation of kulaks as a class" had embittered the intellectuals and cowed the peasantry into being mere robots. Instead, the Russian people whether in the armed forces, in industry, in the collective farms or in the arts and sciences have revealed individual personality, initiative, capacity and even genius for coordination of effort, a sense of ownership within and through the collective, a love for country and loyalty to its governors which has made unity seem almost monolithic. They were defending not only their homes but their common achievements. Even if life was not full of conveniences, it was better than in 1921 or in 1931, and the youth had been assured that it was better. But more important was their feeling that they were defending their hopes and aspirations for a life that was going to be definitely not only better but the best in the world, the best that life could be. It is apparently true that the feeling of general welfare which began to move upward at the close of the first Five Year Plan, which reached a considerable degree of physical satisfaction and personal liberty in 1936 and 1937, although retarded by the purges of 1937 and the transformation of the greater part of industrial effort from consumption goods to war materials after the Munich Conference of 1938, was still present in the people in 1941 at the time of the German attack, and was their back-log of hope and confidence during the days of retreat to the vicinity of Moscow and the streets of Stalingrad. The people had something personal to fight for.

Besides, there was the feeling of patriotism. Enemies and critics had come to believe that collectivization had destroyed the sense of relationship to the soil and to things, and that the international aim of the Communist program had fixed the attention if not the loyalties of the Soviet state and people on a nebulous world-wide socialist state, and had therefore torn them loose from love and loyalty to that which was Russia. But the idea of Russia, of the motherland, of her "holy things," has proved to be as deeply embedded in the Soviet people as it was in the Russian people who resisted the invasions of the early seventeenth and the early nineteenth centuries. This loyalty seems to be as great among the other nationalities as among the Russians, giving the impression that these peoples have found the same kind of expression of statehood in the U.S.S.R. that the Russians have found. This is not entirely new, for many of the smaller nationalities and tribes showed the same consciousness of common destiny with the Russians and fought equally courageously with them in the first world war; yet there is unquestionably greater intellectual grasp at present, and these people participate in the war effort at higher levels of technique and responsibility. More may have occurred than has been reported in the press, but it is deserving of note that only twice have Soviet citizens been brought to court on charges of collaboration during the period of occupation of territories liberated up to the end of 1943. One of the reasons why citizens of whatever national origin have so completely entered into the war effort may be the fact that the local government, whether of collective farm or of factory or of city, is composed by and of those who work there. The sense of proprietorship and the sense of political government for the lower units of

society stand very near to each other in the Soviet system, which results in a combination of the feeling of possession with the feeling of communal responsibility. This is a strange sociological phenomenon. The Soviet community has in it something of the tribal unity, almost primitive, because of the notion instilled by Soviet education, and to a considerable degree borne out in practice, that each has a share in everything and together they are responsible for each one. Add to this the fifteen or more years of training for defense given to all young people and to many of the older workers through the Osoaviachim—sharpshooting, skiing, parachute jumping, alertness to fifth-column dangers, and personal fitness and discipline. All of this gave a feeling not only of responsibility but of readiness, even of eagerness to fight in defense of the fatherland.

So far as the Orthodox Church was concerned, the immediate effect was confirmation of the sense of obligation to share in the struggle for victory. On the day of the attack, the Head of the Church issued a pastoral letter to all the parishes saying, "The Fascist robbers have fallen upon our homeland. Despising treaties and promises, they have suddenly descended upon us, and now the blood of peaceful citizens is already wetting the land of our birth. The times of the Tartars, the German Knights, Charles of Sweden and Napoleon are renewed. The miserable successors of these enemies of Orthodox Christianity desire once again to attempt to set our people on its knees before untruth. . . . Let us remember the saintly leaders of the Russian people, such as Alexander Nevsky, Dimitry Donskoy, who laid down their lives for the people and for the homeland. . . . Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the people. With them she also bore sufferings,

and she comforted herself with their successes. She will not leave her people even now. She blesses with heavenly blessing also the present sacrificial task of all the people. . . . The Church of Christ gives its blessing to all Orthodox for the defense of the sacred borders of our homeland. May the Lord give us victory." [1]

At this moment there was no certainty as to the manner in which the Soviet Government would react to the position of the Church. The fact is that this epistle was addressed to the parishes, and offers its blessing to the Orthodox, not to the government or army by name. The separation of Church and state was respected, while the historic calling of the Church to give spiritual comfort to all the people and to pray for God's help in gaining the victory was openly expressed. Four days later, in the Bogoyavlensky Cathedral in Moscow, a great Te Deum for victory of the Russian army was sung, at which the Metropolitan Sergius gave an address, beginning by using the seafaring call, "All hands on deck." "Shame upon anyone, whoever he may be, who remains unmoved by this call, who leaves it to others to sacrifice themselves for the common good, and himself waits to see on which side it is better to stand. Especially shameful and truly sinful is this among those would-be sons, but in fact traitors of the fatherland, who are sons of the Holy Orthodox Church. . . . Deeply in error are they who think that the present enemy will not affect our holy things or touch our faith. Observation of German life tells us quite a different story. . . . Can we stand by satisfied with folded arms? Can we exchange Christ for some sort of imagined god, created by the unhealthy imaginings of men descended into beasts? . . . Let

[1] *The Truth About Religion in Russia*, Moscow, 1942; in Russian.

the storm come. We know that it will bring not only suffering but also help: it will clear the air and drive out all shortsightedness. Yes, may the oncoming storm of war serve for the healing of our spiritual atmosphere, may it carry off with it all self-made miasma: indifference to the welfare of the fatherland, double-dealing, service of personal advantage, and so on. We already see some signs of such healing. Is it not joyful, for instance, to see that with the first claps of thunder we gather together in such great numbers in our church and that the beginning of our nation-wide sacrificial task for the defense of the homeland we consecrate with divine service in the church?" [2]

It is not difficult to detect in these words the implication that there were some people, in the Church or out of it, who were hesitant, perhaps somewhat beguiled by the "crusade." Indeed, it would have been surprising if there had not been such, when we consider the experience of relations between Church and the Soviet state. It is possible that the Metropolitan took the occasion also to exercise his office as guardian of the soul of the whole Russian people to point his finger also at those outside the Church who showed signs of faltering. But chiefly we note his referring twice to shortsightedness, and to the signs of healing of the spiritual atmosphere. Undoubtedly he is referring to those who have neglected eternal welfare for the short-term welfare of personal satisfaction in this life, who have neglected religion and the true end of man. He rejoices because, in all probability, he knew that the gathering together of a multitude in Moscow was but the localized expression of the return to religion in all parts of the country.

Within a short time the position of the Church became

[2] *Ibid.*

defined as a useful and loyal element in society. It was not only permitted to hold services; its task was facilitated by the opening of additional churches and by other arrangements enabling its message to be brought to the broad public. This may have been partly a precautionary measure, having in mind the people whose loyalty was not ensured, and partly an integration of the Church into the government's all-over plan for building up national unity and the will to resist. The important thing was that the loyalty of the Church, oft-reiterated since the declaration of Patriarch Tikhon, was fully recognized, with the result that the Church was given a place in the ranks of organizations and institutions working for victory. Yet this was done without altering the constitutional relationships of Church and state. The Church refrained from ostentatiousness, and, during the early months of the war, the government merely allowed the broadening out of the Church, chiefly the opening of new premises, in accordance with the provisions of law granting the right to groups of "twenties" to register as congregations and apply for the use of church buildings. The restraint as well as the loyalty and deep spiritual purpose of the Church is seen in the following Prayer to be used at the liturgy in the Russian Orthodox Churches during the war.

O Lord God, give us strength; O God of our salvation, O God, the only worker of miracles, look with mercy and generosity on Thy humble servants, and in Thy lovingkindness hear and have mercy upon us; for our foes are gathered against us, and seek to destroy us, to tear down our holy places. Help us, O God our Salvation, and deliver us for the honor of Thy name, and apply to us the words spoken by Moses to the children of Israel: Arise, stand and behold the salvation which

comes from the Lord, for the Lord fighteth for us. Yea, O Lord God, our Saviour, our strength and hope and our defender, remember not the transgressions and sins of Thy people, and turn not from us in Thine anger, but in Thy mercy and generosity visit Thy humble servants who incline before Thy goodness. Be Thou our strength and stay, and give victory to our defenders for Thy name's sake. And forgive the sins of those who may lay down their lives on the field of battle; and in the day of Thy righteous judgment grant them crowns eternal. For Thou art our defense and victory and the salvation of those who trust in Thee. And to Thee we raise our praise, to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, now and forever and for ages of ages. Amen.[3]

The same spirit is found in the specially prepared Te Deum to be sung in the Orthodox churches throughout the Patriotic War,[4] as well as in the writings and other communications of the Patriarchate at this time. The outstanding motive is spiritual; subsequently, as the Church was called upon to assume broader tasks, we shall find that worldly concerns have also been added.

It was not until the 3rd of July, ten days after the attack, that Stalin made his first radio appeal to the people. It was an appeal of deep feeling, beginning with the words, "Comrades! Citizens! Brothers and sisters! Men of our army and navy! I am addressing you, my friends!" These are not the words of a despot. In fact the tone of the whole speech was simply that of a Russian citizen sounding the alarm on the marketplace.

A grave danger hangs over our country. . . . History shows that there are no invincible armies and never have been. Napo-

[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.*

leon's army was considered invincible but it was beaten successively by Russian, English and German armies. . . . The enemy is cruel and implacable. He is out to seize our lands, watered with our sweat; to seize our grain and oil secured by our labor. He is out to restore the rule of landlords, to restore tsarism, to destroy national culture and the national state existence of the Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Letts, Estonians, Uzbeks, Tatars, Moldavians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidjanians, and the other free peoples of the Soviet Union, to Germanize them, to convert them into the slaves of German princes and barons. Thus the issue is one of life or death for the Soviet State, for the peoples of the U.S.S.R.; the issue is whether the peoples of the Soviet Union shall remain free or fall into slavery. . . . Lenin, the great founder of our state, used to say that the chief virtue of the Bolshevik must be courage, valor, fearlessness in struggle, readiness to fight, together with the people, against the enemies of our country. This splendid virtue of the Bolshevik must become the virtue of the millions of the Red Army, of the Red Navy, of all the peoples of the Soviet Union. . . . This war with fascist Germany cannot be considered an ordinary war. It is not only a war between two armies, it is also a great war of the entire Soviet people against the German fascist forces. . . . The aim of this national war in defense of our country against the fascist oppressors is not only elimination of the danger hanging over our country, but also aid to all European peoples groaning under the yoke of German fascism. In this war of liberation we shall not be alone. In this great war we shall have trusty allies in the persons of the peoples of Europe and America, including among them the German people who are enslaved by the Hitlerite overlords. . . . Forward, to our victory.[5]

While happy at having loyal allies, Stalin and the Russian

[5] Stalin: *The War of National Liberation,* International Publishers.

people knew that the war was essentially their war, their life or death. The appeal is direct to the Russian people, and not to the proletariat of the world. It reflects the continuance of the policy of building socialism first in one country, for the sake of the citizens of that country. Stalin made no reference to classes, but spoke of people, both when dealing with the homeland and with regard to allies abroad, including Germany. This marks a tremendous change from the days of the Revolution, and even from the days of Munich. The abolition of classes in the U.S.S.R. already affects the attitude of the Soviet state toward other states and peoples.

From the standpoint of developments in the Soviet Union, however, the significance lies in the fact that the state on this occasion had no difficulty in keeping step with both people and Church. It was different in 1919, and even during the first Finnish war, when the people grumbled at what they considered an unnecessary adventure. One of the most potent factors in reconciling the attitudes of the people with those of the state was probably the occupation of the territories to the west and along the Baltic coast, for this action represented the historic and even the elemental striving of the Russian people; it united the Party's purpose of liberating the working masses from capitalistic oppression with the Russian people's national aspirations, dating from the days of Alexander Nevsky and from the struggles of Peter the Great. The people and the state achieved harmony in international affairs, and this in an area where the Church was equally concerned, for the Patriarchate had never surrendered its claim to jurisdiction over the Orthodox fold in these areas. The outbreak of war thus brought into a single stream the currents whose headwaters lay in

these three major elements in Russian life, and from this date there has been a sense of mutuality and reciprocal interest that has made Soviet Russia a mighty unified force.

Strangely enough, the Party's devotion to scientific method in ascertaining truth can be considered primarily responsible for this result. One of the penchants of Communist theory is the idea that history has been badly told because interpreted in light of the class character of the historians or of the society in which they dwelt. During the early years of the Revolution, Soviet historians, in trying to correct this error, equally misinterpreted the past, looking at things from the under side, so to speak. By the middle thirties, however, classes in the U.S.S.R. had been abolished, according to Stalin, and, with the achievement of a single class-less society, the way was paved for approaching the study of history in a scientific, unbiased manner, taking the facts as they were discovered, interpreting them when necessary in terms of the class society of the period, but no longer failing to give credit to even the erstwhile class enemy if the facts showed that he had served the ultimate welfare of the people. The monks of the Kiev monasteries in the pre-Tartar period were given credit for bringing culture as well as Christian worship to Russia. Demyan Byedny was upbraided for portraying Vladimir's going to communion as a bacchanalian feast. In the two-volume "Sourcebook of History" of the U.S.S.R.,[6] approved by the All-Union Committee on higher education of the Soviet of People's Commissars, as a textbook for the historical faculties of universities and pedagogical institutes, large sections are devoted to the positive role played by religious leaders and institutions throughout Russian history. There is also criticism, where the Church

[6] Published in Moscow 1938.

befriended the rich and powerful at the expense of the poor and underprivileged, but the Church and the religious are no longer condemned for being the Church and religious. Another interesting example of the way in which religion is embraced within the range of Russian cultural history is found in a splendidly illustrated book entitled "Moscow," published by the Central Committee of the All-Union Lenin Communist Youth Association (Comsomol) publishing house of Children's Literature. Here you find full-page or other illustrations such as these: "The Many-domed Church of St. Basil on the Red Square, Showing in the Foreground a Priest with the Eight-pointed Cross Giving the Blessing to a Host of Worshippers," "The Troitsky-Sergeivsky Monastery Heroically Repulsing a Polish Attack" (1609), "The Peasants near Moscow Greeting the Tsar Alexei Michailovitch Returning from a Pilgrimage and Asking to Abolish the Tax on Salt" (seventeenth century), and a reproduction, with heading in the traditional red, of a page from the Gospels, first printed in 1564, in connection with which the text on the opposite page reads: "At the head of the printing establishment was placed Ivan Fedoroff, a deacon in one of the churches of the Kremlin." These are not isolated examples; they are typical of the way in which the Soviet government, when rid of the fear of the class enemy within the borders of the Union, sought to enrich the life of citizens with a sense of having deep roots in the past. Having done so, when the external enemy attacked, the people were prepared to defend not only themselves and their personal belongings but the country which had given them such a rich heritage, the "holy places" as well as the factories and machine-tractor stations. In fact, it was this profound consciousness of unity with the past as

well as the present and future that made it possible for them to even blow up the magnificent hydro-electric installations on the Dneiper and other modern plants, for they knew that they had within them the dynamic quality of Russia's history with which to rebuild whatever might be destroyed.

Yet there was a serious fault in this education and its result, for it tended to isolate the people of Russia, to make them so conscious of their own strength as to fail to appreciate the real nature of their relationships with other peoples. The slogans "to overtake and outstrip America," "the most democratic constitution in the world," and the wartime citation, "the first to stop Hitler," may not have gone to the heads of the Russian people, but it has created a feeling of independence and superiority which would certainly be ominous were it not for the saving grace of the international objectives of the Party. Here is a paradox. The people save the Revolution in Russia by obliging the Party to go nationalist, in order to achieve common language, spirit and purpose with the people; the Party spares the people, and perhaps the Church, from the "splendid isolation" which has always been characteristic of Russia, by instilling in them a sense of responsibility for a world revolution. The slogan, "Workers of the world, unite," printed on the title page of every book, and the international kopeck paid by members of the Comsomol, together with all the other ways in which the citizens were made aware of the common destiny of the workers of all the world have tempered Russian nationalism; the nostalgia of every Russian for the steppes, forests, rivers and production plants of the Russian land has moderated the passion for world revolution.

Perhaps this explains in part the dissolution of the Comintern. The Communist Party in Russia consists now of quite a different body of members from those in the Party in 1919, when the Third International was formed. The change was heralded by the adoption in the 1936 Constitution of Article 126, which relates the Party to the public organizations of the country—trade unions, cooperative associations, youth organizations, sport and defense organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies. "The most active and politically most conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state." Actually, at that time the Party remained as before, and even tightened up on membership, because of the conditions leading to the purge of 1937. But during the war the change has become a fact, membership rising from about 1,700,000 to probably in the vicinity of 4,000,000. From the ranks of the Comsomol alone 1,379,766 young men and women have entered the Party since the 22nd of June, 1941.[7] It is reported that 5,351,247 young people entered the Comsomol during the same period. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union now consists of men and women embodying the tempered nationalism and moderated internationalism which we have just described. The Party has begun to approach its avowed characteristic of being essentially a part of and not merely attached to the working people of the Union.

This change is reflected in the fact that the new Soviet

[7] "Izvestia," October 28, 1943.

organ of international politics, the fortnightly "War and the Working Class," is published by the trade-union newspaper, "Trud," rather than by one of the Party's own publishing institutions. The same idea may be found embedded in many other words and actions of the Soviet government since the fateful day in June, 1941—Stalin's reference, in his first war radio speech, to the German people, and reiteration of the same motive in connection with both the German and the Polish committees in Moscow; the popular and not the class idea which the Russians accepted in both the Moscow and the Teheran conferences; the reception of the three leading hierarchs of the Russian Church by Stalin and Molotoff, and the welcoming of a visit by an official delegation from the Church of England. It would appear that the Soviet state is prepared to work on the assumption that class differences have been modified even in capitalist countries, so that the whole body politic of the Soviet Union—state, people and Church—now united, may deal with other countries as if they were similarly united within themselves. In any case, if the other countries proceed on the same assumption and endeavor to realize its implications, they will be in the best position to meet the Soviet Union with common language and purpose in dealing with the affairs of the post-war world.

The visit of the Archbishop of York and his two chaplains to Moscow in October and November, 1943, draws our attention to the present state of the Church and to its possible international relationships. We have presented elsewhere (p. 186) the considered views of the present head of the Orthodox Russian Church on the matter of achieving sacramental union with non-Orthodox churches. This matter was not on the agenda for discussion during

the visit of the Anglican delegation, but after its departure Metropolitan Nicholas of Kiev issued a statement published in the Soviet War News (London),[8] in which he recounted the course of friendly relationships from the days of Birkbeck (p. 4), noting especially the visit to Russia of four bishops of the Church of England shortly before the First World War, and stated:

For a number of years before the war of 1914–18 a committee for the rapprochement of the Church of England and the Russian Orthodox Church was working at St. Petersburg, studying the faiths and forms of service. During the last years of its existence the committee was headed by Archbishop Sergei of Finland, now Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia. The war, and later difficulties in maintaining connections with the Church of England, caused the committee to leave its work unfinished. The present war against the evil forces of Hitlerism has shown the two Churches' complete community of attitude to the brutal common foe. This community of feeling unites our Churches in sacred wrath. We have a common belief in the ultimate triumph of light and truth over the darkness and abomination of Nazi banditry. Metropolitan Sergei's message to his flock and the Archbishop of Canterbury's message to the Church of England are very similar in content and purposefulness. The exchange of messages between the heads of our Churches has raised to greater heights the friendly relation between our two Churches. . . . The proposed return visit to England by a delegation of the Russian Orthodox Church will serve to bring the two Churches still closer together.

It is of great significance for the furtherance of these relations between the Church of Russia and the Church of England, as well as with other churches, that the Soviet

[8] "Orthodox Church Bulletin," No. 20, 1943, London.

Government has permitted the elevation of Sergius to the office and title of Patriarch of Moscow and of All-Russia. Having been acting Head of the Church since 1926, when he became Vice Locum Tenens to Metropolitan Peter Krutitzky, then in exile in Siberia, and who died there on August 26th, 1936, and having been accorded the title of "The Guardian of the Patriarchal Throne, His Beatitude Sergius, Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna," on December 27, 1936, he had long been the only candidate for the high office of Patriarch. We have noted that one of his first acts in 1926 was to request the government to permit the calling of a Council to elect a Patriarch, but this request was not granted until 1943, for reasons which the reader will have found in this volume. On September 5, 1943, after Stalin and Molotoff had received Sergius and Nicholas in audience, announcement was made that the election would take place; on the 8th the meeting was held, and on the 12th the enthronement. It should be noted as a matter of record that this was not a Great Council (Sobor) of bishops, priests and laity, as proposed by the Church Constitution adopted by the Sobor of 1917, as the proper body for carrying through the procedure of electing a Patriarch, and not even a full Council (Sobor) of all the Metropolitans, Archbishops and Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church. It was an assembly of those who could come together under wartime conditions, and the vote was supplemented by a referendum by telegram to those hierarchs who were unable to attend, among them the Metropolitan-Exarch Benjamin in New York. The formula was to "invest" Metropolitan Sergius with the title of Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia. It is possible that the legalistic may question the

procedure, but the enthronement of Patriarch Sergius has been greeted with joy by the faithful in Russia, by the Russian Orthodox in America, England and elsewhere, and recognized officially by the other Patriarchs of the Eastern Orthodox Church in Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem.

Certainly no one could be more worthy of this high office. After receiving the thorough theological training provided by the Academy in St. Petersburg, he went in 1890 to serve in the Orthodox Mission in Japan, passing through the United States on his journey to this post. He returned to Moscow in 1893 to become an instructor in the St. Petersburg Theological Academy. The following year he was appointed Rector of the Embassy Church in Athens. In 1897 he returned to Japan for two years, when he was recalled to become Inspector of the Academy, two years later being consecrated bishop and made Rector of this renowned institution. In 1901 he was made Bishop of Yamburg, Suffragan to the diocesan bishop of St. Petersburg. It was during this period that he took part in the discussions on church reform mentioned in Chapter X. In 1905 he was translated to the important post of Archbishop of Finland, and while holding this office, was made member of the Holy Synod. He took part in the Great Council of 1917–18, and, after the Revolution, was made, first, Archbishop of Vladimir and then of Nijni-Novgorod. It was while holding this office that he was called to the arduous task of securing the re-registration and effecting the reorganization of the Russian Church. At first put under arrest, he was soon released and permitted to come to Moscow, partly as a result of the support of this move by the workers of the city of Nijni-Novgorod. His talents as

organizer are matched by his profoundly spiritual nature, by his good humor, and by his erudition. The writer was privileged to go through his dissertation on "The Orthodox Teaching of Salvation," presented for receiving the degree of Master of Theological Science, and was impressed by its scholarly quality and its comprehension of the fundamental spiritual values which the Orthodox tradition holds on this basic doctrine. No one was better fitted than Patriarch Sergius to play the difficult role of head of the Orthodox Church in Russia during the tempestuous years of the Revolution.

With the new Patriarch there will function a new Holy Synod, which conforms to the Church Constitution. This is not a restoration of the Holy Synod set up by Peter the Great to function as head of the Church in place of a Patriarch. Neither is it a renewal of the Holy Synod which Metropolitan Sergius established as a purely advisory body at the time of registering the Patriarchal Church in 1927, and which was given up in 1935 in favor of calling together in council from time to time the bishops from the several dioceses. The present Holy Synod occupies rather the place of constitutional representation of the Church at large. The Council of Bishops, temporarily functioning on behalf of a full Great Council, elects three bishops to the Holy Synod, who, with the Patriarch, select three additional members, making six in all. The present three permanent members are the Metropolitans of Leningrad and Kiev and the Archbishop of Gorki. The Metropolitan Alexis of Leningrad is the ranking member, and would be the Locum Tenens in case of death of the Patriarch Sergius; but at present the Metropolitan Nicholas of Kiev is playing a much more prominent role in the public relations of the

Church. This is partly because of his appointment by the government to be member of the Commission on Atrocities committed by the Nazi armies, and partly because he fell into this role while substituting for Sergius in the affairs of the Moscow diocese during the period when Sergius was in Ulyanovsk, having been evacuated by the government when Moscow was in danger.

The authorities are reported to have set up a special office of liaison between state and Church. The functions of this office are not clear. It may be simply the appointment of the new official Karpoff, to the position held formerly by Mr. Smidovitch as head of the Commission on Religious Affairs attached to the Soviet of People's Commissars. This Commission had charge of the proper carrying out of the laws on religion, especially the law of April 8, 1929, of registration of congregations and of receiving and handling appeals against judgments by local bodies which the congregations have considered to be not in accordance with the laws.

A further development of great importance is the announcement of the Patriarchate's intention to open a higher theological institute and several seminaries, and to renew publication of the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, which has not appeared since 1935. There has always been provision in the law for the establishment and maintenance of schools where theological subjects (no others) might be taught to adults, and it is likely that a limited number of students will apply for such education as soon as the war is over. It is not probable that these seminaries will be able to meet the demands of all the parishes, of which the number seems to be increasing, and others will need to be trained privately, as has been the case throughout the Rev-

olutionary period. Indeed there may be a considerable shortage of priests. No one knows how many of the fifty thousand or so ordained priests at the time of the Revolution have died at home or in exile, have voluntarily, or under pressure, foresworn their profession, how many are still in exile, or how many new men have entered the divine ministry. It is reported that each of the parishes existing at the outbreak of war had at least one priest, but this must be wholly inadequate for the great number of worshippers now attending the services and requesting special offices to be read for men in the service or for the departed. The Church will have also the task of manning the parishes which are now being opened under the more liberal regime, for the significance of recent developments lies not merely, and even not so greatly, in the regularization of the official apparatus of the Church, as in the more friendly atmosphere created by the stupendous event of Stalin giving audience to the Head of the Church. People who have been hiding their religious feelings now feel free to express them publicly, and groups of such people, in places where the churches have all been closed, or in places where the church is distant or full to overflowing, come together in "twenties" to register as new congregations and to apply for the use of church buildings.

Another important problem which will face the church, and is already upon them, is that of rebuilding or replacing church buildings destroyed by military operations of the enemy. Since all church properties belong to the state, it is a question as to whether restoration will be undertaken by the state, perhaps on the budget for education and culture, whether the religious will be supposed to pay for such construction themselves and let the state hold the title, or

whether the question will remain open until the direction of state and public mood on religion can be more clearly ascertained.[9] The fundamental Marxist position must be remembered, and it will be recalled that as late as in the spring of 1943 Kalinin made the statement that: "We believe that religion is a misguiding institution and struggle against it by education. But since religion still grips considerable sections of the population and some people are deeply religious, we cannot combat it by ridicule." The existence of religiousness in the people and their demand for places of worship will be the dominant factor in determining the answers to the questions regarding church buildings and priests.

It is this which will also determine the further development of relations between Church and state. There are those who maintain that the Orthodox Church is in the way of becoming again a state church, in light of the events of the war period. There are two reasons why this would seem to be a false assumption. In the first place, the Soviet government has given due recognition to other religious bodies as well. Thus, from October 15th to 19th, 1943, there assembled in Tashkent a congress of Moslem clergy and believers, which elected the eighty-year-old Babakhan Abdumadjiktkhanoff, an Uzbek, as President Mufti of the Moslem administration of Mid-Asia and Kazakstan, with center in the city of Tashkent.[10] The Central Bureau of the Evangelical and Baptist Union in the U.S.S.R. has let it be known that "the Government is 'doing everything possible to help believers,' " according to Dr. J. H. Rushbrooke, President of

[9] An interesting point is that all church edifices had to be insured, the faithful paying the annual premium, but the title to property rested in the state. Who will get the insurance benefit, and how will it be used?

[10] "Izvestia," October 27, 1943.

the Baptist World Alliance.[11] Dr. Rushbrooke is sceptical about the figure of 4,000,000 Baptists reported in the U.S.S.R. and also regarding the relative position which they hold as compared with the position of the Orthodox Church. It is likely that his position is justified, and it can be explained by assuming that the government would give the greater favor to the ecclesiastical body which has the greater real or potential influence in the country in war time. The second reason for rejecting the idea of a state church is that the Orthodox Church itself, under its present leadership, sees too clearly the distinction between its God-given and God-directed purpose and the materialistic albeit humanitarian character of the Soviet state to willingly accept any formal state-church or established church position. It desires to be, and feels itself to be the Church of the Russian people, not the Church of the Soviet State.

[11] Rushbrooke: *Baptists in the U.S.S.R.*

CHAPTER X

A Christian Basis for Cooperation with Russia

WHEN the question is asked, "Can Christians cooperate with the Soviets?" the first answer may well be that many millions of Christians are now already working with the Soviets. These are the millions of Russian Christians—Orthodox or Evangelical—who till the soil, mind the machines, heal the sick, celebrate the sacraments, and sit in collective farm or factory soviets all over the country and fight in the ranks of the Red Army. These Christians are a part of the Soviet people. Surely Christians in the West can cooperate with these people, and learn from them how to bring about happy working relations between the U.S.S.R. and other countries in all manner of good things. By learning from them we may hasten understanding and build a firmer foundation for working together. They too should learn from us, in order that understanding may become mutual and real. It is to be hoped that this two-way passage will soon be open for exchange of spiritual and theological goods, as well as the instruments of science, war and of politics.

The present inhabitants of the U.S.S.R. are of a relatively low average age, yet they are rooted in intellectual, social and spiritual traditions which stem from the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and some of the brilliant young men and women of yesterday are the wise

counselors of today. Ideas crystallized then are principles now. The policies of the Politbureau and Supreme Soviet throughout the troubled decade 1932–42 follow exceedingly close to the socialist principles classically formulated by Marx, Engels and Lenin, and confirmed at Party conferences held in London, Prague, Stockholm, and elsewhere abroad between 1898 and 1917. The makers of Soviet policy for today and tomorrow draw heavily on the thinking and foundations of this earlier epoch. Stalin took part in some of these meetings and constantly defers to basic principles enunciated by Lenin and his colleagues during that period. Every Soviet boy and girl learns in his first book at school the phrase, "Lenin is dead but his work lives." It is not without significance that Stalin's collected speeches and writings are published under the title, "Problems of Leninism."

Similarly the men who now lead in Church life are those who shared in the spiritual striving and revival of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Younger men in both Church and state carry current responsibilities, but in matters of policy they lean heavily on their elders, and especially on the great thinkers, of whom several are still alive.

It is probable that the Russian Church could not have adapted itself to Soviet conditions if earnest Christian thinkers had not been seeking solutions to Russia's problems contemporaneously with the searchings of agnostics like Plekhanoff and Lenin. Many of the Christians went through the same school of thought and experience as the agnostics. All were deeply influenced by Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche, and they all were concerned with the same problem—how to bridge the gap between the simple peasant

folk and the educated classes, that all might move forward to a new order of life, and the definition of that new life. Some kept strictly to the Marxist path. Others found Marx stimulating but not the answer. The Christian thinkers generally, of whom we write, discovered greater evidence of truth and a surer path to the good life in the teachings of the Church on God, on man, and on human society, while accepting much of the dialectic method of Marxist philosophy.

At the turn of the century Pobiedonostseff, as Oberprocuror, was trying to convince the clergy that the essence of Orthodoxy was something quite apart from thinking and theology, that Orthodoxy lay in simple popular faith: the masses are saved without any theology. His regime tended to lower the style of Church life, to separate the Church from culture and thought, just at the time when the intelligentsia was beginning to return to the Church. The Holy Synod under Pobiedonostseff became spiritually and culturally sterile, yet A. Kireief characterized the intelligentsia in these words: "With fear and shame we go to report that in our laziness, our apathy, we have given over our faith to the Synod, and we ourselves sit with folded hands."

This very confession indicated the beginning of a change. Religious need was again being felt in Russian society, and not merely in terms of a world view, a philosophy, but as a question of life. This period in Russian life has been splendidly portrayed by Professor George Florovsky, in his work on the development of Russian theology.[1] He tells of the influence of Tolstoy, who strangely combined gospel moralism with the religious simplification and "back to the

[1] *Pooti Ruskavo Bogoslovia,* Y.M.C.A. Press, Paris, 1937; in Russian.

peasant" motif of his great enemy, Pobiedonostseff. In Solovieff a new religious universalism appears, uniting West and East, and, more than that, a revelation of the unreasonableness of sharply distinguishing between the divine and the human in the Church. The Church was brought back to the land of the living, and represented, as itself in process of developing and becoming a living organism, the living body of Christ.

Into this tendency toward universalism, coupled with intense interest in the common people, came the tonic of Marxism, which added a philosophy to the over-simplified moralism of Tolstoy. Marxism caused no fears to the Christian thinkers of that day; rather it opened the doors for them to return to Kant, Hegel and religious idealism. Florovsky therefore quotes Fedotoff as saying that "Marxism influenced the religious searchings of the time in the direction of Orthodoxy. Out of Marxism came Bulgakoff, Berdyaeff, Frank, Struve." We have already quoted Lenin in regard to Bulgakoff's idealism.[2] Plekhanoff, Lenin, Bulgakoff, Merejkovsky were all working on the same materials; Plekhanoff and Lenin moved in the direction of materialism and class conflict; the other group moved toward religious idealism. Their own Russian, even Byzantine, nature was strong within them, creating a nostalgia for the elements of their traditional faith. "Not long ago someone told me secretly that soon Christ would come again," wrote Merejkovsky.

In a particularly significant sentence Florovsky states that

the significance of the turn of the century lies in the fact that

[2] p. 57.

during this period there was a turning from "religious thought" to "religious life.". . . It was not the first time of meeting between the Church and the world of culture, not even in Russia. But it was a new kind of meeting, a meeting of the intelligentsia with the Church after the stormy period of nihilism.

Perhaps some such meeting will come to the intelligentsia of the West now that the war has burnt some of the dross out of the cynical liberalism of the Versailles period. In Russia things are always intense and extreme; their nihilism drove clear through, whereas our cynicism only hacked at the edges. When the twentieth century arrived in Russia, her thinkers were considering the futility of nihilism. Lenin seized upon the ideas of the "soviets," the overthrow of power, the path of the communist revolution. The religious intelligentsia naturally sought a Christian way. Both sought real change.

Of extraordinary value in studying this period are the records of the Religious Philosophical Meetings,[3] which brought together a drawing-room full of the most outstanding religious thinkers of the time—some of whom are now well known in the West—Merejkovsky, Berdyaeff, Kartasheff. Twenty-two meetings were held, and the leader or president was none other than Bishop Sergius (Ivan Stargorodsky), then Rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, now Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia. It was a peculiar providence that set him at the head of the Russian Church under the Soviets; certainly his participation in the intellectual and spiritual searchings of thirty years before, involving especially a study of Marxist

[3] Zapiski Religiozno-Philosofskich Sobranii, St. Petersburg, 1903; in Russian.

thought, prepared him in a very special way for this task. As one must study Lenin's earlier writings to understand Stalin's policies, so we do well to refer to these meetings under the presidency of Bishop Sergius, in 1901–3, in order to discover some of the foundation stones of Patriarchal policy, and, indeed, the principles on which Christians and agnostics have found it possible to work together in the Soviet state.

Merejkovsky characterized the meetings thus: "It was as if the walls of the room would part, opening up an unending distance, and this little meeting became the porch of a Universal Council. Speeches were more like prayers and prophecies. A fiery atmosphere was born, in which everything seemed possible." Ternavtseff said:

> We stand at the edge of history. . . . It is time for the whole of Christianity to show not only by word and teaching, but in action, that in the Church there is not only the beyond-the-grave ideal. It is time to reveal the hidden truth in Christianity about the world, the teaching and command of the Christian state, the religious calling of secular power, the salvation of society in Christ—of this it is time to bear witness. . . . And one may consider already as a fact that to truly preach in Russia means to preach to the whole world.

The subjects discussed were: freedom of conscience, Gogol, Church and the world; five times there were papers on marriage, also the excommunication of Tolstoy, the development of dogma, on revelation, the direction of Christian creativeness and culture, on the priesthood. In all discussions and arguments there appeared one basic and sharp question: how to make Christianity again influential in life. This is emphasized in Berdyaeff's remark that "philos-

ophy is not dreaming but action." Here was no more of the "attractive illusion of sacred custom and of pietistic comfort" (Florovsky), but an attempt to face the problems of the whole of contemporary life, and to make tradition creative, to make the "Living Body" live, as Solovieff has said.

The fact that no great change was made either in government or in the Church as a result of these discussions, and of other contemporary movements, should draw no aspersions of futility. Lenin and the Marxists were equally futile during this period. Both groups profited slightly from the reforms of the Japanese War period, but from 1908 to 1917 the government obstructed change whether in Church or society, by Christian idealists or by Marxist revolutionists. We have seen (in Chapter III) how the Church eagerly seized on the earliest opportunity, after the fall of the Tsar, to rebuild her house, and how the Marxist revolution caught this effort and completely redirected its course. We have also traced the destinies of Orthodox Church life and of Marxist communism through the twenty-five years of "construction of socialism," following the course of their dialectic interplay and development. Now, at the end of this quarter-century, we find an astonishing equilibrium in the relations between Church, state and people. The state is the unquestioned master, but both Church and people find themselves peculiarly integrated into the very life of the state. The soldiers who fight, the men and women who work, the Churches who pray and contribute funds for the war effort, the men who sit in the Kremlin, all share in a unified effort with common devotion and self-sacrifice.

The peoples, Churches and governments of Britain,

America, China and other freedom-loving countries are joined with them in this effort. But now arises the question as to whether, at the end of the war effort, and the transfer to peace-time psychology, there will not be a reverse tendency—toward disintegration, renewed antinomies and jealous conflicts between the nations, classes and ideologies which are at present so fortuitously united. There will in all likelihood be a relaxation of the unity that comes from discipline, but there need not be a diminution in the unity related to objective and purpose. After all, the war is not an end in itself; it is a means to achieving an end, and the war effort consists of many kinds of means—those of force, persuasion, inner self-discipline, definition of objects. Similarly the ends are partly immediate, partly more distant; some involve the simple act of pulling a trigger, some involve the comprehensive and intricate assembly of material, intellectual and spiritual forces which can only be begun in these days of blockade and counter-blockade. It is only reasonable to maintain that the unity related to objective and purpose must be retained for the achieving of the more distant as well as the nearer objectives, and through the use of intellectual and spiritual discipline, even after battle commands are heard no more. It is in this area of achieving more distant objectives and purposes that we desire to establish unity and cooperation between countries like the Soviet Union, Britain, China and the United States, and between the adherents of Christian and of non-Christian philosophies in those countries.

Fortunately we have some generally accepted principles on which we are united. They may not satisfy each individual, but the Atlantic Charter and the "Four Free-

doms"[4] constitute definitive objectives of a high order. They have been accepted by the Soviet Union. The Soviet people are fighting for them. In fact, the Soviet people might well say that the points in the Atlantic Charter and in the Four Freedoms really belonged to them before they were caught up by the West, for they are quite largely covered in the following Articles in the Soviet Constitution:

Article 118. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to work, that is, are guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises, and the abolition of unemployment.

Article 119. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to rest and leisure.

The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the reduction of the working day to seven hours for the overwhelming majority of the workers, the institution of annual vacations with full pay for workers and employes and the provision of a wide

[4] "The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.

"The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world.

"The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.

"The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world." (Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Seventy-seventh Congress, January 6, 1941.)

network of sanatoria, rest homes and clubs for the accommodation of the working people.

Article 120. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or loss of capacity to work.

This right is ensured by the extensive development of social insurance of workers and employees at state expense, free medical service for the working people and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the working people.

Article 121. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to education.

This right is ensured by universal, compulsory elementary education; by education, including higher education, being free of charge; by the system of state stipends for the overwhelming majority of students in the universities and colleges; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language; and by the organization in the factories, state farms, machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people.

Article 122. Women in the U.S.S.R. are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life.

The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education, and by state protection of the interests of mother and child, prematernity and maternity leave with full pay, and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

Article 123. Equality of rights of citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or, conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable by law.

Article 124. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.

Article 125. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed by law:

a) freedom of speech;
b) freedom of the press;
c) freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
d) freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

There is, of course, no complete coincidence, but there is evident similarity in objective between these paragraphs and the Four Freedoms, Atlantic Charter, Beveridge Plan, the findings of the National Resources Planning Board in the U.S.A., etc. Do we not find here some of the elements of the common ground and purpose on which we may stand unitedly with the peoples of the Soviet Union for work in peace as for battle in war? It will be but carrying forward into the period of peace the common spirit we have found in time of war.

In considering this idea, however, we must realize that there is a wide area all about this common ground; or, to put it in another way, the common ground is a far-away country for all of us; we start from different points, and proceed by different paths. Nor are we all similarly equipped with material, intellectual or spiritual accoutrement at the start. These differences ought not deflect us from our common purpose or diminish our sense of communality; yet this will happen if we do not face them clearly and frankly, in the dialectic spirit, let us say.

For one thing, some of the Freedoms in the Soviet Constitution are conditional. The freedoms of speech, press, assembly and demonstration, for instance, are granted "in order to strengthen the socialist system" (Art. 125); it is clearly implied that they may not be used "in general." Similarly, the separation of Church and state and freedom of religious worship are not inalienable or intrinsic rights, but are circumscribed by their object, which is "to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience." These are no minor details, as we have seen in our review of the position of Church and religion, and protagonists of the Soviet system ought not let enthusiasm blind their critical faculties in dealing with these matters. Neither, however, should critics throw out the baby with the bath, saying that limited freedom is no freedom at all. Do not the Soviet atheists say that religious freedom does not really exist in the West, and cannot exist, because of the excessive influence of "capital" in the Church? Russians and Westerners alike need to consider the circumstances and conditions surrounding their respective conceptions, and in so doing achieve understanding in place of misconception.

Another factor to be considered is the degree or measure

in which our ideals are expressed in common practice. There is a tendency toward exaggeration among all of us. Both friends and enemies of the Soviet Union have long confused each other by using terms like communism, socialism or capitalism, the tendency being to talk of these things as if they existed in fact as well as in idea. They exist only in part, and usually are mixed up with each other in any given situation. Soviet Russia is more socialist, and Britain and the U.S.A. are more capitalist; but neither England nor the U.S.A. is a purely capitalist nor is the U.S.S.R. a purely socialist state. As we look toward cooperation, let us see in this not a cause for confusion but another evidence that we have common ground uniting us.

This is not to say that Communism or even socialism has completely given way in the U.S.S.R. to a revived spirit of Russian nationalism, or that the experience of "socialism in one country" has simply resulted in a restored Russian empire with a more or less socialist economy. Such a view is unfair to the Russians and a delusion for peoples in the West. Revival of interest in the history and culture of Russia is a natural and logical expression of the principle of cultural autonomy for all the peoples of the Soviet Union, *including* those ethnically Russian. Since the greater part of the people are Russians, and the R.S.F.S.R. embraces the vast bulk of the territory of the U.S.S.R., and since the Russian people produced the most dominant culture, it is to their history and culture that the U.S.S.R. as a whole naturally turns in seeking its surest and soundest foundations.

Fifteen years ago a revival of Russian culture would have been dangerous, for the reason that Soviet socialist

culture was as yet insufficiently developed to offset the influence of feudo-capitalist elements in the old culture. This weakness has been overcome through education, socialist construction, and the purging of un-socialist elements out of the population and the ideology of the Soviet Union. The success of socialism has been great enough to make a return to the economics of Tsarist Russia seem undesirable to the people themselves, while the literary, artistic and cultural elements of Old Russia are prized as their birthright. Even religion is praised for its contribution to culture. The monks who converted Prince Vladimir (988) and the Saints Alexander Nevsky and Dimitry Donskoy are eulogized for their contributions to the people's destiny. It must be remembered that this change has taken place only during the period of the new constitution (since 1936). The Church has proved its loyalty; it is no enemy of the Soviet Union. If recognition of St. Alexander by the government helps to confirm this loyalty on the part of religious people, or if Peter the Great and the Imperial generals Suvoroff and Kutuzoff become heroes and examples for the youth of the Soviet Union, it is an enrichment of their culture and a stimulus to their activity in war as in peace. The government probably takes full account of the risk of a revival of religion, but knows from experience how to handle such a revival, if it should tend toward disloyalty or, regardless of loyalty, should threaten to assume a position of power in the ideology of the people in conflict with the official ideology of atheism. The government's position ought not to be called either appeasement, expediency, or strategy, but ought rather to be recognized as a practical working out of the dialectic process—welcoming or even stimulating the growth of various forces

which, by their interaction, result in a product favorable to the development of "socialism in one country."

In the realm of religion there is another zone or area in which there are things that unite as well as elements that separate. The elements provided for in the Soviet Constitution—work, leisure, education, race equality, etc.—are often considered by Christians as being elements of a Christian social order. When we emphasize these factors, we see a broad zone of agreement. But when we ascribe to the Christian social order such conceptions also as God, the Holy Spirit, sin and salvation, the Marxists object, and they begin to emphasize historical materialism, the omnipotence of science, the absolute earthliness of human life. It is here that we approach the crux of the matter, and the distinction has been neatly put in the Solovetzk document from which we have quoted (p. 89). In these higher realms of conviction and faith, correlation is nil, for the simple reason that in Communist doctrine there is no God, sin or salvation.

N. A. Berdyaeff, one of the most outstanding Russian thinkers, says that Communist teaching and Christian teaching differ on two important points; the first is the teaching on God, and the second, the teaching on man. With God ruled out, as in Marxist doctrine, there can be no teaching of man as the child of God, either in his origin, his life on earth, or his final destiny; neither can the relations between men be considered basically to be those of brothers, sons of a common Father. The Marxists, having no God, scorn this jargon, and explain that human relationships are determined by economic conditions, that scientific ordering of economic life will bring about human relationships equivalent to what Christians mean by brotherhood. If

they deny the supreme value of each child and man, reserving this estimation to the toilers and ruthlessly destroying real or assumed enemies of the toilers, it is because no man is a final value in himself, but only in the collective. Here we find the implication that the Christian doctrine of man is based on excessive selfishness, and on individualism setting itself up as a standard of value. A nice theological quarrel might develop over this point. However, we shall expand on it only by reference to a Russian Orthodox saying, long antedating the Soviets, which is to the effect that man may perish alone but can be saved only with all other men. Here is a warning against the danger of letting humanism run into individualism and ruin the Christian heritage of all through the selfishness of some. Rather let Christians live as brothers, sons of God, and consciously share the diversities of this life along with the continued spiritual satisfactions that are the birthright of the human soul in the life eternal.

Eternal life for the Russian Orthodox has definitely begun on earth. This gives the Russian people a native apocalyptic and also a messianic tendency which it is desirable to examine. They are a young people, with extraordinary vitality in mind, body and soul. Moral decadence of the preceding fifty years has given way, since the First Five Year Plan, to fresh purpose and self-discipline. In the last decade they have recovered a sense of identity with their past, and with it have strengthened their consciousness of the peculiar destiny of the Russian people. Their outstanding place in the war cannot fail to heighten this sense of destiny on the part of the common people. This is no political jingoism or fanatical crusade as led by Peter the Hermit or the followers of Islam. It is rather a deep-

lying sense of the universal and a conviction that the Russian people have a peculiar responsibility for the welfare of all mankind. Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Solovieff, Lenin, all felt this and expressed it in their writings. Even in the ancient "bylini" and post-revolutionary folklore it appears.

The Metropolitan Sergius expresses it in describing the attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church toward the non-Orthodox, in his letter to the Archimandrite Dimopoulos (p. 181). Stalin revealed the same strain when he used these words in presenting the new Constitution for ratification by the Supreme Soviet in 1936:

In a few days the Soviet Union will have a new socialist constitution, constructed on the bases of well developed socialist democratism. This will be an historical document, setting forth simply and condensed, almost in the style of notes, the facts of the triumph of socialism in the U.S.S.R., the fact of the liberation of the toilers of the U.S.S.R. from capitalist slavery, the facts of the triumph in the U.S.S.R. of a well developed, a thoroughly consistent democracy.

This will be a document witnessing to the fact that that of which millions of honest people in capitalist countries have dreamed and continue to dream has already been realized in the U.S.S.R. It will be a document witnessing to the fact that that which has been realized in the U.S.S.R. may fully be realized in other countries as well. . . .

The new constitution of the U.S.S.R. will be a moral help and a real support to all those who now carry on the struggle against fascist barbarism. Still greater significance will the new constitution have for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. If for the peoples of the capitalist countries the constitution will have the significance of a programme of action, then for the people of the U.S.S.R. it will have the significance of the consumma-

tion of their struggle, the consummation of their triumph on the front of the liberation of mankind. As a result of the traversed path of struggle and privation, it is pleasant and joyful to have our constitution, setting forth the fruits of our victory. It is pleasant and joyful to know the objectives for which our people strove, and how they achieved an historical victory of world-wide significance.

It is pleasant and joyful to know that the blood generously shed by our people was not spent in vain, that it produced these results. It spiritually arms our workers' class, our peasantry, our toiling intelligentsia. It advances and arouses the feeling of legitimate pride. It strengthens faith in our strength and mobilizes us for the new struggle to win new victories for Communism.[5]

In this quotation we get Soviet idealism in its proper perspective. The Soviet people view the Revolution of 1917 as a great step forward for mankind. The ideals of Thomas Jefferson and the slogans of the French Revolution of 1789 are considered as constituting a step forward at that historical moment in human history, but the ideals there expressed have become outmoded and superseded by the ideals of the October Revolution in Russia. As the Americans laid down the Monroe Doctrine and, at the end of the nineteenth century, avowed a manifest destiny for American democracy, so the Soviet government cherishes its achievements. As Stalin said, in the speech from which we have just quoted, "for the peoples of the capitalist countries, the constitution will have the significance of a program of action." The Soviet Union believes it has an ideal which other people will follow. The dynamic force is in the U.S.S.R., and some followers abroad will be caught

[5] Stalin: *Questions of Leninism,* Moscow, 1939.

up by it. However, the achievement by each country of ideals which its citizens set before themselves, such as the Four Freedoms, etc., will in large measure modify the action of this dynamic force.

We should not overestimate this factor, nor should we belittle it by calling it a psychological aberration. Other nations in history have become self-inflated; some have seriously attempted to impose their ideas on the world, to the sorrow of all. Insofar as the Soviet government adheres to the Marx-Lenin-Stalin philosophy of human destiny and is guided by the program and tactics long since worked out to achieve this destiny, whether exemplified in the Comintern or otherwise, the Russian people are attached to such a crusading chariot. But this is not characteristic of the Russians as a people. They are chiefly concerned about defense of frontiers and the reuniting of national groups within their borders. The Orthodox Church and the Party meet at another point, namely the support of their respective colleagues abroad. Here Pan-Orthodoxy, "Moscow the Third Rome," and Pan-Slavism approach each other and coincide with the government's aspirations. During the war, both the Church, through addresses and radio-broadcasts given by Metropolitan Nicholas of Kiev, and the government, through fostering the Pan-Slav movement in Europe and in the United States and Canada, have given notable attention to this task. Pan-Slavism was formerly a religious idea in its essence, and meant Russian defense of the other Orthodox Slavs—Bulgarians or Serbs—against the Turks. The Soviets reject this kind of Pan-Slavism, but proclaim a unity of all Slav peoples in the fight against fascism. The Russian people as a whole have been relatively cool to one as to the other, recognizing in

both a political stratagem for gaining their backing in undertakings of governmental or ecclesiastical rather than of popular purpose.

From the standpoint of our study, therefore, it seems fair to conclude that the Russian people and the Russian Church would prefer to put their light on a hilltop and let it lighten and attract all who turn to it, rather than go off on a proselyting mission. To some extent this is characteristic even of Stalin and the Supreme Soviet of all the peoples of the Union. The Party, however, is committed to an active effort aiming at world revolution. Yet we are now witnessing a transformation of the Party which may modify even its stand on this point. When the Constitution of 1936 was in preparation, the internal class conflict was at low intensity. Popular unity had greatly increased as a result of the provision of labor for every citizen in collectivized industry and agriculture, and by reason of improvement in actual living conditions. The constitution therefore incorporated the Party into the regular structure of society, rather than holding it quite apart as a special group of citizens.

The distinctiveness of Party membership thereby was defined in terms of actual leadership as well as in acceptance of Party doctrine, discipline and responsibility. In other words, the Party was nominally at least given a popular basis, representing the ontological, organic, instinctive life of the people. It is true that the purge of the next two years was an effective negation of this new status, but during the war Party membership has increased rapidly and this growth seems to have been in line with the constitutional provisions. Insofar as this is true, the mind and will of the Russian people will increasingly reveal itself in

the Party, and this may modify the nature of even the Party's outlook on world affairs.

Add to this the great social and economic changes taking place in the U.S.S.R. by reason of the war, the conversion of practically the whole of industry to the production of military supplies, and the vast destruction of both nationalized property and personal belongings, all of which will mean such a lowering of the standard of living that years will ensue before the physical benefits of the doctrine of "socialism in one state" will lift that state to a position where it will have the propulsive energy for world conquest, or great attractive power for workers enjoying the Four Freedoms in other lands.

If these freedoms become realized to any considerable extent in other states, especially those with the advantages of a higher standard of living, the workers in those countries will in fact have little to gain from Russia, and might well question the assumptions of Soviet messianism. On the contrary, in gratitude to the Russians for the aid given in the war and for the stimulation to thought and effort provided by Marxian philosophy, they might rather offer their continued assistance to the Russian people in works of healing and restoration. This would be true brotherhood.

In the momentous era before us, there will be great need for kindness, friendliness, mutual helpfulness, and we may hope that neither the Marxists nor the liberals will take intransigeant positions, but rather live and let live. After all, Christians are prone to sin, and Marxists are neither impeccable nor infallible. Each needs to be humble in approaching the other. Each can learn from the other.

There is now need for great sympathy and understand-

ing between Russia and the rest of the world. Fortunately some measures have already been taken to bring this about, although to date much more is being done to inform Westerners about Russia than to give the Soviet peoples a true understanding of life in other countries. As this becomes a mutual process, however, many prejudices, resentments and fears will vanish. There will remain certain essential and fundamental differences, particularly the respective assumptions regarding God and man. Yet the Orthodox Church in Russia has shown how even these apparently incompatible views can be reconciled in actual life. Christians and atheists have a common ground in which to work. Cooperating in this field, results will be credited, by the Marxist, to the inner dialectic of historic processes, and by Christians to the creative hand of God. The future belongs to Christians, Marxists, and many others of quite different ideas and ideologies, and it will contain elements which no one can now foretell. As Professor Florovsky has well said, "The future is not something to be sought or hoped for, but something to be created."

Index

AGATHANGEL, Metropolitan, 78, 79
Alexis, Tsar, 26, 27
All-Russian Conference of Clergy and Laymen, 47 ff.
America, 3, 5, 6, 30, 136, 137, 222, 232
Ancient Apostolic Church, 82
Andrei, Archbishop of Saratov, 30 ff.
Anglican and Eastern Churches Association, 5
Anthony, Metropolitan of Kiev, 39
Atheism, 29, 57, 58, 88, 103, 111, 115, 116, 118, 123, 126, 136, 140, 147, 148, 149, 226, 236
Atlantic Charter, 222, 225
Autocephalous Churches, 171

BAPTISTS, 10, 12, 16, 17, 112, 127, 135
Benjamin, Metropolitan of Petrograd, 75, 77, 165
Berdyaeff, 175, 218, 219, 220, 229
Beveridge Plan, the, 225
Bible, The, 12, 88
"Bloody Sunday," January, 1905, 6
Britain, 3, 4, 6, 136, 137, 221, 222
Budkiewiecz, Monsignor, 71, 73, 75, 165
Bulgakoff, 49, 57, 175, 218

CEPLIAK, Archbishop, 72
China, 222
Christian-Soviet co-operation, 215, 227
"Christomol," 17
Collective farms, 104, 105, 110, 114, 129, 130, 151, 215
Comintern, 230, 233 f., 234, 235
Communism, 87, 92, 142 f., 149, 227
Communist Party, 49, 59, 60 f., 83, 99 ff., 234
  anti-religious propaganda of, Ch. VII *passim*
Communist Youth Association, 17, 87, 116, 145
"Comsomol." *See* Communist Youth Association
Constantinople, Patriarchate of, 168, 169, 180, 181
Constitution of the U.S.S.R., 9 f., 59 f., 103, 104, 153, 164, 223, 224, 225, 226, 229, 231, 234
Cults, Commission on, 4
Culture, Russian, 12 f., 227

DIALECTIC materialism, 62, 120 ff., 136
Dialectic method, viii, 59
Dimopoulos, Archimandrite, 231
Donskoy, Dimitri, 2, 22, 228
Dostoevsky, 5, 13, 231
Dukhobors, 30

EASTERN Orthodox Church, 83, 166, 171, 180
"Economy," principle of, 183, 184, 185
Ehrenburg, Ilya, 156
Engels, 52, 55, 62, 132, 136, 152, 216
Estonia, Church in, 171
Eulogius, Metropolitan, 175, 182
Evangelicals, 10, 29, 30, 34, 112

FEUERBACH, 52
Films, 6
Five Year Plan, First, 102, 111, 114, 147, 162, 189, 230
Five Year Plan, Second, 114, 125, 144

Florovsky, 175, 217, 218, 221, 236
"Four Freedoms," the, 222 f., 225, 233, 235

Gapon, priest, 6
Georgia, Church of, 171
Godless, The, 88, 115, 137, 149
Godless, Union of Militant, 88, 115 ff., 146, 161
"God-seekers," the, 6
Graham, Stephen, 4

Haeckel, Ernst, 57
Harnack, 1
Hegel, 216, 218
Holy Synod, the, 4, 7, 32, 45, 77, 82, 217

Intelligentsia, the, 219
International relations, 215
Ivan IV, 1, 26

Jerusalem, Patriarchate of, 168
Jews, the, 10, 137
Joseph, Metropolitan, 176, 177

Kalinin, President, 64
Karlovtsi Synod, the, 76, 85, 129, 182
Kartasheff, 45, 175, 219
Khomiakoff, 174
Kiev, Metropolitans of, 168, 170
Kireief, A., 217
Krutitsky, Metropolitan Peter, 87, 94
Kutuzoff, 6, 228

Latvia, Church in, 171
Lenin, 49, 53, 54, 57, 62, 86, 99 ff., 111, 132, 136, 139, 152, 216, 218, 220, 221
Lithuania, Church in, 171
Living Church, the, 3, 19, 76, 81 ff., 97, 131, 162, 168, 175, 177, 179, 180
Lunacharsky, 57

Magnitogorsk, 17, 114, 145, 189
Marxism, 49, Ch. IV *passim*, 101, 123, 132, 135, 136, 138, 143, 144, 152, 157, 216 ff., 229, 235, 236
Materialism and idealism, 218
Merejkovsky, 218, 219, 220
Michael, Tsar, 26
Mogila, Metropolitan Peter, 29 n., 167, 168
Mohammedans, 10, 137, 230
Molokans, 30
Monasteries, 16, 36 f., 49, 51, 67, 69, 159, 178
Moscow, Patriarchate of, 169, 171, 172, 174 ff.

Nevsky, Alexander, 6, 22, 228
New Economic Policy, 12, 86, 99 ff., 111, 128 ff., 165
Nicholas, Metropolitan, 169 f.
Nietzsche, 216
Nikhon, Patriarch, 26, 27, 176
NRPB, the, 225

Old Believers, 10, 27, 29, 34
Old Catholics, 187
Orthodox Church. *See* Eastern Orthodox Church, Russian Orthodox Church, Polish Orthodox Church, etc.

Palmer, William, 4
Pan-Slavism, 223
Patriarchate, the, 7, 14, 26 ff., 32, 76, Ch. VIII *passim*
Peter the Great, 6, 7, 32 f., 228
Philaret, Patriarch, 22, 26
Philip, Patriarch, 26
Plekhanoff, 132, 216, 218
Pobiedonostseff, Oberprocuror, 217, 218
Poland, 152, 166
  invasion of Russia by, 26, 28, 167
  Orthodox Church of, 167

Policy makers of today in Russia, 216
Propaganda, anti-religious, 101 ff., 110, Ch. VII
Publications,
anti-religious, 50, 88, 117, 161
religious, 11, 88, 161
Pustin, Optin, 5

Rasputin, 4
Refugees, Russian, 7, 172
Religion in Russia, Ch. III
freedom of, 131, 226
legal position of, Ch. II
prohibition of religious propaganda, 9, 10
under the Soviet regime, 7 ff., Ch. II, Ch. V, Ch. VI
under the Tsars, 1, 6, 26, 32, 33, 119, 176
Western ignorance of, 4, 7, 8
Renovated Church, the, 82, 86, 94, 160. *See also* Living Church, the
Revolution, the Russian, 6, 40, 50, 52, 58, 81, 127, 232
Roman Catholic Church, the, 3, 10, 71, 136, 161, 165, 167, 186, 187
Russian Orthodox Church, 1 ff., 136, 161
adaptation to Soviet conditions, Ch. V
and reunion, 161, 181
liturgy of, 17, 41, 44
registers of, 34
relations of, with other churches, Ch. VIII
sacraments of, 42, 44, 66, 184, 186, 215
separation from State, 27, 29, 30, 45 ff., 162, 163, 164, 227
Russian people, qualities of the, 215 f.

St. Alban and St. Sergius, Fellowship of, 5
Schools, separation from Church, 10, 11, 44, 88
Schopenhauer, 52
Sergius, Patriarch, 2, 4, 21, 82, 87, 94, 96, 106, 111, 155, 157, 163, 165, 173, 176, 177, 180, 219, 220, 231
Sobor, the, 45, 48, 50, 77
of the Living Church, 80 f.
Socialism, 48 f., 111, 114, 128, 129, 130, 136, 141, 143, 221, 227, 228, 235
Social order, the, 228 ff.
Societies, religious, 9, 102–104, 127, 159
"Solovetsk document," 89, 229
Solovieff, 174, 217, 218, 220, 231
Sorsk, Nil of, 25 f.
Soviet Government, its attitude to the Church, 3 f., Ch. V, Ch. VI, Ch. VII
Spencer, Herbert, 52, 132
Stakhanoff Movement, 144, 156
Stalin, 2, 38, 52, 87, 99, 101, 110, 138, 146, 152, 156, 159, 231, 232, 234
Stanley, Dean, 4
Stargorodsky, Ivan, 219
Struve, 218
Student Christian Movement, 9, 17, 135
Sunday Schools, 10, 103
Suvoroff, 6, 228

Theological Academies, 13 ff., 38, 39, 51, 118
Tikhon, Patriarch, 3, 5, 30, 46, 64 ff., 75, 76, 78, 79, 83, 84
Tolstoy, 5, 13, 218, 220, 231
Trotsky, 76, 87, 99, 100
Truth About Religion in Russia, The, 22, 30, 39, 140
Turgenev, 5

Ukraine, 83, 127, 162, 166 ff.
Orthodox Church of the, 162, 168, 170
Uniats, 166, 167, 171

Vitalij, Metropolitan, 155, 157
Volotzk, Joseph of, 24 ff.
Vvedensky, Archpriest, 77 ff., 97

War with Germany, 2 f., 22 ff., 157, 221 f., 235
White Russia, 96, 166, 168 f.
Workers' Anti-religious University, 100 ff., 117 ff., 126 ff.

Yaroslavsky, Emil, 115, 148

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